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i 
Course of Argument 
This thesis explores the issues regarding which regime style would be appropriate for 
China to adopt in the regulation of takeover defences, given that there are two distinct 
takeover regulatory systems in the world – that of the UK, and that of the US. China 
has already adopted a UK-style shareholder-friendly regulatory system. This thesis 
considers the reasons why China has chosen a shareholder-friendly takeover 
regulatory system rather than a US-style director-friendly regulatory system. In 
addition, combining analysis of the character of China’s market and its legal 
framework, it discusses whether the current regulatory system is appropriate for 
China or not. Furthermore, it considers specific features of individual takeover 
defensive tactics and the possibility of their use being legitimised in China. 
This thesis is relevant because of the likelihood of the freeing up of the Chinese 
takeover market in the future; as this happens, there will be more and more takeover 
activity, taking place in China’s market. Thus it is important to provide adequate 
legislation for market players. Though China adopted the UK’s shareholder regulatory 
system many years ago, when it first regulated its takeover market, the shareholding 
structure in China is totally different to the UK’s, and so it is important to discuss 
whether this regulatory system is still relevant for China or whether there should be a 
change to a regulatory system more like that of the US. As China issued the 
Administrative Measures of Preferred Shares Experimental Units in 2014, and the 
new leadership in China has continued China’s economic reform over recent years, it 
 
ii 
could be said that China’s listed companies have become more attractive to investors 
and there could be more hostile raiders entering the market. Hence there is a need to 
consider whether China’s delegation of decision-making powers to the shareholders 
regarding defence against hostile raiders is appropriate. It is also important to 
establish which takeover defence measures might appropriately be legalised and 
which would be inappropriate for China.  
Chapter 1 introduces background information about the trend of mergers and 
acquisitions and hostile takeovers, China’s state-owned enterprises and briefly 
consider takeover defensive measures. Following this, it discusses shareholding 
structures, and problems in China’s market in comparison with the UK and US.  
Chapter 2 outlines both the UK’s and US’s distinctive takeover regulatory systems 
and evaluates their pros and cons, as well as the reasons why certain regulatory 
systems are suitable for each market. 
Chapter 3 explores the differences between China’s ownership structure, market, and 
legal framework, and those of the UK and US. It also summarises the weaknesses of 
the Chinese system(s) in seeking to transplant a western-style set of takeover 
regulations into China’s market. Primarily, these are that (a) China does not provide 
sufficient legislation relating to takeover defence measures and (b) Chinese market 
players and legal advisors do not have adequate experience of takeover defence 
measures. 
 
iii 
Chapter 4 discusses takeover defence measures related to stock trading – share 
repurchase, the ‘pac-man’ defence, the use of white knights and ESOP. The chapter 
concludes that the first two tactics may be too risky for target companies such that 
their adoption should be prohibited in China while the latter two tactics may be 
helpful and could be widely used by China’s listed companies.  
Chapter 5 considers takeover defence measures related to management, such as 
poison pills, shark repellents, the scorched earth policy, dual class recapitalization and 
three kinds of parachutes. Except for the scorched earth policy, which could be 
harmful to the long-term interests of target companies, the other tactics may work 
well in China’s market and help Chinese companies secure controlling power or raise 
the share premium.  
Chapter 6 looks into defensive measures relating to litigation, raising anti-trust issues 
with relevant authorities, inadequate information provision by bidders and other 
crimes. It summarizes how measures relating to litigation could help delay the hostile 
takeover process, but could also terminate it, even if the target company is only 
seeking a greater share premium. This process could also involve government 
intervention, and its effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. Even if this group of 
measures are the most frequently used tactics by target companies, this thesis does not 
recommend it over other options.  
Chapter 7 analyses and compares the legislative systems of the US and UK and 
concludes that the UK’s system is better for contemporary China. However, there is 
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still the potential for China to legalise certain takeover defensive measures in the 
future as China’s market is continually being reformed.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis in proposing that China is justified in adopting the 
UK’s shareholder-friendly regulatory system. This is partly based on consideration of 
promoting takeover activities, and the existence of China’s SOEs, which may be 
reasons to prohibit certain defensive measures in China’s market. As the reform of 
China’s market continues, moderate defensive tactics like the white knight, parachute 
system and poison pill could work well. However, the decision-making power should 
remain in the hands of shareholders and the government should provide sufficient 
supervision over the market whilst following the principle of protecting shareholders’ 
interests.  
The importance of the thesis, and its contribution to existing knowledge, is the 
research for it has found that most other researchers are focused on the mandatory bid 
rule – adopted from the UK – in China, but that hardly any systematic research is 
being undertaken into defensive measures. Thus, this thesis fills a gap in the current 
literature on the takeover regulations area for China. It also discusses most of the 
major takeover defensive tactics, analysing in which markets certain defensive tactics 
work, and whether they would be appropriate for China. Newly-released regulations 
show the intention of Chinese legislators to turn to a more US style – which will make 
certain takeover defence measures possible in China, such as the poison pill; whether 
these are suitable for the Chinese market is debatable. In addition, it is found that 
 
v 
Chinese companies, especially high-tech companies, quite frequently use several 
defensive measures when they list on the US market, and the function of these tactics 
in securing control over the target company can be seen. Thus, research into how to 
regulate those defensive measures and what problems might arise with their use in 
China is important for regulators, and will make this thesis meaningful in China. 
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1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. M&A 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are processes that occur ‘when an individual or a 
group acquires the whole or substantial equity share capital or assets of a publicly 
listed company’.1 In recent years, there has been much M&A activity around the 
world. The first wave of mergers occurred between 1897 and 1904,2 and Asia is now 
a part of what is the fifth major merger wave.3 The pace of mergers and acquisitions 
picked up in the early 2000s after a short hiatus in 2001.4 It is now widely believed 
that M&A is the quickest way to expand an acquirer’s business,5 and it is also found 
that takeovers are more likely to take place because the market players’ needs to keep 
abreast of prevailing corporate trends6. M&A is a continually evolving field7 in the 
contemporary world of economic and legal research.  
                                                
1 Alan Peacock and Graham Bannock, Corporate Takeovers and the Public Interest (Aberdeen 
University Press 1991) 7. 
2 EconomyWatch, ‘History of Mergers and Acquisitions’ (2010) 
2 EconomyWatch, ‘History of Mergers and Acquisitions’ (2010) 
<http://www.economywatch.com/mergers-acquisitions/history.html> accessed 07 May 2012. 
3 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 3. 
4 Ibid 3. 
5 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restucturings (4th edn edn, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 2007) 14. 
6 A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard 1990) 17. Cited 
from Christian Witting, Liability of Corporate Groups (forthcoming), chapter 2. 
7 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restucturings (4th edn edn, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 2007) 68. 
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Manne argues that potential bidders monitor the share price of public companies, 
looking for underperformance: “The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be 
with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those 
who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently.”8 Some takeovers 
promote economic efficiency, by permitting an increase in the scale of production and 
distribution, thereby lowering the cost of each unit if production.9 For example, it is 
argued that the improved corporate management and increased efficiency in the 
company brought the shareholders large premiums.10 And there are economists 
pointed out the improved efficiency caused by the takeovers also helped to increase 
the market value.11 But problems can also arise from the existence of the threat of a 
takeover; it is argued for example that such a threat will distract managers from 
concentrating on long-term profit maximization. 12  Also, Shleifer and Summers 
argued that “hostile takeovers facilitate opportunistic behavior at the expense of 
stakeholders, and it enable shareholders to transfer wealth from stakeholders to 
themselves more than create wealth…So it is incorrect to gauge the efficiency gains 
                                                
8 Henry G. Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 Journal of Political 
Economy 110, 113. 
9 Jr. John C. Coffee, ‘Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the 
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance’ (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1145, 1149. 
10 Jensen, M. C., 'Takeovers: Folklore and Science' (1984) 62 Harvard Business Review 109-21 
11 Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, ‘Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers’ in Alan J. Auerbach(ed), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (University of 
Chicago Press 1988) 33 
12 Robert H Hayes and William J Abernathy, ‘Managing Our Way to Economic Decline’ (1980) 
Jul-Aug Harv Bus Rev 75,76. 
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from takeovers.”13 However, there is also empirical evidence that takeovers are 
value-maximizing events for target firm shareholders and enhance social efficiency.14 
Each shareholder, acting according to their own economic calculations, seeks to 
maximize the returns on their investment in a target company either by agreeing to a 
bidder’s offer and selling their shares at a premium, or else they retain their shares 
when they consider the offer to undervalue the company. M&A activities therefore 
provide opportunities for both bidders and target company shareholders. Thus, even if 
there are criticisms regarding the disadvantages of M&A activities, it should not be 
forgotten that they do push the development of the global economy by facilitating 
efficiency. In this thesis, it believes the positive effect of takeover activities on the 
improvement of corporate management and efficiency and argues that the takeovers 
could help the development of the market. 
In practise, most M&A activities start with a tender offer from the bidders. This offer 
aims to allow the bidder to buy shares in the target company ‘at an offered price 
within a certain period’.15 In the US, the tender offer itself is regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, while the courts regulate managers’ responses 
                                                
13 Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, ‘Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers’ in Alan J. Auerbach(ed), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (University of 
Chicago Press 1988) 34 
14 Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, ‘Lifting the Veil of Words: An Analysis of the Efficacy of Chinese 
Takeover Laws and the Road to the Harmonious Society’ (2011) 24 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 
181, 182. 
15 Joy Dey, ‘Efficiency of Takeover Defence Regulations: A Critical Analysis of the Takeover 
Defence Regimes in Delaware and the U.K.’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369542 > accessed 05 March 
2012 7. 
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to a bid.16 Even though it has not been defined in statues or regulations within the US, 
American courts have attempted to define tests to ascertain if certain activities 
amounted to a tender offer.17 In the UK (but not the US), there is also a mandatory 
bid rule, such that anybody who acquires over 30 per cent of the voting shares of a 
target company must make an offer to purchase the remaining shares of that 
company18. This is designed to ensure a fair exit opportunity for all shareholders upon 
a change of control in the target company.19   
2. Hostile takeovers 
Hostile takeovers first emerged in the 1950s in the UK, and since then have happened 
increasingly frequently over time, in companies with dispersed stock ownership,20 in 
countries with developed markets. A hostile takeover is the one that proceeds without 
the support of target company management. Offers to purchase are made directly to 
                                                
16 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1743.  
17 Joy Dey, ‘Efficiency of Takeover Defence Regulations: A Critical Analysis of the Takeover 
Defence Regimes in Delaware and the U.K.’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369542 > accessed 05 March 
2012 7. 
18 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1736.  
19 Joy Dey, ‘Efficiency of Takeover Defence Regulations: A Critical Analysis of the Takeover 
Defence Regimes in Delaware and the U.K.’ 11 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369542 > accessed 05 
March 2012. 
20 John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes 
in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 221，221. 
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target shareholders.21 It is argued that, based on consideration of ‘law and economics’, 
a hostile takeover mostly happens while the target company is under poor 
management and the acquire could serve the function of replacing the incumbent 
management with a new board.22 It is also acknowledged by some researchers that 
hostile takeovers became the major threat, other than the governance devices of 
corporate law, because they could provide opportunities for a target company to 
improve its performance if it is taken over by a bidder, and otherwise, provide a good 
reason for directors to keep on their toes, worrying about a hostile bidder preying on 
the company.23 Evidence shows that takeovers, especially hostile takeovers, at least 
increase the target company’s shareholders’ wealth in the near future, and that the 
minority shareholders of the target company also benefit from successful takeovers.24 
It could be expected that replacement of an inefficient management system with a 
better one could increase the price of the corporation’s shares. However, there are still 
                                                
21 Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 US 624 (1982). 
22 Juan Chen, Regulating the Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies: Divergence from the West 
(Springer 2014) 47. 
23 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1733.  
24 Marco Ventoruzzo, ‘The Thirteenth Directive and the Contrasts Between European and U.S. 
Takeover Regulation: Different (Regulatory) Means, Not So Different (Political and Economic) Ends?’ 
Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No 06-07 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=819764> accessed 20 Jan. 
2013 9. 
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those who question the efficiency-enhancing characteristics of hostile takeovers, such 
as the SEC Advisory Committee.25  
High takeover premiums can have a distorting effect on decision-making by target 
company shareholders.26 This is because the premium can sometimes be as much as a 
hundred per cent of the share price. Thus it is understandable that most of a target’s 
shareholders may be swayed by the instant profit offered by the deal even though they 
believe that the target company may have better long-term prospects as an 
independent company. For example, Vodafone AirTouch paid £112bn to take over its 
rival Mannesmann in Germany in 2000,27 which became the largest corporate merger 
up to that time. Although 90% of shareholders believed that Mannesmann had better 
long-term prospects as an independent company, they were nonetheless swayed by 
the instant profit offered by the deal.28  
In addition, a hostile takeover could cause inequality. Some claim that those who 
accept a bidder’s offer should compensate the shareholders who surrendered their 
rights.29 However, it is unreasonable to give any shareholders particular consideration 
                                                
25 Cited in Jr. John C. Coffee, ‘Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of 
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance’ (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1145 note 3 and 
note 13. 
26 Zhongwen Huang, Xiangdong Liu and Jianliang Li, Waizi Zaihua Binggou Yanjiu (Research on 
Foreign Capital M&A in China) (China Financial Publishing House 2010) 148. 
27 BBC, ‘Vodafone Seals Mannesmann Deal ’ (BBC, 11 February 2000)  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/630293.stm> accessed 10 March 2012. 
28 BBC, ‘Mannesmann: A Culture Shock’ (BBC, 4 February 2000)  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/631413.stm> accessed 15 March 2012. 
29 Tunde I. Ogowewo, ‘The Inequlity of Equality in Takeovers’ 23 JIBLR 178, 178. 
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when selling to a buyer seeking control of a company. This should not be seen as an 
unequal treatment of shareholders, but as the difficulties incurred by collective actions: 
an offeror cannot be required to ‘make whole’ offeree shareholders in respect of the 
personal relationship they may have with the offeree.30 It is also acknowledged that 
not all shareholders are likely to favour the offer from a bidder; thus it is claimed that 
different classes of shareholders may be treated unequally in the process of the 
takeover. As a matter of fact, according to the Takeover Code, the shareholders in the 
target company have the rights to have comparable offers if the company has different 
classes of shareholders31 and same information should be provided as soon as 
possible at the same time.32 Nonetheless, in the UK law directors are under a duty to 
treat shareholders fairly – not necessarily equally.33 More importantly, the “squeeze 
out” rule and the “sell out” rule could provide the minority shareholders sufficient 
protection once the offeror gain acceptances of 90 per cent in value of the shares.34 
Thus it could be seen that all the shareholders’ rights could be protected under a 
reasonable fair basis. Also, a general concept within UK law is that controlling shares 
are worth more than non-controlling shares,35 so it might be argued that the pursuit of 
equal treatment should not influence the content of takeover regulation too much.36  
                                                
30 Ibid 182. 
31 The Takeover Code 2013 Rule 14.1. 
32 The Takeover Code 2013 Rule 20.1 and Rule 23. 
33 Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v The Rank Organisation Ltd [1985] BCLC 11.  
34 “Squeeze-out” and “Sell-out”, Ch.3 Pt.28 Companies Act 2006 
35 Shrot v Treasury Commissioners [1948] AC 534 (HL). 
36 Paul L Davies, ‘The Notion of Equality in european Takeover Regulation’ in Jennifer Payne (ed), 
Takeovers in English and German Law (Hart Publishing 2002) 5. 
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No matter who assess the impact of hostile takeover, the advent of it has been 
recognised as a stimulus for the development of new takeover regulatory regimes, and 
created a new challenge for corporate control.37   
3. Takeover defences (2 modes) 
Hostile takeovers have taken place for decades, and given that they pose threats not 
only to the shareholders of the target company, but also to its management, the need 
to regulate market control in the takeover field is critical. However, different 
jurisdictions have different ways of controlling tender offers or hostile bids.38 There 
are two predominant takeover defence environments in the world: one is the US’s and 
the other is the UK’s. In the US, takeover activities are regulated by a variety of state 
and federal laws, and the Delaware law is the primary piece of legislation that 
regulates takeover defences. ‘In the comparison of the regulation of takeover 
activities in the US and UK, particularly those related to the freedom of adopting 
defensive tactics against takeover bids’, Armour and Skeel argued, ‘in the UK, 
defensive tactics by target managers are prohibited, whereas in the United States, the 
Delaware law gives managers a good deal of room to manoeuvre.’39 In the US, the 
                                                
37 John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes 
in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law 
Journal 221, 222. 
38 Joy Dey, ‘Efficiency of Takeover Defence Regulations: A Critical Analysis of the Takeover 
Defence Regimes in Delaware and the U.K.’ 3 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369542 > accessed 05 
March 2012. 
39 John Armour and David A. Skeel, ‘The Divergence of U.S. &U.K. Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 30 
Regulation 50, 50. 
 
9 
mode of regulation is ‘the domain of courts and regulators’,40 and is fundamentally 
manager-friendly as it gives the power to refuse a bid to the managers. Conversely, 
the UK’s takeover defence system is shareholder-friendly, and seems to facilitate the 
frequency of takeovers by giving defence powers to shareholders in seeking to resolve 
takeover issues. Even if the mandatory bid rule could deter the takeover to some 
extent, and the market for corporate control could be really competitive to make the 
target company more attractive to potential raiders so the takeover process could be 
deterred as well. But it could be said that the prohibition of the takeover defensive 
measures for the directors did lower the difficulty level of takeover offer compared to 
the regulation system in the US since there could be more pre-bid defensive measures 
included in the target company’s article. 
When discussing the delegation of the powers to defend against hostile takeovers in 
these two systems, agency cost is a key issue to consider. Like most real-world agents, 
managers are not always entirely faithful to their principals. Their incentives are 
likely to diverge from those of the shareholders and, when this happens, managers 
may be inclined to pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense.41 This 
                                                
40 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1743.  
41 Julie Wulf, ‘Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers of Equals"’ 
(2004) 20 J L Econ & Org 60, 96; Jay C. Hartzell, ‘What's in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are 
Acquired’ (2004) 17 Rev Fin Stud 37, 59 . This report showed that CEOs in target companies gained 
more personal benefits than shareholders and obtained greater post-merger control rights while target 
shareholders obtained a smaller proportion of joint gains. 
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phenomenon is referred to as “agency cost(s)”.42 If a takeover bid is successful, 
current managers may be replaced by others, who will presumably be better, so 
existing managers must compete against potential acquirers for the right to continue 
to manage corporate resources. Consequently, both shareholders and directors have 
distinct attitudes towards the market regarding corporate control. Thus, it is 
reasonable for shareholders to question directors’ motives when they are employing 
defensive measures against a hostile takeover bid. Undeniably, takeovers carry the 
risk to target company directors that they will lose their jobs; hence, directors are 
likely to prefer a regulatory system in favour of them. It is understandable that almost 
all directors would like “their behaviours to be as unconstrained as possible”;43 
presumably, if managers were opposed to a takeover, they might be expected to lower 
the likelihood of the offer succeeding by using takeover defensive tactics which 
shareholders may not prefer. Thus, it is argued by scholars that in the US, takeover 
defences are commonly thought to be motivated by management’s interest in 
entrenching itself.44 
According to Armour and Skeel’s research, the UK system has some clear advantages. 
The first relates to the speed of conducting a takeover: the bidder should follow up on 
its intention to make a formal offer by doing so within 28 days. In the US, there is no 
                                                
42 Donald Rutherford, Dictionary of Economics (1992) 10, This dictionary defines the term “agency 
cost” as a “cost arising from a contractual relationship between a principal and an agent”. 
43 Joordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, ‘Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defences’ 
(2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633, 640. 
44 Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, ‘Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover 
Protection in IPOs’ (2001) 17 JLEcon & Org 83, 83. 
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clear timetable for that.45 Second is the potential for high litigation costs in the US. 
Data shows that one third of hostile takeovers in the US are litigated,46 and this may 
involve high costs in hiring lawyers and may also be time-consuming. Hostile 
takeovers in the UK do not experience this. Thus, the UK’s process appears to be 
quicker and cheaper than the US, and is also more proactive in response to market 
developments.  
In both takeover regulatory systems, takeover defensive tactics can be adopted at a 
pre-bid stage, or a post-bid stage. However,  ‘no defensive measure can be said to be 
foolproof, and some may be disadvantageous as well, depending on the particular 
situation of a corporation. However, every tactic affords some negotiation leverage 
and time to formulate strategies for safeguard.’47 Pre-bid strategies include poison 
pills, shark repellents, dual-class stock, sale of assets, friendly hands, while post-bid 
strategies include greenmail, the Pacman defence, white knights and white squires, 
employee stock ownership plans, leveraged capitalization, and share buy-back 
plans.48 
                                                
45 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1745-1746.   
46 Ibid. 
47 Joy Dey, ‘Efficiency of Takeover Defence Regulations: A Critical Analysis of the Takeover 
Defence Regimes in Delaware and the U.K.’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369542 > accessed 05 March 
2012 5.  
48 Ibid 5-6. 
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Thus it is easy to know that each kind of takeover regulatory system has its own pros 
and cons and it is hardly to say either of them will fit in all countries. Succinctly, 
some scholars hold the opinion that the UK’s takeover system has clear advantages.49 
It is also argued that a hostile takeover is easier in the US because of a ‘network 
effect’50 and that it is easier to ‘anticipate the types of hurdles and judicial treatment 
that takeovers are likely to experience’ in the US, rather than UK system.51 But the 
UK rules are clearer ex ante than those of the US since the UK’s rules are set in the 
Code and the US’s rules are depending on the judicial fact-finding rules in Delaware.    
This thesis, will consider the circumstances in the UK and US to establish why 
regulators chose certain systems for each market and how the takeover regulatory 
systems of these western markets might or might not fit in China’s unique market and 
legal framework, and which system provides better lessons that China may learn 
from.   
4. China’s circumstances 
In China, the wholly private companies could be traded freely in the market as they 
are in the western markets but the SOEs are not. So in the following part it will 
                                                
49 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727. In this paper, the authors illustrated the advantage of the UK’s regulatory system compared with 
the US’s, and conclude that the UK’s system is more efficient than the US’. 
50 Sharon Hannes, ‘The Hidden Virtue of Antitakeover Defences’ (2002) Harvard Law School John M. 
Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 354 available at 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/354> accessed 12 July 2015 page 58.  
51 Ibid. 
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discuss the key special market player in China – the SOEs for a better discussion of 
which regulation system will be more suitable for China. To provide a better 
understanding of China’s market before discussing China’s regulation of takeover 
activities, the existence of state-owned enterprises, which represent a large percentage 
of capital in China’s market, should first be considered.   
1) Discussion of the existence and functions of China’s SOEs: how are these 
SOEs affecting China’s development?   
In general, there are three kinds of SOEs in China, with different percentage of shares 
owned by the state. These are: 1) wholly state-owned enterprises; 2) state-controlled 
enterprises, and 3) state holding enterprises.52 Wholly state-owned enterprises are 
those where 100 per cent of the capital is owned by the state, while state-controlled 
enterprises are ones where the state owns a controlling percentage53 of shares. In state 
holding enterprises, the state invests some capital into those companies but does not 
actually control them, so these companies are similar to other companies in the 
                                                
52 National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC [2003] 44 Letter about the Opinions to Identify a State 
Owned Enterprise [Guanyu Dui Guoyou Gongsi Qiye Rending Yijian de Han] (2009) available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/statsinfo/auto2072/201311/t20131104_454901.html, accessed 08 May 2014.  
53 Generally, the state will own more than 50 per cent of shares and have absolute control of a 
company. In some cases, the state may have less than 50 per cent of shares of the company, however, 
the percentage will still more than other shareholders such that the state can still control the company 
as the biggest shareholder; in those circumstances, these companies are also state-controlled enterprises. 
See: ibid. 
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market, with the important difference of the existence of a special non-shareholder –
the state.54   
Wholly state-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises include 113 central 
enterprises and some locally administered, state-owned enterprises, which are 
governed by 36 provinces (autonomous regions; cities).55 The 113 central enterprises 
are governed by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) and companies such as the China Railway Corporation and China Post 
Group are governed by Ministry of Finance of China.56 
Those 113 central enterprises are mainly enterprises within the nuclear industry, oil 
industry, weapons industry, etc.57 – key industries for the development of the country.  
Thus those industries are not open to public investors because of their special 
importance to the development of the country. In addition, some enterprises58 have a 
monopoly within their industries, although most industries are gradually changing 
towards a more open and free market because of the driving force of progress brought 
                                                
54 Ibid. 
55 The Enterprise Department of Ministry of Finance of the PRC, ‘The Economic Operation of the 
SOEs in China During January to March in 2014 [2014 Nian 1-3 Yue Quanguo Guoyou ji Guoyou 
Konggu Qiye Jingji Yunxing Qingkuang]’ (18 April 2014)  
<http://qys.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/qiyeyunxingdongtai/201404/t20140418_1069082.html> 
accessed 29 April 2014.  
56 Ibid. 
57 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, ‘List of 
Central Enterprises’   <http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/> accessed 10 May 2014. 
58 There are seven natural monopoly industries in China. Those are: the military, the grid and power 
industry, the oil and petrochemical industry, the telecommunication industry, the coal industry, the 
civil aviation industry and the shipping industry. See Jiansan Shi and Shiyu Qian, Comparative Study 
on Antimonopoly Review of M&A (Lawpress China 2010) 35. 
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by competition.59  It can also be predicted that China’s monopoly enterprises will 
join in the future competitive environment in the same way that those in developed 
countries did when there is a more sound market to support the protection of state 
services and to ensure the stability of society. That said, judging from the current 
situation, it is not yet time for the government to release power to the market to 
operate freely because of the lack of experience and sufficient legal protection. There 
remains the need for a legal system that is constructed in accordance with Chinese 
characteristics, and does not just replicate an advanced foreign legal system.  
The SOEs have a strong set-up: the state protects them from competition within the 
market. That does not necessarily mean that SOEs have no competitors, however. In 
the case of Sinopec and ENN Energy vs. China Gas, the announcement of a hostile 
takeover bid helped China Gas’s share price rise over subsequent months, probably 
because of the increase in the percentage of China Gas’s shares owned by its white 
knights. The share price reached 4.26 HKD per share after hostile raiders officially 
gave up on their takeover intention in 2012, which was far higher than the hostile 
offer of 3.5 HKD per share. Thus, it could be presumed that the announcement of the 
hostile takeover brought China Gas to public investors’ attention as a company with a 
strong potential for listing; the failure of the hostile takeover also demonstrated the 
target’s power to defend against such a move, indicating that it may have the ability to 
solve such crises in the future. Both Sinopec and China Gas were wholly state owned 
                                                
59 Ibid 36. 
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SOEs, and this hostile takeover attempt shows that even SOEs have competitors – 
both SOEs in the same industry and some non-SOEs. Also, the State Owned nature of 
China Gas should not be ignored, as whilst the state is a powerful supporter for a 
company, this does not mean that the state is in full control over all listed companies 
that exist in the market, which includes non-SOEs. Thus, whilst the market in China is 
distinctive, it cannot be said that western countries’ regulating strategies would not 
work based on assumptions of the market not being ‘free’.  
2) Continuing reforms of China’s SOEs in the new era 
The existence of SOEs has a large impact on China’s market and indirectly affects the 
creation of relevant regulations. Whether and how these SOEs may change in the 
future should be considered crucial when regulating market activities.  
In China, reforms to SOEs have not stopped since President Xi and his team sought to 
increase their effectiveness. For decades, China had put SOEs in leading positions in 
China’s market and used this as a principle to guide the development of China’s 
market in 1999 in Several Major Resolutions by the Central Committee of the CPC on 
the Reform and Development of State Owned Enterprises.60 Even though China’s 
SOEs have frequently been criticized by researchers, their leading status seems to be 
                                                
60 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Guoyou Qiye Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding 
[Several Major Resolutions by the Central Committee of the CPC on the Reform and Development of 
State Owned Enterprises] The Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the CPC, 22 
September 1999. 
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unshakable.61 That is to say, any suggestions that hinge on the abolition of China’s 
SOEs or totally privatising SOEs are not likely to be applicable to contemporary 
China.  
In the regulation of activities in China’s market, certain political and administrative 
factors should be considered in order to make the regulation fit the market. Although 
SOEs are owned by the state and have a political background, they can still be good 
market players if they have good corporate governance systems. Indeed, China has 
endeavoured to improve SOEs’ performance in the market during these years to keep 
up with the pace of the market’s development. Every administrative team in China 
was trying to secure the leading position of state owned companies: according to 
former president Zemin Jiang’s report at 16th Party Congress on Nov 8, 2002, during 
the “reform toward the socialist market economy” in China should “stick to and 
improve … the state property management system.”62 In addition, President Jintao 
Hu’s report at the 17th Party Congress in 2007 emphasized the importance of the 
reform of the shareholding structures of SOEs, as well as of their corporate 
governance systems.63 Moreover, at the 18th Party Congress in November 2014, 
                                                
61 Juan Chen, Regulating the Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies: Divergence from the West 
(Springer 2014) 11. 
62 Zemin Jiang, ‘Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situationin Building 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ (The Sixteenth National Congress of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC)) available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/4429120.html accessed 1 November 2014. 
63 Jintao Hu, ‘The Report of Jintao Hu at 18th Party Congress’ (The Seventeenth National Congress of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC)) available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/6429847.html accessed 1 November 2014. 
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present President Jinping Xi reaffirmed the importance of reforms of SOEs and 
proposed deeper reforms and changes to achieve a more effective and fairer market in 
China.64 Consequently, it is clear that the reform of China’s SOEs has been a priority 
over recent years and there are no signs to indicate the government will remove the 
SOE concept from the market.  
The results of these reforms can be expected to emerge over time. Although China’s 
market is not as free as western markets and there are certain defects in it, the efforts 
of China’s government into improving the market have had positive effects. 
Additionally, the new administrative leadership has expressed their plan to continue 
to work towards an advanced market by pushing the idea of “mixed ownership” and 
increase SOEs’ vitality, control, and influence;65 thus it could be seen that after many 
years of trying, China has found its own way to develop its economy, learned from – 
but not totally the same as –western countries’ systems. The creation of takeover 
regulation may follow a similar pattern. Though the existence of SOEs makes China’s 
market more distinct, and China should not copy everything from western markets, a 
regulatory system, which bears similarities to a western one, could yet fit China’s 
market.  
                                                
64 Jinping Xi, ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’ (The Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
CPC Central Committee) available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html 
accessed 1 November 2014. 
65 Ibid. 
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To some extent, SOEs’ defects were quite possibly caused by their own 
administrative systems: something that may be changed through reform. Scholars 
have criticised the transfer of control of SOEs by the state for having political 
incentives, because most privatized SOEs were badly managed and the state wanted 
to take the advantage of privatization to help the performance of these companies as 
well as reduce the financial burden on the state.66 However, Jin’s research has 
revealed the differences between SOEs and other companies and confirmed the 
importance of SOEs in the market.67 In addition, there is other research that shows 
there are ways in which China may improve the effectiveness of SOEs’ production.68 
However, scholars have pointed out a distinctive feature of the SOEs that makes them 
different from other companies: that is, the corporate governance in a SOE is easily 
affected by political factors.69 In addition, the agency problem could be more serious 
in SOEs than in other companies, as whilst there are executive directors in SOEs in 
charge of making decisions, SASAC can issue orders to those directors since these 
directors occupy an administrative position that sits under the SASAC. Thus, the 
decision-making power of directors is indirectly controlled by the SASAC, 
                                                
66 Jijun Yang, Dong Lu and Dan Yang, ‘State-owned Enterprisesp Government Control Right Transfer’ 
(2010) 2 Economic Research 69, 69. 
67 Bei Jin, ‘Repositioning State-Owned Enterprises Reform’ (2010) 13 Xinhua Wenzhai 45, 49. 
68 Yanbing Wu, ‘The Dual Efficiency Losses in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (2012) 3 Economic 
Research 15,26. 
69 The integration of government administration with enterprise is a long-standing issue in China and 
is still unresolved now. Scholars point out that the reform of SOEs was only launched recently. Further 
details could be found in Hongliang Zheng, ‘Corporate Governance Theory and China's SOEs Reform’ 
(1998) 10 Economic Research 20 and Yanbing Wu, ‘The Dual Efficiency Losses in Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises’ (2012) 3 Economic Research 15, 26. 
 
20 
representing the state. Consequently, there should be concerns about delegating power 
to directors which may in actuality mean the state has too much power over the 
market. That said, there may be resolution to the agency problem in China. According 
to President Xi’s report at the third plenary session of the 18th CPC Central 
Committee, China will endeavour to promote a “mixed-ownership” structure in the 
market and try to “improve the State-owned assets-management system and 
strengthen State-asset supervision by focusing on capital management.”70 As a result, 
SOEs would become part of the competition in the market with less state interference. 
Also, if those aims are achieved over the coming years, SOEs may develop a modern 
corporate governance system and perform more effectively. If directors were given 
more control over the company, their decisions may reflect the orders of the state less 
and be more in the best interests of the listed company and its shareholders. 
3) Hostile takeovers in China 
For China, hostile takeovers are a rare phenomenon, because of a lack of dispersed 
stock ownership and the fact that the country is still at an early stage of economic 
development. As the Chinese economy continues to grow dramatically, it has begun 
to increasingly look outside its borders for acquisition candidates. The 2005 
acquisition of IBM’s PC business by Lenovo is one example. However, the 
acquisition of Chinese companies by non-Chinese firms is difficult and risky, as 
                                                
70 Jinping Xi, ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’ (The Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
CPC Central Committee) Pt.2. 
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China is still in the early stages of becoming less centralized and more of a free 
market economy.71 Figures show that China’s economy has realized double-digit 
growth for a number of years, but there are still many regulatory restrictions imposed 
on M&A in China that inhibit the volume of deals rising to levels that would naturally 
occur in a less controlled environment. The Chinese regulatory authorities have taken 
measures to ensure that Chinese control of certain industries and companies is 
maintained, even as the economy moves to a more free market status.72 
Prior to the Administrative Measures for Strategic Investment by Foreign Investors in 
Listed Companies (potentially reversing a long-term policy limiting the ability of 
foreign investors to acquire controlling positions in Chinese companies), foreign 
investors were limited in their ability to acquire tradable Class-A shares and were 
often restricted to non-tradable Class-B shares, which are less appealing. The new 
rules opened up the Chinese market for foreign investors to purchase tradable shares, 
however. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the market is totally open and that 
foreign investors have an unrestricted ability to acquire control over Chinese 
corporations. In fact, after opening the door for foreign investors to purchase tradable 
Class-A shares, China adopted additional rules that required foreign buyers of 
Chinese assets to obtain Ministry of Commerce clearance before completing deals 
                                                
71 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restucturings (4th edn edn, John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. 2007) 6. 
72 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 4-5. 
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involving key industries and well-known Chinese brands.73 The restriction of foreign 
companies purchasing shares in China’s market applies to all types of companies. To 
be specific, according to Regulation on Domestic Securities Investment by Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor, foreign institutional investors could only purchase 
certain amount of A-shares in China’s stock market if it got the qualification of 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII).74 Any foreign institutional investor 
should meet the requirements of being a QFII and apply to the CSRC and State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) to decide whether it can get the 
qualification and the maximum allowance it can invest in China’s stock market.75 
It is true China does not have a totally open market at present, but no market is 
entirely open to all foreign investors. Indeed, ‘if US readers find such restrictions 
inconsistent with their desire for open and free markets, they need to remember the 
relatively recent opposition to Chinese Petroleum company CNOOC’s bid for Unocal 
on ‘national security’ grounds and realize that even countries which hold themselves 
out to be ‘free marketers’ may deviate from such a stance for political reasons.’76  
                                                
73 Ibid 93. 
74 Regulation on Domestic Securities Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 2006, a.2 
and a.5. 
75 Ibid a.6, a.7 and a.8. 
76 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 93. 
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The ownership structure in China has changed in recent years and China’s takeover 
regime has taken her initial shape. It seems likely that evolution will continue for both 
in the future.77 
In the wake of the development of China’s economy and the adoption of some 
advanced regulations similar to those of major industrial countries like the US and the 
UK, several issues have been vigorously debated, and the takeover regulatory system 
is one of them. According to the China M&A Law Report, research on M&A in China 
is conducted from diverse angles. Before 2009, much research adopted an anti-trust 
perspective to analyse the problems with takeover issues, but the field of research has 
now expanded to encompass the national security review, takeover defence tactics, 
and tender offer regulations. Most saliently, 10 per cent of published papers relating 
to M&A issues focus on takeover defence regulations,78 which indicates that takeover 
defence issues have come to receive more and more attention from researchers over 
time.  
In recent years, whilst hostile takeovers have occurred in large, highly developed 
industrial countries with sophisticated markets, they seem to have been less 
experienced in emerging markets such as China, Brazil and India.79 Now, data show 
                                                
77 John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes 
in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law 
Journal 221, 223. 
78 China M&A Law Report (Jiansan Shi ed, Law Press China 2010) 410. 
79 John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes 
in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 221, 273. 
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that M&A activities in China have increased considerably, but that the rate was ‘still 
relatively low compared to that of the US or the UK’,80 and few bidders attempted 
takeovers of targets in an unsolicited way. China, which in 2011 ranked 2nd in the 
world for GDP,81  experienced few hostile takeover cases that were completed 
successfully. This is because China is a distinct environment where ‘there is little 
immediate prospect of a market for corporate control developing’. 82  The 
shareholding structure is very distinct in China because most shares are state-owned 
or state-owned legal person shares and both are not tradable in the market. Thus, ‘the 
transformation of state-owned enterprises into publicly traded companies in the 
process of China’s market opening has only been partial – indeed, the term used is 
corporatization, not privatization’.83 
Most corporations in mature capitalized markets such as the UK and US will defend 
against hostile takeovers through the use of various tactics while companies in China 
seldom do so. Moreover, a large number of M&A activities in China are primarily 
undertaken in the secondary market, and potential hostile bidders can easily succeed 
in their activities by signing an agreement (transferring state-owned shares) with the 
majority shareholder (could be state or private) in control of the company. Thus, 
                                                
80 Ibid 273. 
81 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary Fund 2012). 
82 John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes 
in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law 
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potential hostile bidders can simply negotiate with the majority shareholder(s) to 
control the target company, rather than needing to use more complicated means and 
make a tender or hostile offer.84 Therefore, there are few anti-takeover measures used 
in China’s market.  
Apart from the issue of the market environment, there is a gap in takeover defence 
legislation between China and advanced industrial markets. In China, there is no clear 
definition of a takeover defence, or of the delegation of powers for choosing to adopt 
a takeover defence in either Chinese Company Law or the Securities Law. However, 
according to related articles in Company Law,  
The shareholders of a company shall be entitled to enjoy the capital proceeds, 
participate in making important decisions, choose managers and enjoy other 
rights.85 
The success of hostile takeover defence tactics may keep control in the hands of the 
current board and shareholders of the target company or raise the price of shares in 
order to get as high a premium as possible for the target company’s shareholders. By 
contrast, the success of a hostile takeover may also change the management structure, 
which means the target company’s shareholders may not be able to choose future 
managers of the company. Therefore, shareholders should have the power to decide 
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whether a defence against a hostile takeover is consistent with legislative intent.86 
According to Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies 
(2008 Revision), 
The decisions made and measures taken by the directors, supervisors and senior 
management of the target company with respect to the takeover activities may 
not prejudice the lawful rights and interests of the company or its 
shareholders.87 
Thus, it could be seen that the decision-making power is delegated to shareholders 
instead of directors because directors will need the approval of shareholders regarding 
the takeover activities’ major issues. However, this is only an administrative 
regulation, which is not as powerful as a law. For this reason, many scholars have 
argued that the delegation of the decision-making power over takeover defence tactics 
to shareholders should be enshrined in law, not just by an administrative regulation.88  
It is predicted that hostile takeovers will occur more frequently in China, in the 
future.89 According to PwC’s research, the percentage of takeover activities in 
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China’s market grew 37 per cent compared with 2014, and it is predicted to grow at 
double-digit rates in the future.90 It is known that many Chinese corporations 
reconstruct themselves by buying a shell, and M&A activities could provide a good 
platform for a back door listing, so that a hostile takeover may also be a good choice 
for bidders to buy an ideal shell. If the frequency of hostile takeovers increases, the 
use of anti-takeover measures may also be expected to increase accordingly.91   
Most anti-takeover methods could theoretically be adopted, but some may not be 
suitable for China in practise. Thus, these measures should be discussed, in turn, to 
establish which specific takeover defence tactic might functionally be adopted. 
However, not all research findings support the idea of focusing on the development of 
takeover defence tactics. It has been argued that the advent of takeover bids could 
promote the booming of the market, and that hostile takeovers, which can be seen as a 
major part of M&A activities, are regarded as an advanced mechanism which can 
both raise shareholder value and ‘enhance the efficiency of the corporate system as a 
whole’.92 Thus takeover defence tactics could be an obstacle for an emerging market 
like China, as it is just at the beginning of its developmental path.  
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The first takeover defence case arose in 1993, when Baoan Co. made an unsolicited 
offer to take over Yanzhong Co., and the target company complained to the CSRC 
about illegal activities that featured in the process, but the takeover still succeeded 
even if anti-takeover defence tactic was used.93 Following that case, more than 20 
anti-takeover cases arose in China between 1993 and 2009.94 It was then claimed by 
an official report that China did not provide a good environment for M&A activities 
so that the top priority should be to facilitate the development of the M&A market, 
instead of setting obstacles to it, by improving the legislation of hostile takeover 
regulations.95  
That said, China’s market has many other defects that pose a problem to the existence 
of hostile takeovers, such that takeover defence tactics may not be the most urgent 
issue for China to solve now.  
Firstly, China’s market does not feature the highly dispersed shareholding structures 
found in advanced industrial countries that allow bidders to achieve control through 
buying shares in the market. Instead, the ‘organs of the central and provincial 
governments, or related affiliates, still control a majority of the shares of most 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges’.96 According to the 
                                                
93 Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Centre, China Corporate Governance Report (2009)---The 
Market for Corporate Control and Corporate Governance (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2009) 120. 
94 Ibid 111. 
95 Ibid 127. 
96 Franklin Allen, Jun Qian and Meijun Qian, ‘Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China’ (2005) 
77 J Fin Econ 57, 85-86. 
 
29 
most recent data in China’s stock market, it shows that there are 978 SOEs out of 
2839 listed companies, and those SOEs take 48 per cent of the total capital of China’s 
market.97 Moreover, ‘until recently, shares were not even legally tradable except to 
other state-affiliated investors.’98 
Secondly, the price of state-owned shares, legal shares and shares owned by 
individuals vary greatly, and most of the former shares’ prices are cheaper than the 
latter’s.99 It is therefore understandable that bidders would prefer to control a target 
company by buying these cost-efficient shares instead of seeking control via a more 
complicated and less economical way. 
Thirdly, Chinese Company Law sets some obstacles to transfer these state-owned or 
state-affiliated shares. The law regulates that major investment in a Chinese listed 
company must be approved by many government agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Commerce and the China Securities Regulatory Commission,100 which highly limits 
the freedom of transactions in the market. Moreover, this regulation also gives market 
control to the state, and not to shareholders.   
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Fourthly, bidders may not have enough financing because of the inefficiency of 
China’s market. As discussed, a hostile takeover may require bidders to pay a 
premium to target companies, so that the lack of funding (or funding efficiency) may 
cause takeovers to fail. Due to the special circumstances in China, many companies 
buy a ‘shell’ to be listed on the stock market so that the bidder company cannot raise 
finance via issuing shares to the public, which increases financing difficulty for the 
bidders.101 In addition, the issuing of enterprise bonds is restricted102 in China and 
the liquidity of such bonds is limited, so the risk of financing for bidders is extremely 
high.  
In addition, the inexperience of market participants and the overestimation of the 
price of shares in China’s market make hostile takeovers much more risky than in a 
mature market. Successful M&A activity depends on agents including investment 
banks, appraisal agencies, law firms and accounting firms.103 Most do not offer 
services focusing on Anti-takeover areas, even though some large law and accounting 
firms offer professional services related to takeovers. On the other hand, most hostile 
bidders seek to takeover their target companies because of the potential for profit after 
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the merger, but if, as is suggested, the share prices for Chinese listed companies are 
frequently overestimated,104 bidders may not realise desired profits in the end. 
Given that the market in China seems not to provide an efficient market for mergers 
and acquisitions, an efficient legal protection system could be a good solution. The 
fact is, however, that China does not have a clear takeover regulatory system; it only 
mentions takeover rules in its Securities Law, Company Law and some related 
administrative regulations.105 It is argued by scholars that the relationship between 
the bidder(s) and the target company could ‘be supplied by means of a development 
of the principles of general corporate law, without the separation of a distinct body of 
takeover rules’.106 To some extent, this is the approach adopted in the United States 
by state and Federal Law.107 China first introduced M&A legislation in 1989108 and 
the continuous updating of this legislation has provided a good basis for future 
development.109 
However, it is also argued that China has a highly developed takeover regime, at least 
as a formal matter. China’s approach is a blend of the UK and US Delaware models, 
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refracted through distinctive national institutions.110  The rule that any post-bid 
defensive measures taken by target company boards should be approved by 
shareholders is similar to the UK system. At the same time, the requirement of 
directors’ duties regarding the adoption of takeover defences is like the US system. 
Thus, it could be said the Chinese takeover regulatory system is a combination of the 
two. However, it is agreed by most scholars that China’s takeover regulatory system 
is more like that of the UK, featuring a high level of state control.111 Yet, China does 
not have a Takeover Panel to solve problems relating to takeover issues or regulate 
takeover defence measures, which the UK does. China only has organs under the 
jurisdiction of the CSRC, acting as advisory authorities, leaving the CSRC as the 
ultimate enforcement agent.112 Moreover, it seems unlikely that Chinese courts will 
accept cases involving contests for corporate control without specific authorization 
from the Supreme People’s Court, unless it is in the areas of Corporate and Securities 
Law, such as derivative suits and securities fraud litigation.113 
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Even though the possibility of a market for corporate control in China seems more 
distant than for many other emerging countries, the hostile takeover of publicly-traded 
firms in China is ‘far from inconceivable’.114 China’s SOE-friendly approach has 
long been widely criticized.115 However, China has started to redefine her regulations 
to restructure SOEs and to change the capital market landscape:116 ‘The landscape is 
far different from 1990 when the first stock exchange, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
was launched. Most SOEs in monopoly industries, such as energy and 
telecommunications, are attempting to delist or reduce publicly traded shares from 
stock market in order to maintain more business secrecy and solidify state control.’117 
As the Chinese economy and capital markets mature, the state may elect to relinquish 
control over some publicly-traded firms or industrial sectors.118 The central and local 
governments have also become more sophisticated in operating state assets and deem 
that less administrative interference and more market competition can promote the 
competitiveness of SOEs.119 To some extent, however, it is understandable that the 
state would wish to exert at least some control over those significant enterprises and 
industries it considers to be pillars of the national economy.                                                                                                           
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This thesis will analyse whether the UK’s takeover defence system is a better choice 
for China and discuss each major kind of takeover defence tactic to find out the 
possibility of legitimating them in China.   
This thesis argues that the UK’s takeover regulatory system is a better choice for 
China because of its pro-takeover element. However, China’s regulatory system is 
becoming more of a combination of both the US and UK systems, because of new 
policies that make certain defence measures, like the poison pill, available to China’s 
market. With China’s market becoming more competitive and advanced, as long as 
the reform of China’s SOEs continues, China’s listed companies are likely to become 
attractive in the future. Therefore, it would be appropriate for China to legalise other 
defensive measures in order to assist the development of the market. The thesis 
proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 2 starts with a theoretical discussion about the UK and US takeover 
regulatory systems. It summarizes the pros and cons of each. It concludes that the 
differences between China, the UK, and the US in terms of their market features and 
market players should be considered in judging which regulatory system is 
appropriate for China.  
Chapter 3 discusses the differences in market structures and legal frameworks 
between China and the western countries. The special circumstances and problems 
that exist in China are discussed. This chapter highlights the concentrated share 
structure prevalent in China, which can result in the power to adopt takeover defences 
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belonging to one major shareholder, or the state. This is totally different to the UK 
and US, and even though Chinese government is trying to reform its shareholding 
structure, it is still a long way off. This discussion provides a basis for later 
consideration of each kind of takeover defence tactic. Directors’ duties are also 
discussed, as tender offers present an inherent conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders.120 The managers’ interests may not be aligned with that of the 
shareholders, insofar as if the takeover was to go through, there is a high possibility 
that they will be ousted from the control of the company.121 Consequently, whether 
the managers should have the power to defend against a takeover offer will be an 
important choice. Also, the different approaches taken to directors in the UK, US and 
China are discussed, As China takes a positive view towards promoting takeover 
activities, There is particular focus on the idea that giving control power to 
shareholders would be better for reducing the possibility that directors may act in their 
own interest. 
Other problems that most Chinese listed companies may have are also discussed in 
this chapter. Firstly, the lack of takeover defence experience is considered. It is 
known that in many M&A undertakings, bidders do not obey takeover rules because 
takeover defence tactics are still fresh to Chinese listed companies. Control power is 
often abused by both bidders and target companies, as in the case of Huajian 
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Electronic v Jinan Department Store, when the board of directors took defensive 
measures to frustrate the bidder’s offer without the approval of the shareholders.122 
Secondly, it is also pointed out that the current takeover defence legislation has many 
defects, such as an unclear legislative attitude, a lack of efficiency in supervision and 
enforcement, and the ambiguous content of related legislation.123 Until China finishes 
its shareholding structure reform, it cannot be clearly known how many shares the 
government has in the stock market; however, the highly concentrated shareholding 
structure is analysed by way of background for subsequent chapters which discusses 
which takeover regulatory system fits China’s market better. 
The following chapters introduce reasons why China chose a UK-style takeover 
regulatory system instead of a US-style one. The discussion is based on a comparison 
of the UK and the US to find out under what conditions and in which kind of market 
these takeover defensive measures work, and whether these measures are too risky or 
not.  
Chapters 4 to 6 examines three categories of takeover defence tactics. Chapter 4 
covers takeover defence tactics relating to stock trading, including share repurchase 
tactics, the Pac-man defence and the white knight defence. Chapter 5 considers 
takeover defence tactics relating to management, including poison pills, the scorched 
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earth policy, shark repellents, dual class recapitalization, cross-holding, seeking for 
the support of minority shareholders and institutional investors, greenmail and three 
kinds of ‘parachutes’ (golden, silver and tin). Chapter 6 discusses takeover defence 
tactics relating to litigation and other known defensive tactics, but focus largely on 
raising anti-trust issues, inadequate disclosure of information and crimes, as well as 
some less popular anti-takeover measures.  
In each case, a definition is given, explaining the tactic’s function, and how they work 
to defend against a takeover. Each chapter also considers shortcomings in the 
operation of each defence tactic, as well as obstacles that may prevent their successful 
functioning. Based on this discussion, a conclusion is proposed as to whether that 
particular defence tactic should or could be adopted in China considering China’s 
economic and legal environment, as well as whether there exist any obstacles to 
legalising it or whether any problems will be caused by doing so.  
Chapter 7 considers the legislative intent in China and then discusses why China 
chose a UK-style system and not a US-style system. One key reason is that China’s 
government is reluctant to delegate law making and enforcement power in critical 
economic policy areas to the courts, which are difficult to monitor and control 
centrally. Because China’s market is more regulatory than court-centred, any disputes 
solved by the court could only help to guide the resolution of relevant cases in the 
future without any enforcement power. Also, the UK’s regulatory approach could be 
more effective by providing rules and principles to relevant authorities to solve 
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takeover issues, and it could help the government to monitor market activities more 
effectively. Even if the government delegates law making power to the court, it will 
inevitably raise concerns about institutional competence and efficiency. Additionally, 
it is pointed out that the key reason that the US approach is unlikely to be replicated in 
other countries, even in advanced legal systems, is that ‘it places extraordinary 
demands on the judiciary to respond, in real time and in full view of the capital 
markets, to legal issues deeply interwoven with complex business transactions where 
large sums of money are often at stake.’124 The share price of the target company 
could be different every day during the takeover process, and if the authorities are not 
professional enough to deal with complex issues it might be harmful to the target or 
bidder company’s shareholders’ interest. Analysis of China’s market, especially the 
existence of SOEs, is also provided in this chapter, to establish whether certain 
regulatory systems would work in China’s market. Additionally, the principles and 
problems faced by China in regulating takeover activities are discussed.  
Finally, chapter 8 summarises the thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Two major systems of takeover 
regulation 
Executive summary 
This chapter argues that different legislative systems have different rationales, and if 
China wishes to take reference from the UK or the US regulatory system, it must 
know the advantages and disadvantages of each in order to establish which is better 
for it. Thus, this chapter discusses the pros and cons of the UK and US systems to 
provide the basis for further discussion as to which system would be better for China 
in later chapters.  
This Chapter is divided into three parts: the first introduces the UK’s regulatory 
system; the second introduces the US regulatory system; and the third is a summary 
of conclusions. The former parts introduces each system via the (1) rationale and 
background to regulating takeover activities; (2) the advantages and disadvantages of 
each system; (3) an evaluation of each system.  
First, however, there is an analysis of why the UK and the US started to regulate 
takeover activities and the point of view each adopted towards them. Both the UK and 
US have recognised that successful takeovers change the controlling power of a 
company. Even though the US and the UK both have a dispersed shareholding 
structure and relatively advanced market, their main shareholder groups are different: 
there have historically been more institutional investors in the UK’s market who 
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preferred a statutory system in which they can exert control over the company, while 
the US originally had more retail investors, who did not trust institutional investors. 
Consequently, the judges made the US’s regulation system director-friendly while the 
UK chose a shareholder-friendly takeover regulatory system. The UK’s system has 
certain advantages, such as quicker, cheaper and more established procedures, equal 
treatment and procedural protection of shareholders, and effectiveness. Moreover, 
share premiums may be strengthened in a takeover-friendly regulatory system, and 
minority shareholders benefit from this. In terms of disadvantages, the British system 
has been criticized by scholars to be short-sighted and may be unhelpful for the 
long-term development of a company. The US regulatory system provides 
professional directors with more power to fight for greater premiums for shareholders 
as well as adopt sufficient remedies when problems arise so that the target could make 
a wise choice. However, the possibility of agency problems and the directors’ 
self-interested actions have concerned scholars in that they could harm shareholders’ 
interests.  
Consequently, the UK and US approaches have been established based on analyses of 
their own market and the features of their typical market players. Therefore, the 
market features and political circumstances in China, as well as the western markets’ 
features, should be considered when debating China’s policy choice.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is market-oriented in both the US and UK, and the largest 
corporations are characterized by a separation of ownership and control that is 
uncommon elsewhere in the world. Thus the distinguishing feature of the so-called 
“Anglo-American” system of corporate governance is that share ownership in public 
corporations is dispersed.125 Each of the US and the UK has a common law 
orientation, unlike the civil law approach that characterizes many other countries. 
Each jurisdiction has had to face acute questions regarding the regulation of takeovers, 
such as whose interests should be protected and what responsibilities directors should 
have to shareholders.126 These have been worked out over time.  
When it comes to business and finance, the US and the UK arguably have more in 
common than any other pair of developed economies. Despite similarities in other 
areas of law, the US and UK have very different strategies for regulating takeovers, 
which is seen as the most prominent issue in all of corporate law. The divergences in 
US and UK takeover regulations are surprisingly deep. They represent two distinct 
takeover regulation modes. One is the UK’s self-regulating system and the other is the 
US’s judicial law-making system. It is argued by Armour and Skeel that the UK’s 
‘self-regulation of takeovers has led to a regime largely driven by the interests of 
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institutional investors, whereas the dynamics of judicial law-making in the US have 
benefited managers by making it relatively difficult for shareholders to influence the 
rules.’127   
An account of the differences in the development of the two systems suggests that the 
choice of rule-maker (whether judges or self-regulatory bodies) can be just as 
important an influence on the substance of takeover law as regulatory competition.  
However, whether the current differences endure is an on-going question for the UK 
and the US. It can be imagined that the increasingly heterogeneous investment culture 
in the UK will undermine UK self-regulation, and that institutional shareholders in the 
US will press for a more shareholder-cantered approach in their system. Whether the 
substance of regulation is determined by their mode, and how, in turn, the differences 
in processes can be explained are interesting questions.128   
As seen, different countries are in favour of different merger control provisions and 
major differences arise from a few key factors, described by the OECD as follows:  
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… the criteria for defining or examining mergers,129 the standards by which a 
merger is considered desirable or undesirable130 and as regards procedure131… 
Takeover regulation has a substantial influence in the world economy since takeover 
activities may transfer control of economic resources.132 Thus, it is important to 
review the basis of takeover regulations in both the UK and US and thereafter to 
establish which mode is more appropriate for China’s market based on the review of 
these systems. 
Moreover, the substance of takeover rules will affect shareholders’ gains from the 
takeover activity.133 That means, on one hand, that ‘policy choice’ will affect 
shareholders’ gains from target corporations – i.e., whether they get a sufficient 
premium for their shares. It has been argued by Albert O “Chip” Saulsbury IV that the 
US legislation system will undoubtedly generate additional value for a company’s 
shareholders due to the greater negotiating powers of directors in seeking a 
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higher-priced deal. 134  Hence, the policy choice made by the US increases 
shareholders’ gainssur. On the other hand, shareholders’ investment in bidder 
corporations should also be considered because if a bidding company takes over a 
target company, it could be seen that the shareholders in the bidding company will be 
indirectly invested in the target company after the takeover offer has been accepted. 
In this way, it could be argued that the US regulatory system makes it possible for a 
bidder company’s shareholders to bear the risk of spending more money on taking 
over a target company which used takeover defensive measures to increase its 
premium. In the UK, the Takeover Code includes a strict timetable that all takeover 
activities must follow,135 and within that limited timeframe it is possible that the 
shareholders of a bidder company may overestimate the value of a target’s shares. 
Even in the US, since the directors are relatively free to employ defensive measures to 
negotiate a high premium for the target’s shareholders, the interests of the bidders 
may be jeopardised if a bidder company accepts a target’s share price, which may 
cause the bidder to pay more money for the target. Therefore if negotiating power is 
vested in directors, as in the US, shareholders in the bidder company may run the risk 
of a low return on their investment. Moreover, bidders’ offers may help the 
undervalued company where there is high information asymmetry between the bidder 
and target companies in increasing the share price of the target company, and thus 
                                                
134 IV Albert O. "Chip"Saulsbury, ‘The Availability of Takeover Defenses and Deal Protection 
Devices for Anglo-American Target Companies’ (2012) 37 Del J Corp 115, 161. 
135 The Takeover Code (Eleventh edition) 2013 Rule 31. 
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bidders’ gains could decline with the number of offers announced.136 Consequently, 
the target company with low market capitalisation could get high returns from an 
announced bid.137 It is therefore likely that takeover regulations will influence 
takeover frequency and thereafter have a sizeable impact on both the target and 
bidders’ gains. 
Scholars have pointed out that takeover regulations represent a kind of policy choice, 
such that the most important thing could be a focus on the wider economic impact of 
takeovers and on perfecting the regulatory system.138 The following sections will 
focus on the UK and US regulatory systems and introduce the basis of regulating 
takeover defences to illustrate why legislators made their policy choices, and how the 
systems are different, by reviewing various scholars’ works. Both systems will then 
be evaluated.  
2. The UK system of takeover regulation 
Armour and Skeel have observed that hostile takeovers first emerged in the 1950s,139 
and that professionals, especially institutional investors, avoided the need for ex post 
                                                
136 Paul Draper and Krishna Paudyal, ‘Informtion Asymmetry and Bidder' Gains’ (2008) 35 Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting 376, 405. The authors did an empirical study on the relationship of 
information asymmetry, bid frequency, and bidder’s gains, and found out the companies with high 
information asymmetry could benefit from the takeover offers.  
137 Ibid 392. 
138 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 460. 
139 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1729-1730.  
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litigation by developing a body of norms, enforced by reputational sanctions, which 
ensured that contentious issues were resolved ex ante without the need for court 
involvement. The UK’s statutory system was therefore driven by the preponderance 
of institutional investors in the marketplace, and a regulatory framework that trusted 
them to govern themselves.140 
1) Rationales & Regulations 
The 1920s merger wave resulted in the transformation of the corporate economy from 
family-controlled businesses into modern large corporations in which ownership and 
control were separated141. The process advanced swiftly, and was largely complete 
between the 1950s and the end of the 1960s.142 Historically, a vast majority of 
companies were family-owned and managed. Although this kind of management 
could limit possibilities for expansion and inhibit the professionalization of 
management,143 it could also allow companies to avoid the problems associated with 
                                                
140 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1730. 
141 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal, 422, 423. 
142 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control: 
The British Experience’ (2004) 46 Business History 256-284, the author argued that despite Hannah’s 
claims to the contrary, the weight of evidence is that “personal capitalism” was not displaced by the 
1920s merger wave. Instead, it began to be gradually unwound during the first of half of the twentieth 
century, and the process accelerated after 1950, with the transition to big business largely complete by 
the end of the 1960s merger wave. 
143 A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard 1990) 235-237, 
attributes Britain’s weak economic performance to the persistence of “personal capitalism” and its 
incompatibility with the development of organizational capabilities.  
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the separation of ownership and control.144 However, as the management structure 
evolved with the development of the market, such concentrated family-owned control 
over a corporation seemed to become less prevalent in the market. Thus the Greene 
Committee on Company Law recommended the introduction of the right for a bidder 
who had acquired 90 per cent of the shares to “squeeze-out” any remaining minority 
shareholders,145 and section 155 of the Companies Act 1929 introduced the right for a 
purchaser whose offer had been accepted by a 90 per cent majority to force the 
remaining 10 per cent of shareholders to sell their shares on the same terms, with a 
right of appeal to the court on questions of value and oppression.146 This provision 
proved to be absolutely fundamental to the emergence of the hostile takeover later in 
the 1950s, because it allowed bidders to acquire the entire share capital of its target, 
thereby preventing minority shareholders from free-riding on its efforts to improve 
efficiency.  
                                                
144 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 423. 
145 Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee (1925-26 Cmd 2657), Part O Reconstruction 
and Amalgamation, para. 84-85.  
146 The S.155 Companies Act 1929 subsequently became the s.210 Companies Act 1948, then s.429 
Companies Act 1985 and is now to be found in ss.979 et seq. Companies Act 2006. The Financial 
Services Act 1986 belatedly added the counterpart to this right to “squeeze out”: the right of minority 
shareholders to be bought out. Section 172 and Schedule 12 Financial Services Act 1986 and s.430A-C 
Companies Act 1985, which allows a minority shareholder who did not accept a bid to require a 
purchaser who has purchased over 90 per cent of the shares to buy their shares. This would prevent 
coercive bids – although the possibility of these is greatly restricted by the City Code, which requires 
equal treatment and information of shareholders – and also, more importantly, protects the small 
shareholder who may not have been paying attention when the takeover bid was made. The rules about 
a “sell out” can now be found in ss.983 et seq. of the Companies Act 2006. Cited in Andrew Johnston, 
‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ (2007) 66 Cambridge 
Law Journal 422, 425. 
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In the 1960s, a second large merger wave struck the UK, causing distinct changes. 
Further separation of ownership and control resulted and essentially enabled a group 
of professional administrative staff who were not shareholders to control a 
corporation.147 That meant that the UK started to go into an era of managerial 
capitalism and its corporate governance improved at that time. Most companies 
performed better in the market and expanded their business thanks to professional 
management. At the beginning of the 1950s, some form of family control kept up the 
old standards in some of the largest UK firms, but there was a growing trend that 
ownership and control was better to be divorced in the developing market. In such 
cases where a company did not have a majority shareholder, management had a blank 
check, as shareholders could not overcome the collective action problem.148  
Bull and Vice explained the reason for the emergence of hostile takeovers in 1958 in 
detail as follows: 
Firstly, there was a structural change in British industry. Production shifted ‘from 
textiles and heavy capital goods to aircraft, light electrical engineering and machine 
tools’.149 Both income distribution and retailing also changed during that time, which 
helped raise consumption.  
                                                
147 L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (2nd ed. edn, London 1983) Ch. 10 196. 
148 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Dividends as a Substitue for Corporate Law: The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in the United Kingdom’ ((2006) European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper 
No69/2006). 
149 G. Bull and A. Vice, Bid for Power (3rd ed. edn, 1961) 29. 
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Secondly, a large portion of the corporate profits were taken by a 
dramatically-increased tax burden, so corporations might not have funds for future 
development if directors did not reduce the amount of profit distributed to 
shareholders.150 
Furthermore, companies were leaning towards spending surplus cash on the 
replacement of assets in times of high inflation. Generally speaking, the share price 
should keep pace with the value of the companies’ assets, yet, the share price at that 
time could not keep up with the growth of companies’ profit-earning assets because of 
the reduction in distribution to shareholders caused by the aforementioned 
constraints.151 Thus, the share price was much less expensive than the asset value of 
the company, which provided a rare opportunity for hostile bidders to expand their 
business.  
As a result, between 1952 and 1955, a great ‘boardroom revolution’ happened in the 
UK, as the livelihood of corporate managers was threatened by suddenly-emergent 
hostile takeovers.152 Hostile takeovers would be seen as a threat by the current board 
of directors with the possibility of their being replaced, so that the directors, to certain 
extent, would have to put shareholders’ interests ahead of their own when executing 
deals regarding takeovers, as directors are given ‘both power and protection 
                                                
150 Ibid 30. 
151 R. W. Moon, Business Mergers and Takeover Bids (3rd edn, London 1968) 125. 
152 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 428. 
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commensurate with their interest in corporate affairs’.153 Shareholders already had 
the right to appoint or remove a board of directors, to attend meetings, and obtain 
information on the performance of the company, and these rights seemed sufficient 
for non-professional dispersed shareholders to manage a company by themselves. 
This could also prevent time-consuming collective action problems and help to 
maximise a company’s value or even, more broadly, society’s wealth.  
It is also argued by proponents of the agency model that defensive measures were 
devices by which managers could sacrifice shareholders’ benefits to secure their own 
positions in a company, and that social welfare might even be reduced.154 If a board 
was permitted by litigation to take defensive tactics to deal with a hostile takeover 
offer, it could be predicted that more bids would fail because of said defensive 
measures, making defensive measures a threat to the takeover mechanism. 
Furthermore, if the directors could decide whether or not to adopt takeover defence 
measures, this could delay or prevent prospective takeovers and reduce the number of 
potential bidders. Thus, the market of corporate control may not work as well as in the 
market whose takeover activities are encouraged.155 Accordingly, a lively market 
needs a legislation system that limits the viability of takeover defensive measures 
taken by directors. 
                                                
153 Henry G. Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 Journal of Political 
Economy 110, 112. 
154 F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Company Law (Cambridge, Mass. 1991) 
173, 174. 
155 Ibid. 
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Consequently, both the use of deal protection devices and takeover defences by the 
directors have been strictly prohibited by the UK’s regulatory authorities since 
1968,156 thus the directors in UK companies do not have abundant negotiating power 
to decide over the sale of their company, making hostile takeovers more viable. 
These factors have also affected the attitude towards hostile takeovers of the 
law-makers at that time in the UK, and helped lead them to adopt a 
shareholder-friendly regulatory system. The following sections will briefly introduce 
the UK’s regulatory development and discuss its pros and cons. 
a. A brief introduction to why takeover regulation occurred 
With respect to litigation, the UK adopted a different approach from that of the US. 
This is largely due to three main reasons: the first is an optimistic opinion of takeover 
activities, the second is the identity of majority shareholders, and the other is different 
attitude towards the concern of agency cost.  
In 1959, the Issuing Houses Association and other associates157 took the first step 
towards producing regulations to conduct takeover activities in the UK. 158 As 
takeover activities emerged in the UK market, the balance of opinion was that “the 
                                                
156 IV Albert O. "Chip"Saulsbury, ‘The Availability of Takeover Defenses and Deal Protection 
Devices for Anglo-American Target Companies’ (2012) 37 Del J Corp 115, 117. 
157 These include the Accepting Houses Committee, the Association of Investment Trust, the British 
Insurance Association, the Committee of London Clearing Bankers and the London Stock Exchange. 
Cited from Sir Alexander Johnston 19. 
158 Sir Alexander Johnston, The City Take-over Code (Oxford University Press 1980) 19. 
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process is a natural one and, since it is generally based on the best utilisation of 
physical capacity, managerial experience and available labour, it has almost always 
proved to be in the national interest… (And) it is therefore important that it should 
continue and should not be artificially impeded.”159 More importantly, regulators 
shared similar views to scholars, such that the UK’s legislation comes originally from 
a perspective of favouring takeover bids. 
As mentioned, the UK has many institutional investors in its market as majority 
shareholders in companies, who are assumed to have the ability to make their own 
decisions regarding takeover issues. In the UK, this statutory system was principally 
orchestrated by the community of investment bankers and institutional investors; 
corporate managers were not a well organized demographic, and, compared with the 
American system, had little say in the formulation of the regulatory approach. As a 
result, it is unsurprising that the rules were primarily designed to protect the 
shareholders’ interests.160  
In addition, since there is always a concern regarding agency cost in dealing with 
major company issues, the majority shareholders, as institutional investors, would 
rather trust themselves over directors to take the final decision. Both Hogg v. 
Cramphorn Ltd.161 and Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd.162 established 
                                                
159 Ibid 20. 
160 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1731. 
161 Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254, [1966] 3 All E.R. 420. 
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that the question of the purpose of deploying takeover defence measures by directors 
must be established before the question of the effect of the decision on the 
shareholders’ rights - or the viability of a takeover - is addressed.163 In neither case 
was it in any doubt, based on the evidence, that the board’s motivations had been 
improper, but in every case the question of propriety is a matter of fact and of 
evidence.164 In this way, mistrust between the managers and the shareholders have 
the potential to be a big issue, because the shareholders are possible to believe that the 
directors did not act in the company’s or the shareholders’ best interest just because 
they have different ideas of these company issues.  
In October 1959, Notes on Amalgamations of British Business (Notes) was published 
which established takeover regulations’ principles and distinguished principles from 
procedure.165 The Notes delegate power to the shareholders to decide whether to sell 
their company or not, and suggests no interference in the free market. The principles 
the Notes set forward provided the basis for the future takeover regulation of UK. 
Shortly after the Notes were released, the Board of Trade set out Licensed Dealers’ 
(Conduct of Business) Rules (Rules) in August 1960. These establish the meaning of 
a “takeover offer” and are “a most effective and useful guide to the proper conduct of 
                                                                                                                                      
162 Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] A.C. 821, P.C., [1974] 1 All E.R. 1126, a case 
on appeal to the Privy Council from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
163 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 440. 
164 Ibid 440. 
165 Sir Alexander Johnston, ‘The City Take-over code’ in (Oxford University Press 1980) 20 The 
Notes do not provide too much detail regarding procedures but outline some general principles for 
practitioners to follow when they are dealing with takeovers. 
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takeover offers”.166 In 1963, the Notes were revised in a more logical order,167 and in 
1968 the Panel was established to issue and administer the City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers.168  
b. Features of related regulations  
At present, UK takeover activities are regulated by three major instruments. The first 
is the EU Directive on Takeover Bids (EU Directive), which sets out “minimum 
standards across the European Union for the regulation of takeover bids”.169  The 
second is the Companies Act 2006, which established how to regulate the manager’s 
actions, liabilities, compensation and other related rules, since both bidder companies 
and target companies involved in all takeover activities should obey the rules that the 
Companies Act sets. The third, and most important one, is the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers (the Code), the details of which regulate UK takeover 
activities, encompassing both principles and the procedures. 
The first piece of legislation is the EU Directive. The EU Directive drew reference 
from the UK’s approach to regulating takeover activities; hence it encourages the 
board of directors to remain neutral in its actions.170 But the EU Directive sets an 
                                                
166 Ibid 24. 
167 Chapter IV: First City Code and Panel in Sir Alexander Johnston, The City Take-over code (Oxford 
University Press 1980)  30-50. 
168 The Takeover Code 2013, overview and section 4(a).  
169 The Takeover Panel, The European Directive on Takeover Bids (Aug 2005) 2; EU Directive -- 
Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Art. 1.1. 
170 EU Directive -- Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Art. 3.1(c). 
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optional ‘breakthrough rule’171 to neutralize some of the takeover defensive measures 
in the event of hostile offers. However, few member states implement it. Meanwhile, 
the Directive is trying to harmonise the laws within EU countries and limit the ability 
of the controlling group to entrench its position and fend off appropriate offers.172  
The UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers is the major regulation relating to the 
takeover activities within the UK. Experts have generally lauded it as a system of 
self-regulation that offers the advantages of speed, flexibility and low-cost 
administration.173 Many of its provisions are uncontroversial and reflect a consensus 
view about the way in which takeovers should be carried out. However, the Code’s 
prohibition on defensive measures by management in the event of a takeover is far 
more controversial.174 
                                                
171 EU Directive -- Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Art. 11: 
“Where, following a bid, the offeror holds 75 % or more of the capital carrying voting rights, no 
restrictions on the transfer of securities or on voting rights referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 nor any 
extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the appointment or removal of board members 
provided for in the articles of association of the offeree company shall apply; multiple-vote securities 
shall carry only one vote each at the first general meeting of shareholders following closure of the bid, 
called by the offeror in order to amend the articles of association or to remove or appoint board 
members. To that end, the offeror shall have the right to convene a general meeting of shareholders at 
short notice, provided that the meeting does not take place within two weeks of notification.” 
172 Marco Ventoruzzo, ‘The Thirteenth Directive and the Contrasts Between European and U.S. 
Takeover Regulation: Different (Regulatory) Means, Not So Different (Political and Economic) Ends?’ 
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2013 63. 
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The City Code consists of six General Principles and 38 rules and is far more 
comprehensive than the Revised Notes. The Code required comparable treatment of 
shareholders of the same class, equality of information to all shareholders and that the 
offeree board must provide their shareholders with their opinion on the bid. The 
incumbent board’s opinion would be of considerable importance to target 
shareholders because of their detailed knowledge of the position and prospects of the 
business, and so, when combined with the common law duty, this provision of fair 
treatment to all the shareholders in the City Code175 considerably improved the 
ability of target company shareholders to make informed decisions. Common law was 
not well equipped to impose affirmative duties of disclosure on directors, particularly 
given that it does not in general impose fiduciary duties on directors towards 
individual shareholders.176 Rule 25.1 of the current version of the City Code requires 
the Board of the offeree to provide offeree shareholders with the board’s opinion of 
the offer together with the independent advice they have received. The Rule also 
details a number of issues that their opinion should consider and requires reasons to 
be given for the opinion.177 This could help with preventing certain issues happening 
                                                
175 It is stated by Andrew Johnston in ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives 
on the City Code’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 442 that “the Code required similar 
treatment of shareholders of the same class, equality of information to all shareholders and the offeree 
board to provide their shareholders with their opinion on the bid.” And see Gething v. Kilner [1972] 1 
All E.R. 1166, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 337. 
176 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 442. 
177 Ibid 442 note 98. 
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during the takeover process, and aimed to regulate takeover activity in detail with the 
Panel providing more professional and effective help.  
Thus it could be said that the introduction of the City Code effectively prevented a 
flow of litigation to the English courts.178 It also said that the City Code prohibits 
activities that hinder takeovers, which are swiftly and pre-emptively dealt with by the 
Takeover Panel.179 
2) Advantages 
The City Code has been amended frequently, except for its key provisions. In 2004, 
the European Takeover Directive180 was made to harmonise the rules of takeovers in 
the European Union and it set certain principles for the member states to follow and 
some optional arrangements for the member states to reserve the rights in 
implementing some rules.181 At that time, the UK Parliament passed legislation 
putting the Panel on a statutory footing for the first time, and the terms to enforce that 
were included in the Companies Act 2006. These terms of enforcement functioned as 
an authorization for the Panel to lay punishment directly on law-offenders, which is a 
sustainable advantage in keeping with a statutory approach.182 
                                                
178 The Howard Smith case was exceptional, arising from an appeal to the Privy Council from the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales. Cited from ibid note 90. 
179 Ibid 441. 
180 Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 (O.J. 2004 L142/12) . 
181 Ibid, a.12. 
182 Section 952 Companies Act 2006 gives the Panel power to impose sanctions on wrongdoers. 
Before this, the Panel had to rely on public censure of wrongdoers or on the FSA, which had endorsed 
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Moreover, it is noted that the UK system has prima facie advantages over the US 
system because the former’s procedures seem to be much ‘quicker, cheaper, and more 
certain’ than the latter system, which relies upon litigation.183 However, whether and 
to what extent takeover defensive measures should be permitted when a target 
company receives a hostile offer remain issues discussed by scholars. According to 
Amour and Skeel’s research, the City Code’s “no frustration action rule” seems to be 
based on the available empirical findings evidence.184  
In particular, the City Code is perceived to benefit dispersed shareholders, as it 
provides equal treatment, and some procedural protection, to shareholders. These 
protections also required practitioners to follow the ethical standards while 
performing their managerial duties.185  
The influence of the City Code was so substantial that it utterly altered the UK’s 
system of corporate governance. Because of its prohibition of defensive tactics when 
targets receive a hostile offer, it is claimed that managers were forced to focus on 
short-term value for shareholders and minimise general management discretion.186 
                                                                                                                                      
the City Code under s143 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, taking action at its request 
against “authorized persons”. Cited in Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and 
Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 447 note 112. 
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The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
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185 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
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The introduction of the City Code could therefore be said to have been good for 
corporate governance and received broad support from economists from a financial 
point of view.187  
There is a mandatory bid rule in the City Code that ensures all shareholders get a 
controlled premium. This provision can also prevent creeping acquisitions of control 
as well as encourage portfolio diversification. Thus, individual investors could control 
the level of risk of their investments. All takeover activities cost bidders a certain 
amount of extra money to pay the premium to all of the target company’s 
shareholders, meaning there may be fewer takeover bids as fewer potential bidders 
could afford such a cost; ultimately, this would potentially mean be fewer changes in 
corporate control. 188  It is understandable that shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders, are more concerned with their share premiums than the management of 
the company, hence this could maintain investors’ confidence to invest in the target 
company. The current management, to some extent, could improve because of the 
threat of removing them if a hostile bid is successful. 
3) Disadvantages 
                                                
187 F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Company Law (Cambridge, Mass. 1991) 
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In terms of the disadvantages of the UK’s regulatory system, it is argued that the City 
Code – and the prohibition on defensive measures in particular – was introduced 
because Common Law had demonstrated itself incapable of putting in place a system 
of takeover regulation that ensured takeovers remained a viable means of ensuring 
managerial accountability to shareholders. It also raised the question of how best to 
protect against the most competent controlling shareholders’ abuse of their rights 
when deciding to sell the company. That is to say, how to protect minority 
shareholders, given the knowledge gap between these shareholders and the controlling 
shareholders.189 
The UK Takeover Code strips the board of any ability to use takeover defences and 
now prohibits the use of deal protection devices.190 Instead, the authority to decide on 
the merits of a transaction rests solely with the shareholders of the company. By 
eliminating defences, the revised Takeover Code significantly reduces the board’s 
negotiating power and reduced the premiums for the shareholders.191  
It could be said that the market for corporate control is the product of explicit choices 
rather than natural forces,192 and it may be true that ‘policy choices’ are made in the 
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pursuit of better corporate governance and to better profits for shareholders. However, 
scholars have claimed that the regulations focus less on the benefits of bidder 
shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders 193  and more on an expedient 
takeover process.194  
4) Evaluation:  why this system is appropriate for the UK 
Even if there are many considerations that informed takeover regulation, only the 
aforementioned Notes reference litigation over frequently used defensive measures 
taken by boards of directors. In fact, what the courts have pursued is a way to resolve 
disputes by applying pre-existing directors’ duties. The Common Law approach sets 
out the fiduciary duties of directors and grants managers considerable discretion to 
make decisions as motivated by a proper purpose. Thus there is no fundamental 
difference between decisions taken to adopt takeover defensive measures and other 
managerial decisions.195 It is true that the detailed examination of the purposes 
behind a decision fits the existing managerial system of company law very well, but it 
also brings considerable uncertainty and delay from the investor’s point of view.  
                                                
193 Ibid 459. 
194 According to the timetable in the City code, all the preparation of the offer usually should be 
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195 Johnston explained that: “ Through the courts’ application of the proper purpose rule, managerial 
decisions that could be construed as defensive measures in response to takeovers were regulated no 
differently from any other managerial decisions.” In Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: 
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Thus, it has been said that “there was a danger that litigation itself could become a 
potent defensive measure.”196  
There is also a mandatory bid rule in the UK in order to protect minority shareholders 
by listing the circumstances when the bidding company should make a general offer. 
The Code requires that “when a mandatory offer is required and who is primarily 
responsible for make it except with the consent of the Panel, when: (a) any person 
acquires…an interest in shares which (taken together with shares in which persons 
acting in concert with him are interested) carry 30% or more of the voting rights of a 
company.”197 This rule complements the equal treatment principle of the Takeover 
Code which states that “all holders of the securities of an offeree company of the 
same class must be afforded equivalent treatment; moreover, if a person acquires 
control of a company, the other holders of securities must be protected”198. Thus, the 
requirement for a mandatory bid ensures that a premium is paid for the acquisition of 
control. 
At the same time, the equal treatment aspect ensures that all minority shareholders 
benefit from that premium.199 Common Law had not insisted on equal treatment of 
shareholders, as sales of shareholdings were considered a private matter with no 
implications for those outside the contract. Thus, when a bidder could purchase a 
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controlling shareholding or a large minority block in a private sale before launching a 
takeover bid, the remaining shareholders would find that their shares were valued on 
the basis of being a minority stake only.200 However, the Takeover Code provided 
sufficient protection for all the shareholders during a takeover activity by having the 
equal treatment rule. Equal treatment guaranteed all the shareholders were treated 
fairly and all of them would have an opportunity to oppose a takeover. The equal 
treatment of shareholders is manifest not only in the equal price of shares, but also the 
information disclosed about the takeover activity.201   
It is also claimed by scholars that, in terms of content, nothing has changed since the 
Directive was implemented – although some of the Code’s provisions now have 
Parliamentary approval. The dominant theoretical view of the City Code remains that 
it is both a regulatory solution to a market failure,202 and that it ensures managerial 
accountability to shareholders without creating externalities for third parties. 
Shareholders are conferred the right to decide whether to accept the offer of selling 
their shares at a premium or to refuse the offer and trust the current managers when 
they are faced with a bid.  
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More importantly, the Takeover Code placed a higher requirement on directors’ 
fiduciary duties than the common law by “embodying in a particularly clear way the 
principle that, during the course of a takeover bid, directors of the target company are 
meant to act as the agents of the shareholders”,203 whereas Company Law only 
requires directors “to act within [their] powers and to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole”, which afford inadequate 
protection to a target company’s shareholders.204 It was suggested, however, that the 
protection of minority shareholders would be improved if the law required directors to 
promote the success of the company in order to “benefit the members” rather than 
“the company as a whole”.205 Thus, the Takeover Code stipulates a non-frustration 
rule in Rule 21 to make sure directors will not do anything to frustrate a takeover 
offer without the shareholders’ approval.206 Consequently, this stipulation, and the 
mandatory bid rule both serve the principle of equal treatment to all shareholders in 
order to protect their rights; this protection could be an improvement over previous 
attempts because of its limiting the risk of the directors acting according to their own 
priorities when dealing with takeover offers.   
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At the same time, as discussed before, minority shareholders’ typical focus is on 
amount of premium, rather than managerial accountability, and takeover activities, 
especially hostile takeovers, could help fulfil the minority shareholders’ desire to 
receive a higher premium. Thus, letting the shareholders decide whether to accept a 
hostile takeover offer or not could be the best way for the minority shareholders to 
achieve their aim. Even though the City Code is criticised for only focusing on 
maintaining the majority shareholders – i.e., institutional investors’ – confidence by 
giving these shareholders the power to choose to defend against a takeover offer or 
not historically, it did help promote the operation of a market for corporate control 
and could benefit minority shareholders as well.207 Thus it could be said that the 
UK’s takeover regulatory system fits the British market properly, since the UK has 
both a large number of institutional investors and many minority shareholders.  
3. The US system of takeover regulation 
The US system of takeover regulation has mainly been influenced by four major 
sources: the Delaware law, the Williams Act, standards when dealing with hostile 
takeovers provided by some cases and the state antitrust law. It is, in a sense, more 
complicated than the UK system because each state has its own legislative authority. 
Even though there are some connections between each of them, as major principles 
are followed by every state in respect of regulating economic activities, differences do 
                                                
207 Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code’ 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 451. 
 
66 
exist among them. Data show that more than 50% of all US publicly-traded 
companies and 63% of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware, therefore 
Delaware Law is by far the most important source of regulation in the US.208 
Therefore, this section will focus on discussing the development of Delaware’s laws 
and consider other states’ regulations only where specifically relevant. 
1) Rationales & Regulations 
Takeover regulation in the US is totally different from in the UK, and this is evident 
in the absence of self-regulation in the US. The UK’s statutory system emerged 
because major shareholders are usually institutional investors and they can be trusted 
to have the experience to take crucial decisions regarding their company themselves. 
Most investors in the US, however, are different. There are few institutional investors 
who own a similar proportion of listed shares in the US as in the UK. Most American 
investors, at least at the time when legislators sought to regulate takeover activities, 
were retail investors who did not trust the “insiders” within financial institutions to 
control the company in their interests; thus, the UK’s statutory system is not preferred 
by US shareholders.209 
Regulating takeovers in the US began much earlier than the emergence of Delaware’s 
takeover cases in the 1980s, even though scholars often mention them 
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simultaneously.210 A series of New Deal reforms of banking and securities law in the 
1930s laid the foundation for US takeover regulation, and after 30 years, hostile 
takeovers began to emerge. At that time, both the reform of Delaware’s corporate law 
and amendments to the securities laws of the Williams Act were passed by Congress. 
These legislative developments were influenced by the 1930s reforms and the final 
decision was taken to leave the takeover regulation to Delaware courts.211 
a. Brief introduction of why regulation of takeovers occurred 
The 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts were passed in the wake of the 1929 Crash and the 
early years of the Great Depression, and sought to correct the perceived market 
abuses of the 1920s by imposing new disclosure and antifraud regulations.212 
To conduct a hostile takeover, two methods were often used: the first is a proxy 
contest, and the other is a hostile tender offer. The proxy contest is conducted by 
insurgents to persuade other shareholders to vote on “contested issues and board seats” 
in order to change the controlling group in the company, while a tender offer is made 
directly by a bidder to other shareholders, indicating the desire to buy their shares to 
                                                
210 John Joseph Wallis, ‘The New Deal’  available at  
<http://econweb.umd.edu/~wallis/oup_newdeal_FTE.pdf> accessed 21 Jan 2013. 
211 Andrew N. Vollmer Andrew E. Nagel, and Paul R.Q. Wolfson, ‘The Williams Act: A Truly 
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control the company.213 Its use of proxy contest can be dated to 1954, when Robert R. 
Young214 launched a hotly contested and ultimately successful proxy contest215 for 
control of the New York Central Railroad, which was viewed as an assault on the 
existing norms of Wall Street behaviour and discouraged public challenges to 
corporate directors.216 However, proxy contests were not an effective mechanism to 
obtain control of the company, because their success depended greatly on a bidder’s 
persuasive powers and the extent of a company’s shareholders’ dissatisfaction. 
Instead, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, corporate raiders found another useful 
mechanism — the tender offer.217 
Soon after the introduction of the tender offer, in the late 1960s, merger and 
acquisition activities intensified, so regulators in the US made a series of important 
reforms to make the legislative framework fit the new market. Most reforms had an 
effect on legislation that lasted until the end of the 1990s; the most significant was the 
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expansion of the powers of a company to indemnify its directors. This change was 
made by the 1976 amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation Law, which also 
reviewed self-interested transactions, included a provision authorizing ‘cash-out 
mergers’,218 and reduced the availability of appraisal rights.219 
Although none of the major changes were directly aimed at the emergence of hostile 
takeover bids, the managers’ frequently raised proposal to reform takeover legislation 
was finally taken into account by legislator. Expanded indemnification provided more 
protection against the possibility of fiduciary duty litigation and more protections 
were provided for directors when exercising their rights.220 
By the 1980s, most takeover defence tactics had been tested in the market and had 
been judged proper or not by the Delaware courts: when target companies were facing 
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a hostile bidder,221 nearly all of the most important cases would make their way 
through the Delaware courts – even though Delaware’s pre-eminence as the leading 
state of incorporation had started to fade since the 1960s.222 
The ground rules that defined how 1980s takeover bids were structured were put in 
place by the other major 1960s reform, the Williams Act. In its original incarnation, 
as introduced by New Jersey Senator Harrison Williams in 1965, the Bill would have 
made it unlawful for a bidder to acquire more than 5% of a target company’s stock 
“until the expiration of twenty days after such person has sent to the [target company], 
and has filed with the [SEC] a statement” describing, among other things, “the 
background and identity of all persons”.223  
In 1968224, Congress passed the Williams Act, the aim of which was to “protect 
individual shareholders when there are corporate raiders who are attempting to take 
over their stocks of the target company225 by addressing the bidder’s information 
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disclosure duties and setting up some procedure requirements”.226 Specifically, the 
Williams Act required bidders to disclose certain information, including their 
background and identity, the source of funds, the purpose of the takeover, etc.,227 
when the bidder obtained more than five per cent of a target’s shares228. Moreover, 
the Act gave the shareholders of the target company the right to withdraw tendered 
shares in the first seven days of the tender offer, in addition to other articles pertaining 
to share price that protected shareholders’ benefits. 229  
Thus, the Williams Act helped prevent bidders from conducting a so-called “Saturday 
night special” tender offer to push shareholders to make a decision on tendering their 
shares and “make the offer available on a first come, first served basis”. 230 
Meanwhile, directors of target companies were restrained by their fiduciary duties as 
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interpreted by the American courts when dealing with an offer. 231 In addition, 
shareholders could consider the offer over a proper time period, and would not be 
penalised if they withdraw their tendered shares. Thus, it could be said that the 
Williams Act gave shareholders more protection in takeover activities.  
In 1985, many defensive tactics were employed by directors,232 until the poison pill 
and other defensive measures were challenged by some institutional investors to 
increase the likelihood of a tender offer succeeding.233 At that time, there was a sharp 
increase in the frequency of takeover activities such as had not happened since the 
great merger wave at the end of the Gilded Age.234 Most managers used a variety of 
defensive tactics to fight hostile bidders; one of the most influential was the poison 
pill,235 developed by Marty Lipton who was a co-founder of New York’s Wachtell 
Lipton.236 The Delaware Supreme Court also issued landmark opinions on regulating 
defensive measures. For example, in the case of Moran v. Household Int’s, Inc., the 
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court held that “the poison pills are not per se impermissible, despite the fact that they 
discriminate between the tender offer bidder and other shareholders of the target 
company”.237  
Additionally, there were several cases that promoted the development of Delaware 
takeover regulations and helped establish directors’ duties and general principles 
when dealing with the takeover bids. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 238 
judges established a two-part test for directors on deciding whether to adopt defensive 
measures against a hostile bid. First, that the defensive tactics should be employed to 
an threat to the target company and second, that the directors needed to prove they 
were acting in good faith in respect of corporate governance and had conducted 
reasonable investigations to believe the offer was a danger to current corporate policy 
and effectiveness.239 Consequently, the poison pill was accepted by the court as a 
feasible takeover defensive measure in the US. 
Once a hostile bid was in process, directors’ duties changed, as determined in Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.240 Directors were permitted to use 
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defence tactics to get the highest possible price for shareholders once shareholders 
had decided to sell the company, or the company would be broken up.241 
At the end of the 1980s, more than 40 states enacted takeover defence legislation that 
was almost the same as the Delaware style that protected directors of companies in 
employing takeover defensive measures. Moreover, almost every state legislature 
gave target companies’ managers “new tools for resisting unwanted takeover bids”.242 
That said, it is difficult to find any systematic research on whether other states still 
follow Delaware’s standards. 
b. Features of related regulations   
US takeover legislation has some specific features, as will be detailed. Firstly, 
directors are fully bonded by their fiduciary duties in running the day-to-day business 
affairs under Delaware corporation law, and their duties were enhanced in excising 
their power of controlling the corporation when facing a hostile offer under the 
Unocal and Revlon standards.243 Secondly, Delaware law allows the directors of a 
target company to employ a variety of takeover defensive tactics if they believe that a 
hostile offer poses a threat to the current corporate governance of the target company 
and will not have good prospects for the benefit of shareholders in the future. 
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Moreover, there is a constituency statute that allows the directors to frustrate a 
takeover bid to protect stakeholders when they think the takeover would infringe the 
stakeholders’ interest in most states in the US.244 The most famous example is the 
invention of the poison pill as a defensive measure, a tactic that was, subsequently, 
widely used in the US – but only the classic version of the poison pill is accepted.  
To be specified, Delaware law prevents a hostile bidder from completing a back-end 
merger245 with a target company for three years after buying more than 15% of a 
target’s shares unless: 1. The bidder gains approval of the target board in advance; 2. 
The bidder goes from less than 15% ownership of the target to more than 85% 
ownership in a single tender offer; or 3. The bidder gains approval from two-thirds of 
the disinterested shares after buying more than 15%.246 Section 203 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (DGCL) was enacted in 1988, providing the bidders a 
“meaningful opportunity for success”. 
The UK’s takeover regulation was influenced by tax, at first, as mentioned in the 
previous section; it has also been argued that the incentive for regulating Delaware 
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takeovers was also influenced by franchise tax structures. 247  In addition, the 
development of US takeover regulations “depended upon the accumulation of 
common law precedents”, while the UK’s were motivated by the needs of the 
market.248 US judges could only make decisions in cases already presented to them; 
thus the evolution of US takeover law was highly dependent upon judges having to 
settle disputes. Whether directors or shareholders could take advantage of litigation 
seems to be decided on the basis of the specific group of litigants – “which group is 
better-organized or funded than the others, the content of the law may be expected to 
develop in a manner favourable to their interests”.249 Accordingly, US takeover 
regulations clearly benefit managers more than shareholders since “they had enough 
time to wage an effective campaign against a hostile bidder”.250 It is also hard for 
bidders to succeed in a hostile bid as there are various defensive measures that 
directors can use to defend against their offers. 
2) Advantages 
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The US enjoys the efficiencies of having one language, one country and one market 
across a continent,251 and thus US takeover regulations are in one sense, less 
complicated. As stated, in the US, half of all publicly-held companies are 
incorporated in Delaware, and the debate over antitakeover law has therefore focused 
almost exclusively on Delaware law.   
It is true that the availability of takeover defensive tactics and deal protection devices 
in Delaware corporate law gives managers of the target companies more negotiating 
power to fight for a higher premium for shareholders in takeover activities than that in 
the UK,252 and that some empirical studies show the advantages of US legislation in 
this respect.253 Since most of directors of target companies are professionals and are 
experienced in corporate governance, but most shareholders are not, directors could 
provide shareholders with an expert analysis of a bidder’s offer and enable them to 
make a more informed choice on whether to accept the offer. Thus, the onus of 
negotiating power on directors could reasonably let these professionals generate 
additional value for a target company’s shareholders.254 
Even if directors cannot be totally trusted not to take any defensive measures in their 
own interest, there are remedies provided by Delaware law. In fact, Delaware law 
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requires higher standards of directors when they are dealing with an offer. In order to 
prevent directors abusing their negotiating rights to fight against a hostile bid, 
accepting a lower bid by managers simply with the reason of better long-term 
prospects is forbidden by the Delaware law. It would require rather the directors 
accept the highest bid for the shareholders than picking the lowest one with such 
reasons if the company is inevitably be taken over by the bidder.255 In addition, if the 
directors did refuse an offer because of the threat of being removed by the bidder, 
shareholders still have the right to sell the company.256 More importantly, it is 
criticised by the scholars that the constituency statute has negative effect on the 
shareholders’ interest in companies incorporated in the states passing the stakeholder 
constituency statute in the US.257 
Directors are restrained by their fiduciary duties to a company, so it is reasonable to 
trust directors nominated to manage the company. Section 203 of DCGL encourages a 
‘fair deal’ for all shareholders, and its primary strength is that it forces a bidder to pay 
“for the inherent value of the corporation”.258 Thus it could be predicted that 
shareholders at least would not be selling their company at a loss in the short-term. 
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On top of these advantages, deal protection devices attached to a merger agreement 
could be a “signal to the market that the company is an attractive target”259 such that 
it may attract more new bidders to a target company to choose a favourable bidder. 
Delaware law adopts less target protections, because there were relatively few 
potential target companies located in Delaware (most of the companies are major 
American corporations).260 Thus, if target protection is too strong, there will be no 
possibility for the existence of hostile bids, which will not help the development of 
the market. Indeed, the availability of takeover defence tactics could be seen as target 
protection, to some extent, and seems to be adequate for the target to fight against the 
hostile bidder or find a best offer. 
3) Disadvantages 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the potential of agency costs in the US may be more 
self-evident compared with the UK, because US directors have the power to take 
defensive measures against a hostile takeover offer and there is a very clear danger of 
self-interest tainting the actions of directors. That means that the threat of a breach of 
fiduciary duties by directors still exists. Any defensive response must ultimately 
permit the existing board to be replaced, if it should fail to deliver, through proxy 
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machinery.261 The primary purpose for which the directors used their powers may be 
for shareholders’ benefit, but directors may nonetheless adopt improper defensive 
measures, for example because they were directly motivated by maintaining their 
positions on the board or their control over the company.262 However, if the aim of 
frustrating actions against the corporate raiders was to protect business plans, this 
could be good for the company, and even the community in which it is based, and 
such actions should be allowed.  
As noted above, Section 203 of the DGCL is different to other provisions in the US 
because it details some restrictions on abusing takeover defensive measures.263 
However, an empirical study has shown some defects in that provision. The study was 
conducted between January 1988 and December 2008 and revealed the following: 
firstly, over that 21-year period, no bidder necessitated the applicability of Section 
203 as a condition to their offer; secondly, no bidder’s holding shares went from less 
than 15 per cent to more than 85 per cent in a singer tender offer in these years, results 
which reflect an inconsistency with the claims of the proponents of Section 203; and 
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thirdly, that “no bidder ‘busted through’ and suffered the three-year moratorium on a 
business combination that Section 203 requires”.264 
More importantly, it was found that acquisitions may “reduce the managerial slack by 
replacing inefficient management”; thus, the takeover activities could constrain 
directors to work in shareholders’ interests and keep the market more competitive.265 
The availability of the takeover defensive tactics within the US regulatory system 
may reduce the number of takeovers; hence this system stems the market’s 
development. Moreover, shareholders in the US complain of being treated unequally 
in respect of some takeover defences, such as “greenmail” or “poison pills”, and the 
US’s directors’ positions seems to be more secure than it is in the UK. These factors 
have attracted criticism from researchers because they reduce the accountability of a 
board in adopting defensive measures as well as the power of shareholders to remove 
the board in a proxy contest.266 
4) Evaluation: why this system is appropriate for the US 
Regarding US takeover regulation, it is said that a jurisdiction’s laws should facilitate 
takeover bids while restricting the possibility of two major conflicts — “the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders, and of interest between majority 
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shareholders and minority shareholders”.267 US takeover regulations could be said to 
successfully satisfy these primary goals, as in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
the Delaware court established the rules to test whether directors have proven 
reasonable grounds “by showing good faith and reasonable investigation”268 to 
defend against a takeover offer while there is a conflict of interest between directors 
and the shareholders.  
In addition, even though there is no legislation like the EU Directive to guide US 
takeover regulation, they have nonetheless been significantly affected by anti-trust 
law.269  In the US, however, the absence of restrictions on defensive measures that 
may be employed to repel a hostile bid is questionable.270 Moreover, the debate 
regarding antitakeover legislation has been claimed to have significant influence on 
its economy.271 
The existence of strict SEC requirements and greater possibilities for “delaying” 
litigation than in the UK, as well as the absence of a mandatory bid rule, make hostile 
takeover bids in the US risky. Charter amendments to “stagger” board changes or 
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authorise preferred stock issues to “friendly” parties are widely accepted in the US as 
legitimate defence tactics.272 These measures will hinder the taking of control over a 
target company. 
In terms of questions about breaches of fiduciary duties by directors, it is said that the 
US does not practice an unrestrained free market in relation to hostile takeover 
bids.273 Defences are sometimes allowed where appropriate and directorial discretion 
is subjected to safeguards. This may protect business developments for the longer 
term at the expense of premiums for target company shareholders. Accordingly, the 
US, to some extent, does set a series of principles that directors should follow and 
gives directors a limited freedom to decide the future of the company – whether to sell, 
or refuse the premium that the bidder offered. This could be a good reference for 
regulating takeover activities as well.274  
Additionally, a main consideration in the Delaware courts’ decisions to allow 
managers to use defensive tactics was that shareholders have a safety value – i.e., 
their voting rights. Thus, should managers be faced with a hostile takeover and try to 
block shareholders from exercising their voting rights, Delaware courts require them 
to meet an almost impossible standard: they have to convince the court that there was 
a compelling justification for preventing shareholders from exercising their voting 
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rights.275 This could be seen as a protection for shareholders in preventing directors 
from breaching their duties to safeguard their rights. However, the focus is on the 
process of informing the board, not necessarily on the merits of the decision, which is 
where the similarities of the two regulatory systems end. While the US gives directors 
a great deal of autonomy in deciding on the merits of a deal, the UK gives this power 
to shareholders.276 No one can guarantee whether a hostile takeover offer will benefit 
a target company’s shareholders in the long run, however, and there could be takeover 
offers which may benefit the shareholders in the short-, but not the long-term. Thus it 
could be a risky choice for the decision makers whether to sell the company or not 
and if the directors have the power to make the decision, it is not hard to find a good 
reason to convince US authorities that they are acting in shareholders’ interests. 
Consequently, it could be possible that directors may use takeover defensive measures 
de facto on the basis of their own interest rather than the shareholders’ in the US, and 
the shareholders have to take the risk of premium losses. At the same time, even if the 
US has tried its best to prevent the directors to act in their own interest, it is criticized 
by David Millon that “shareholder primacy is not a legal doctrine”.277 It is argued 
“corporate law ends up being irrelevant to the crucial question of corporate purpose 
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and management’s responsibility, leaving them largely within the discretion of 
management itself”.278 Thus it could be said that the prevention of directors acting for 
their own interest could be less effective as Delaware law desires. In the UK, however, 
shareholders can make their own decision whether to take that risk or not, provided 
that directors offer objective advice to them.   
4. Conclusion 
The UK and the US are both good examples of systems that regulate takeover 
activities: their lawmakers duly considered the market features, differences between 
their markets and the developmental directions of their markets before making 
regulations in order to make sure they would fit their market and cooperate with 
corporate governance improvement. Thus, these two distinctive regulatory systems 
could work well in either market and have improved gradually during their 
development. If China wants to have a proper takeover regulatory system, these 
factors should also be valued; otherwise it is hard to say the regulatory system would 
work. Furthermore, there is another principal factor that will shape takeover 
regulation – the differences in the political power of market players.279 In China, this 
might influence takeover activities more than it does in western countries due to the 
existence of state-owned companies. Therefore, in the following chapters, political 
differences will also be discussed as different levels of political power on the part of 
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market players could possibly lead to an unfair market and make takeover regulations 
hard to implement.  
In addition, the anti-trust impact on takeover regulations cannot be ignored: firstly, 
“the links between industrial concentration and the danger of monopolistic pricing”280 
are a possible result of a successful takeover transaction, and secondly, merger policy 
has been particularly influenced by economic analysis281 and all efforts put into 
regulating the market are for a better economic performance of companies and a 
better economic order. These factors should be considered when designing the 
regulation of takeover activities.  
Despite the different approaches that the US and UK take in regulating M&A 
activities, the substantive requirements for directors’ approval is almost identical. In 
addition, the general powers and duties of American and British directors parallel one 
another.282 Both jurisdictions require directors of a target company to approve merger 
transactions. In both the US and the UK, the incentive of the directors’ business 
decisions is always the key point when analysing the actions of directors during the 
sale of company, and courts generally give deferential treatment to directors. More 
importantly, directors in the US, under Smith v. Van Gorkom283 in Delaware and 
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those in the UK under the Takeover Code have a duty to be adequately informed and 
must seek the advice of independent financial advisors on the adequacy of the offer.  
In addition, both sets of takeover regulations become increasingly bidder-friendly 
with increasing geographic scope284 and, within jurisdictions, reflect the respective 
political interests of bidder and target firms. In the UK, there is a uniform regulatory 
system to provide guidance about takeover activities, while in the US, situations are 
more complicated, as they must reference both federal and state law, and each US 
state has different regulations. Resultantly, solutions to the same takeover issue could 
be different between different states.  
Overall, all western legislation and the law of the state of incorporation on takeover 
activities provides a good reference for China in order to better enable her to perfect 
her own legislation. To achieve that, one should also consider the principal factors 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, and the anti-trust influence on merger 
policy, as well as some special conditions of China’s market. Thereafter, this 
regulation could be expected to be a good and appropriate one, which might work 
well in the Chinese market and help maximizing the benefits for participants in a 
takeover transaction.  
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Chapter 3: Background to regulation of 
takeovers and comparative study of UK, US and 
China: comparisons of shareholding structures, 
market features and legislative frameworks 
Executive Summary 
This chapter will further the discussion of China’s circumstances compared with those 
of the US and UK in order to establish whether certain takeover defensive measures 
could work in China, and which system China should adopt in terms of anti-takeover 
regulations. Whilst the last chapter focused more on political and social reasons 
behind the UK and US regulatory systems, this chapter will consider legal and 
economic factors to establish the differences between China and the western markets 
and reveal the difficulties of simply transplanting a western-style regulatory system 
into China.  
To compare the US, UK and Chinese markets, this chapter will first consider the 
differences in ownership structures between the three countries. Both the UK and the 
US have highly dispersed shareholding structures; the UK has more institutional 
investors, and the US has more non-financial investors. China’s market has a highly 
concentrated ownership structure with a distinct ‘Yigu Duda’ problem, because the 
state indirectly holds a large percentage of shares in SOEs. Even though China 
enacted shareholding structure reform, the problem of concentrated ownership still 
exists and might be the main issue in seeking to transplant western laws to China. 
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This chapter will also compare the histories of the three markets and outline that the 
UK and the US have international and more advanced markets with long histories of 
development, while China’s market is still young and needs much more work to 
develop. Thus, the western markets are currently more effective than China’s. It is 
also argued that the share price of companies in the Chinese market does not reflect 
the real value of its companies. In addition, the western markets give shareholders 
more power, but China’s immature market does not protect minority shareholders’ 
rights as well as majority shareholders’.  
This chapter will also discuss the varying legal frameworks of these countries and 
explain how much of China’s takeover legislation is drawn from each of the US’s and 
UK’s systems. The chapter notes that there are rules in China which only exist in 
name, with the state having too much power in the market because of the large 
percentage of shares it owns. The UK and the US have well developed legal 
frameworks and supervisory authorities to regulate and watch over the market. In case 
of disputes, they can provide good protection for shareholders. The main concern in 
these countries is the protection of minority shareholders because of the dispersed 
shareholder structures they have. China’s legal system still lacks experience and 
relevant legislation, however. Corporate governance and supervision problems are 
still serious issues in China’s market and the development of China’s legal regimes in 
regulating takeover activities has not caught up with the developmental pace of the 
market, so the law cannot yet solve all the problems that emerge. In addition, the 
supervisory body, the CSRC, is not free from the government to provide independent 
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supervision over the market and needs to improve the quality of its supervision of the 
market.  
Consequently, due to the existence of these differences between China and the 
western countries, not all law that has worked well in western countries will also work 
well in China. Thus any attempt at transplanting certain takeover defensive measures 
to China should first consider these differences and analyse whether they would fit 
China’s market or not. 
 
1. Introduction 
The regulation of takeover activities matters to future practice. China’s market is 
distinctive. Factors that should be considered in the design of a proper regulatory 
framework are as follows: what is the legislators’ attitude towards takeover activities? 
Can the institutional investors’ judgement be trusted? How can the interests of 
conflicted groups in a transaction (such as minority and majority shareholders; 
shareholders and directors) be balanced? And how might the on-going reform of 
SOEs change the highly concentrated shareholding structure? The new Chinese 
government is still working on reforms and will issue a plan as to how to continue 
these reforms in the near future. 
Takeover defensive tactics may reduce the likelihood of M&A activities to some 
extent, and might also protect very valuable listed companies from hostile takeover. 
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At present, most Chinese companies only use anti-trust law as a defence to fight 
against hostile offers, with no, or few, other measures taken by target companies 
except for asking for governmental help in seeking judgements regarding 
monopolization, and that is why China still requires regulation for takeover defence 
tactics.    
Historically, Chinese SOEs tried to raise funds from the Hong Kong stock market in 
the 1990s, when the Chinese authorities were persuaded by financial experts to adopt 
the regulations then used in Hong Kong.285 In addition, the members who drafted 
Mainland China’s takeover regulations consulted Hong Kong experts in their law 
making process; thus, the influence of Hong Kong’s takeover regulations is strong.286 
As Hong Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom until 1997, Hong Kong’s legal 
system is based on a British legal regime. This is one reason why China’s takeover 
legal system chose a British-style system initially. Also, since creating a totally new 
regulation or legislation in a new area could be time-consuming for China then, and at 
that time China do not have sufficient experience in regulating a stock market with 
the backward economy. Moreover, since the takeover regulation worked well in 
Hongkong and the UK, localize this relatively mature regulation system into China’s 
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new market would be appropriate and it would help China focus on developing its 
economy. 
However, transplanting a western regulatory system into Mainland China is not such 
an easy thing because of the different market structure, legal systems, and even 
cultures that may have some effects on transplanted laws. One thing to be noted is 
that “the effectiveness of the various functions of the takeover regulation depend on 
the corporate governance systems they are part of”,287 in that takeover regulation can 
significantly influence the efficiency of a market. It is therefore necessary to discuss 
the development of the markets and relevant legislation, in the UK, US, and China. 
This can facilitate an understanding of how and why some regulations work in 
specific markets, which is important to establish in assessing which regulatory system 
will work for China and, as a result, which way China should go with her market and 
system of legislation. This chapter will therefore introduce the features of these three 
markets through an explanation of how these markets developed and what the 
characters of these markets are. China’s highly concentrated shareholding structures 
will also be discussed. Discussion will focus on a comparison of the legal frameworks 
of these three countries. In each case, regulation was intended to solve certain issues, 
which arose during a certain period, so no one system can fit where the same kind of 
market and a similar legal framework do not exist. Following the analysis and 
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comparison of these three countries, the discussion of multiple forms of defensive 
tactics will be conducted in subsequent chapters.  
2. Different ownership structures and markets  
The markets of the US, the UK and China are not the same. They have each enjoyed 
unique developmental histories and have different shareholding structures. Thus, to 
find out which rules are most suitable for each market, it is useful to know something 
about the features of each of them. 
1) Differences in ownership structures 
a. UK and the US’s ownership structures 
Both the UK and US have highly dispersed shareholding structures, but research 
shows that the patterns of share ownership are different for each country. 288 
According to Short and Keasey, institutional investors occupy a large proportion of 
the total UK shareholdings, while in the US, most shares are held by households - one 
of the non-financial sectors. Institutional investors are said to be more active in 
corporate governance because there are fewer restrictions in the UK. In the US, 
restrictions on institutional investors are far more stringent, to prevent individuals 
from holding too large a stake in an individual company, also raising the cost to 
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financial institutions of participating in corporate governance.289  Whether dispersed 
shareholding ownership is beneficial or not is disputed, but research has suggested 
that there may be a connection between dispersed shareholding ownership and the 
emergence of takeover activities. That is, the emergence of takeover activities may 
have pushed the development of both the US and the UK’s shareholding structures 
gradually.290 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the timeline of merger waves is highly similar to 
the timeline of the transition of both the UK and the US ownership structures from 
family-oriented to a more dispersed set-up. Scholars have concluded that the takeover 
process was crucial to the evolution of the ownership and board control of British 
companies.291 The US ownership structure started its transition from the end of 19th 
century to the beginning of 20th century, and the US merger wave emerged at almost 
the same time.292 The UK ownership structure was not as dispersed as the US at that 
time. In fact, in the 1920s, after the US shareholding structure had completed its 
evolution, UK companies were still highly family-oriented, and remained so until the 
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late 1950s.293 Research showed that during the 1950s, family board members still had 
a considerable influence in corporate governance in many key business enterprises,294 
and data also show that family representation on the boards of companies was high.295 
However, during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a remarkable “decline [in] family 
power in British industry”296 which accelerated the pace of ownership change in the 
UK. After that, the UK market developed to be similar to the US, with ownership 
separated from control. This ownership change improved corporate governance in the 
UK (and the US), and made the capital market more effective. Furthermore, merger 
waves helped the expansion of companies from their hometowns to the national level, 
issuing shares to a wide range of investors in the process.297 
The UK capital market is said to be “deep and efficient” and, according to the UK’s 
listing rules, “actively discourage[s] block-holdings of above 30%” which has 
encouraged “the strong dominance of the widely-held ownership group”.298 
 
                                                
293 David J. Jeremy, A Business History of Britain (OUP 1998) 199 and 205-209. 
294 Andrea Coli and Mary B. Rose, ‘Families and Firms: The Culture and Evolution of Family Firms in 
Britain and Italy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’ (1999) 47 Scandinavian Economic History 
Review 31,37. 
295 Julian R Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, ‘The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and 
Control ’ (2003) CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3822 12.  
296 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control: 
The British Experience’ (2004) 46 Business History 256, 284. 
297 Julian R Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, ‘The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and 
Control ’ (2003) CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3822 22. 
298 Jeremy Grant and Thomas Kirchmaier, ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe’ 
(2005) 2 European Management Review 231, 231. 
 
96 
b. Yigu Duda (highly concentrated Shareholding Structures in China) 
In China, however, things are more complicated due to the controversial nature of 
China’s shareholding structure. Most shareholding structures are either highly 
concentrated or highly dispersed, and most major shareholders are institutional 
investors. In many cases, the controlling shareholder is the state. Data show that, up to 
the end of 2008, only a small number of companies listed in China were controlled by 
foreign investors, and about 35 per cent of listed companies were controlled by 
private investors. The rest were controlled directly or indirectly (through different 
entities) by the state.299 Moreover, at that time, hostile takeovers seemed impossible 
in that market because most state-owned shares are non-tradable.  
In the 1990s, the purpose of listing Chinese SOEs on the stock market was to improve 
SOEs’ corporate governance and raising capital by offering shares to the public and 
minority shareholders who might put pressure on the board of directors and give the 
SOEs the impetus to resolve long-standing financing problems.300  
From 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has led a ‘share 
segregation reform’ to convert non-tradable shares in China’s market into 
publicly-tradable shares. This reform is aiming at diversifying the shareholding 
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structure for China’s listed companies.301 The reform has successfully prevented the 
government from being both the main sponsor of SOEs and the manager at the same 
time, in order to liberate the executive board of listed companies. However, as in a 
shareholder-friendly market, the state still has certain powers over major decisions, 
such as the sale of the companies. According to the data of both CRSC and 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC),302 there were 953 listed companies out of total 2,387303 in the A share 
market in China which involved the state as a stakeholder, with a total value of 13.71 
trillion RMB investment.304 Even if the state claims that they are freeing the market 
to make it one without government interference (the SASAC has promised to allow 
listed companies to be managed by the executives, and not the authority itself), its 
influence over listed companies is still strong, with a large amount of shares of 
controlled by the state authority indirectly. It could be argued that the performance of 
SOEs “was not significantly different than that of private-sector firms in the same 
industry”.305 However, some scholars disagree, and have argued that this research 
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and its conclusion had limitations.306  Additionally, SOEs may never face the 
problem of “hard budget constraints”,307 as the state has taxation powers and may use 
them to rescue an SOE from funding difficulties. Moreover, it is also suggested that 
the SOEs lack discipline in the capital market, which made them “less motivated and 
efficient than private companies”.308 
2) Differences between China’s market and the UK and US markets 
To understand the takeover-related issues in a specific market, it is necessary to 
discuss what kind of market it is, whether mergers and acquisitions happen frequently 
and then one can make a judgement as to what kind of legislation will be most suited 
to that market. As the UK and the US have developed markets, it will be helpful to 
discuss these markets’ developmental process and their features, and then compare 
them with China’s market. 
The US and the UK markets are the two foremost international markets in the world. 
The former is the more ‘popular’, with most of the Fortune 500 companies listed on it, 
and is more familiar to Chinese companies because some Chinese companies are now 
listed there. The latter has evolved gradually, “from a market organized to trade in 
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government securities to a market spanning the globe and the industrial spectrum”.309 
Scholars have found that the “correlation between the UK and the US markets [has 
increased] since the 1950s, and in the years since 2010 has been stronger than 
ever”.310    
 
a. Brief introduction to the development of UK and US markets 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) dates from 1792 and became the major US 
securities market within a few decades of its founding.311 It is the largest securities 
market in the world.312 It is said that the reason the NYSE is the dominant market is a 
combination of both Dutch and British “financial innovation and entrepreneurship”,313 
and the NYSE playing to its strengths over time.  
The US market has experienced some disruption during these 400 years, particularly 
in 1929. At the beginning of 1920s, the US stock market experienced a huge increase 
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in its total volume and “the public entered the market in greater and greater 
numbers”.314 It was said to be a New Era in America at that time, but there was the 
storm shortly after the boom, when on the 23rd of October, 1929, there was an 
incredible rapidly fall in the stock market, bringing this New Era to its end.315 This 
crisis provided a lesson to investors that an immature market without regulation or 
supervision can threaten society.316  
A recent change in the NYSE came in 2005 when the NYSE became an advanced 
“hybrid market”,317 which “combines cutting-edge technology with human judgment 
and accountability to create strong, transparent financial markets”.318 This change 
increased competition within the companies listed on the NYSE and led it to be a 
more efficient market with better services.319 One thing is certain after its centuries of 
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development: the US market is very attractive to investors because it could be said to 
be the most mature market in the world.  
In the UK, there were once much smaller provincial stock exchanges,320 but the 
major stock market is the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE merged lots of 
stock exchanges to incorporate its branches, such as the Glasgow Stock Exchange, 
and dates back to the 17th century.321 Over about 300 years of development, the 
London Stock Exchange has “expanded in geographic breadth from national to 
international and in industrial scope from governments to various industrial 
securities”.322 Now it has about 3,000 companies from more than 70 countries trading 
on it,323 making it one of the most international markets in the world. The types of 
shares listed on the LSE are various, but the most important one is the ordinary 
share.324 It is generally believed that most of the shares issued before 1885 were 
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ordinary shares325; shortly after that, 12 per cent of listed companies shares were 
preference shares,326 which were mostly issued by “overseas railroad and finance 
companies”.327 By the end of the 1890s, the commercial banks and other financial 
institutions became more and more competitive in the market than the large merchant 
banks, which has previously played a key role in the LSE,328 making the market 
livelier.  
The LSE has undergone various revolutions over the course of its development, 
including some very significant recent change. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the 
internationalization of finance had changed the world economy dramatically. The US 
had already started to prepare their market for a more international outlook at that 
time,329 and in the 1980s, the volume of the Tokyo Stock Exchange was big enough 
to challenge the leadership of the NYSE and the LSE.330 Thus it is reasonable to 
think that the UK would have lost its market share had it not made some changes to 
keep up with other markets. After the Big Bang of October 1986, the LSE came to be 
dominated by non-member firms, which enabled the exchange to function as a mutual 
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organization for all members; it also reformed trading technology to make all 
transactions more promptly. The removal of price fixing in trading commissions was 
another outcome of the Big Bang.331 The Big Bang not only changed the LSE; it also 
made things different elsewhere. UK financial institutions’ structures changed.332 The 
financing atmosphere became more competitive than before. Secondly, after the 
Financial Services Act 1986, investor protection was increased. Additionally, the 
development of risk products threatened the LSE’s trading during these years.333  
The Big Bang raised awareness of the effectiveness of investor protection, and during 
the revolution that followed, the government deregulated the financial markets and 
increased its attention on the protection of investors.334 Today, the London capital 
market is extremely competitive in the world economy, just like the US. 
b. A brief introduction to China’s market 
China’s market is young compared with the US and the UK markets, but its 
development has been incredibly rapid. The emergence of the household contract 
responsibility system (HCRS)335 directed the original shape of the shareholding 
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economy that provided the foundation of building a capital market in China.336 In 
1981, China’s financial market was created to meet the rapidly growing economy by 
establishing a bond market.337 Shortly after that, the government recognised that the 
bond market could not meet the liquidity needs of the state-owned enterprises,338 and 
both private and state-owned enterprises were left facing serious financial difficulties. 
As a result, the government established two nationwide stock exchanges, which made 
remarkable contributions to the economic development of China and acted as the key 
financing markets for China from that point onwards. These were the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (1990) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (1991).339 After over 20 years’ 
progress, China’s stock market experienced a rapid development. The number of 
listed companies on China’s two stock exchanges boomed from 53 in 1992 to 2,342 in 
2011,340 increasing to a total turnover of 42,164.97 billion Yuan.341 
Of great relevance to introduce China’s market is the typology of shares that are listed. 
China’s shares are divided into two classes, “depending on the [eligibility of] buyers 
                                                                                                                                      
469 and Ma Ying and Hans-Michael Trautwein, Thoughts on Economic Development in China 
(Routledge 2013) 220. 
336 China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Markets Development Report (China 
Financial Publishing House, 2008) 28. 
337 Hong Wu, Zhongguo Zhengquan Shichang de Falv Tiaokong [Legal Adjustment of the Development 
of China's Securities Market] (Law Press 2001) 2. 
338 Wei Zhang & Li Chu, ‘Introduction’ in Wei Zhang (ed), Zhongguo Zhaiwu Wenti Yanjiu [Research 
on the Question of China's Debts] (China Financial Publishing House 1995) 42. 
339 Hong Wu, Zhongguo Zhengquan Shichang de Falv Tiaokong [Legal Adjustment of the 
Development of China's Securities Market] (Law Press 2001) 8. 
340 CSRC, Summary for Securities Market (2012). 
341 Ibid. 
 
105 
and the currency in which the shares are denominated”.342 One class represents “A 
Shares” (or “A Gu”), which are shares listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges and denominated in the Chinese currency - the RMB. These are only 
accessible to domestic investors.343 Usually the market players in A Share market are 
domestic investors – such as individual person and domestic institutional investors 
etc., but since China’s economy develops in recent years, it does allow certain foreign 
investors to invest in China’s domestic A Share market such as QFII and Renminbi 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII).344 However, the QFII and RQFII 
should invest in China’s A Share market within certain quota set by Chinese 
government.345 The other class of shares, “B shares”, are listed on both the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges carrying “a face value denominated in RMB” but are 
subscribed and traded in US Dollars. These are open to all investors, both in China 
and abroad.346 Only 0.05 per cent (108 out of 2,342) of all the companies listed on 
China’s stock exchange issue B shares, according to CSRC data.347 This thesis 
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therefore mainly focuses on the buying and selling of “A shares” in China’s listed 
companies. 
 
c. Whether the market in China is developed and mature 
Since China entered the World Trade Organisation in 2006, China’s coastal cities and 
provinces have created more wealth “than at possibly any time in the world history 
except the post-war US”.348 However, China’s stock market and the securities 
industry did not experience rapid development during that time. China’s economy 
was lacking in private property and was “dominated in all important aspects by 
agencies of the government” so that the stock market could not adapt to the 
economy.349  
According to Wei’s research, share prices could not reflect the economic performance 
of listed companies with the existence of non-tradable shares. Changes in stock prices 
in China’s market are divorced from the actual business activities of listed companies, 
and share prices can be greatly influenced by major shareholders when there are a 
large percentage of non-tradable shares. This is closely related to the proportion of the 
stock’s price-earnings ratio of non-tradable shares: the greater the proportion of 
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non-tradable shares, the larger the price-earnings ratio will be, resulting in a decline of 
the value of investment in the stock market.350 
As a result, the state has tried to reform non-tradable shares since 2005 to solve the 
problems351 and it was “basically finished” in this task by the end of 2007352. The 
reforms successfully made the state sell its non-tradable shares over a period of time, 
with all shares tradable in the market by the end.353 According to the most recent 
monthly report from China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation (CSDC), 
91.82 per cent of restricted shares successfully became tradable until March 2016 and 
there are only extremely small amount of non-tradable shares in China’s market – less 
than 1/10,000 of the total shares of China’s market.354 However, there is still no clear 
evidence that the non-tradable share reform has prevented the government from 
dominating listed companies. Indeed, the state remains, to some extent, the major 
shareholder in many listed companies in China. However, the reform resolved 
problems with the divergence in share prices among state owned shares, legal person 
shares and tradable shares, unifying the share pricing mechanism. Moreover, these 
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reforms changed China’s stock market from being a weak to an efficient market.355 
At the same time, the government improved the supervision mechanisms for listed 
companies to increase the effectiveness of supervisory actions.356 With an improved 
supervision system and less state intervention the market could be expected to play as 
a free and effective market for the investors. Data show that from 2006, on the basis 
of this more defensible legal framework, China’s capital market expanded rapidly, 
and transactions in the market were more frequent. By the end of 2007, the total 
market value of 1,550 listed companies stood at 327,000 billion RMB (roughly 
32,700 billion GBP). This was equivalent to 132.6% of China’s Gross National 
Product (GNP) at that time and made China the biggest emerging market in the 
world.357 
That said, according to one report by the CSRC, China’s market remains an 
“emerging and transitional” market and is still evolving.358 
3) What are the strengths and weaknesses of China’s market compared with 
the UK and the US? 
Both the NYSE and the LSE experienced some revolutions in developing their 
markets, and the long-term effects of these revolutions seem to have been similar: 
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they all resulted in a “reduction in commissions and spreads on large trades and an 
increase in the volume of activity”. 359  Both countries have a market-oriented 
corporate governance system and their markets seem to be freer than China’s. 
However, it is hard to say that a market with highly dispersed shareholding structure 
is better than one with a concentrated shareholding structure.360 Both markets have 
their own strengths. Research shows that the with dispersed shareholding structure 
shareholders lack the incentives to monitor the managers and to exercise their voting 
rights, but with concentrated shareholding structure “large shareholders are both 
willing and able to monitor the managers”.361  
Generally, shareholders have the power to decide whether to remove or keep directors 
in the UK; under China’s law, while a shareholders’ meeting is supposedly the 
highest authority within a company, it does not play the ideal function as it was 
designed to do362 especially for minority shareholders. In China, shareholders are 
guaranteed the right to elect directors according to Company Law,363 but there are no 
specific or detailed regulations on how shareholders may elect or recall the directors. 
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In fact, in China, most directors are nominated by major shareholders because they 
have more voting rights, whereas minority shareholders can only suggest director 
candidates but cannot decide who will actually become directors.364 There are many 
SOEs in China and in which the directors are chosen by the government.365 Moreover, 
it is claimed that boards of directors control shareholder meetings and make it even 
more difficult for shareholders to supervise the board’s performance.366 That may not 
be a consequence of the concentrated ownership structure in China, however. In a 
market with a dispersed shareholding structure, the way to motivate the board of 
directors to maximize the shareholders’ interest is to give them higher 
remuneration.367 There are also fiduciary duties for directors established in relevant 
company law in the UK and the US to ensure that directors operate in a manner 
concordant with a ‘good faith’ approach.368 However, whether the directors actually 
manage their company in good faith, with the motivation of a high salary, is 
questionable. Indeed, it could be expected that directors will make some, or more, 
decisions in their own interests. For example, in the US, the directors have the power 
to decide whether to accept an offer or not. Once a hostile takeover bid is announced, 
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the target company’s director may make a de facto decision for the company as it is 
possible that the directors will refuse the offer in order to prevent being moved from 
the target company themselves. 
In a market with a concentrated ownership structure like China, if the majority 
shareholders have sufficient ability to monitor the company, with the incentive of a 
greater share premium, the performance of listed companies should not be worse than 
companies operating in a dispersed ownership market. Admittedly, the US and UK 
markets are more mature than China’s, with a longer history and more experience. 
That said, the incredible speed of China’s market development cannot be denied. 
Problems nonetheless exist in China’s market, not only in terms of the highly 
concentrated shareholding structure, but also in the value of the listed companies. As 
China’s major shareholder in the market is the state, the market is not able to divest 
itself from state interference completely. The existence of this special shareholder 
should not be seen as a straightforward defect in China’s market or as an obstacle to 
transplanting western regulations to develop China’s market, however. If the State can 
avoid the abuse of its power in business transactions, it could operate as a professional 
shareholder, alongside the well-educated members of the SASAC. This ‘special’ 
shareholder could also act as an institutional shareholder in deciding key issues 
regarding listed companies.   
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3. Different legal framework 
As an emerging market, China is still on the way to establishing a well-functioning 
stock market. An efficient capital market requires not only a sound transaction system, 
but also regulations to “deal with the abuse and … credibility of the threat of using 
the law to deal with abuse”.369 Thus, it is necessary to consider the legal framework 
of each country in order to establish what kind of legislation each country has that is 
aimed at ensuring market efficiency and the protection of investors.  
1) A brief introduction to the regulatory framework in the UK and US 
The UK and the US, as two advanced western economies, have legal frameworks 
different from China, and from one another. It is therefore essential to consider the 
differences between these countries before discussing how to transplant a western 
takeover regulatory system to China. 
The UK’s legal framework is basically enshrined within common law, statutes and 
other regulations. Common law principles have developed through case law while 
standards for the conduct of takeover have been developed by the industry itself.370 
There are also some regulations that may influence UK legislation regarding 
takeovers, such as the EU Directive, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Additionally, the regulation of directors’ duties is an important element of takeover 
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regulation, the principles of which are included in the Companies Act 2006. As part 
of corporate governance regulations, there are also some reports 371  that have 
influenced the legal framework as well.372  
In the UK, the stock market is regulated by a system of regulatory bodies. This is 
illustrated in the figure below: 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) can be seen as a financial service institution, 
regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), with the FCA’s control 
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responsibility delegated by the HM Treasury. 373  Resultantly, most transaction 
procedures that occur on the LSE are regulated by FCA.374 The Companies Act also 
regulates the responsibilities of the directors and provides some general guidelines,375 
while the Criminal Justice Act 2003 serves to “prohibit the use of confidential inside 
information”. 376  These are the primary pieces of legislation that regulate the 
behaviour of end-users of the UK’s financial system – such as the directors of listed 
companies. The Banking Act 2009 regulates the banking system, and aims at 
preventing “unauthorized business and illegal deposit taking”.377 Additionally, a 
regulatory body pertinent to this thesis is the Panel on Takeover & Mergers (the 
Panel), which is a body established in 1968 that operates according to the Takeover 
Code (‘the Code’). The panel used to be a non-statutory body378 that finally gained 
statutory functions under Chapter 1 of Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006.379 As 
stated on the Panel’s official website, its “main functions are to issue and administer 
the Takeovers Code and to supervise and regulate takeovers and other matters to 
which the Code applies. Its central objective is to ensure fair treatment for all 
shareholders in takeover bids”. The Code is not concerned with matters regarding the 
corporation and its shareholders, such as the financial or commercial advantages or 
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disadvantages of a takeover, however. Additionally, public interest questions, such as 
competition issues are “the responsibility of other regulatory bodies, such as the 
Competition & Markets Authority and the European Commission”.380 Presently, the 
UK courts are reluctant to intervene in takeovers and leave the Panel to act as “the 
judge and the jury in takeover matters”.381  
The US regulatory system is a little complicated. The US is a common law country 
like the UK, but their systems are not totally the same. The US Constitution is the 
“supreme Law of the Land”, under which federal and state legislation must exist.382 
Legislation thus exists in a hierarchy in the US; takeover legislation is no exception.  
There are three major US markets (the NYSE, American Stock Exchange, and the 
NASDAQ 383 ) and some small regional markets. These are regulated by the 
government and industry simultaneously.384 
The current regulatory system is represented in the figure below: 
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The US regulatory system has three levels: the first is the federal government, 
followed by state government, and then the industry itself.385 There are two major 
pieces of pertinent legislation in the US: one is the Securities Act 1933; the other is 
the Securities Exchange Act 1934. The latter created a federal agency to oversee the 
US market, forming the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).386 Each state 
also has legislation to regulate securities activities and prevent dishonest securities 
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salesmen from selling “building lots in a blue sky”;387 the states’ Securities Acts are 
therefore often called “blue sky laws”.388 Additionally, self-regulation plays an 
important role in the American system. The SEC only covers federal requirements 
and will become involved in cases that violated federal statutes, especially those 
“involving fraud, insider trading, takeover attempts, and the sale of unregistered 
securities.”389 
As discussed in the last chapter, US takeover legislation is more “director-friendly” 
than UK legislation as directors’ professional knowledge is trusted over that of 
institutional investors’; the features of the US market must also be taken into account. 
Unlike the case in the UK, in the US, a large percentage of household shareholders 
can limit the ability of shareholders to control companies such that the directors may 
be the best individuals to wield power in terms of their responsibility to manage 
companies responsibly, for shareholders.  
2) A brief introduction to current takeover-related regulation in China 
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Before 1992, China’s stock market was regulated by provincial regulatory bodies, and 
each body was relatively independent, operating under the directions of local 
governments.390  
Now, there are some key national laws in China that regulate takeover activities, 
including the Securities Law, the Company Law and the Measures for the 
Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies (Takeover Measures). The 
major supervisory authority is the China Securities Regulatory Commission. In 
addition, in 2005, the revision of China’s Company Law perfected its mergers and 
acquisitions mechanism and corporate governance structure in order to coordinate 
with the development of China’s market.391 Furthermore, even though the companies’ 
constitutions are not part of the takeovers legislation, they are important in regulating 
the relationship between the parties that may be involved in a transaction and often 
include some key provisions, such as those, which relate to the deployment of 
takeover defensive measures.392  
As discussed previously, China’s takeover law is more like the UK’s, but the 
takeover-related legislation as a whole is a mix of US and UK regulations. On one 
hand, China’s first national Securities law, the Law of the People's Republic of China 
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on Securities, implemented China’s “open door economic reform” policy, 393 
comprised of 12 chapters and 240 articles. 394 These chapters consisted of the 
following: “(1) General Provisions, (2) Issuing of Securities, (3) Trading of Securities, 
(4) Acquisition of Listed Companies, (5) Stock Exchanges, (6) Securities Companies, 
(7) Securities Registrar and Clearance Institutions, (8) Securities Service Institutions, 
(9) Securities Industry Association, (10) Securities Regulatory Authority, (11) Legal 
Liability, and (12) Supplementary Provisions”.395 When setting up these regulations, 
Chinese lawmakers referred to the US Securities Act and tried their best to adapt 
western securities legislation concepts to suit China’s stock trading’s needs.396 Indeed, 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and China’s CSRC signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding advice supplied to Beijing securities 
regulators in order to develop the Chinese financial market and, with the cooperation 
of the SEC, China’s Securities Law became similar to the US’, making it easy for 
interested western parties to relate to.397 
China’s stock market was established in 1990. The first law relating to takeovers in 
China was the Tentative Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading 
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of Shares in 1993,398 which introduced a mandatory bid rule similar to that of the 
UK.399 This rule was originally aiming at protecting minority shareholders, however, 
there are a few exemptions400 listed in the Measures for the Administration of the 
Takeover of Listed Companies 2008 (Measures). To be specific, the procedures of all 
takeover activities are regulated by relevant laws and administrative regulations. The 
following principles are followed: (1) protection of shareholders, 401  (2) the 
contestability of takeovers,402 and (3) effective supervision.403 According to Article 
62 of the Measures, under certain circumstances below, the acquirer could apply for 
the CSRC to be exempt from making mandatory takeover offer:  
“(1) the acquirer and the transferor can prove that the transfer has not altered the 
actual control of the listed company; (2) the listed company is confronted with 
serious financial difficulty and the acquirer has put forward a reorganization 
scheme to bail out the company that has been approved by the shareholders, and 
the acquirer promises not to transfer the shares held thereby within the 
subsequent 3 years; (3) the acquirer obtains the shares newly issued thereto to it 
                                                
398 Wei Cai, ‘The Mandatory Bid Rule in China’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law 
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399 Article 48 of Tentative Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Shares, any 
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Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 145, 159. 
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by the listed company upon the approval of the non-interested shareholders of the 
listed company, which makes the shares held thereby by the acquirer over 30 per 
cent of the total, and the acquirer promises not to transfer the shares held thereby 
within the subsequent 3 years, and the general meeting of shareholders of the 
company agrees to the exemption for such a takeover bid; or (4) any other 
circumstance recognized by the CSRC for adapting to the developmental changes 
of the securities market or to the requirements for protecting the lawful rights and 
interests of the investors.”404 
Meanwhile, if the acquirer failed to get exemption and extend a takeover offer, it shall 
make a cash offer.405 However, exemptions are claimed to lighten the acquirer’s 
financial burden but have failed to “offer protection to the minority shareholders in 
China, as expected”.406 Moreover, it is claimed that the mandatory bid rule only 
existed in name, and that exemptions existed to help state-controlled listed companies 
avoid the associated financial burdens.407  
There are two major types of takeover procedure in China: the first is takeover by 
tender offer, and the second is takeover by private agreement. 408  Before the 
completion of the reform of shareholding structure, most takeovers in China happened 
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via private agreement because of China’s large amount of non-tradable shares. 
According to China’s Securities Law, “with respect [to] acquisition of the shares of 
listed companies which are held by the investment institutions authorized by the State, 
such acquisition shall be pursued in accordance with the provisions of the State and 
shall be subject to approval by the relevant department in charge.”409 Thus, at that 
time, regulating takeover defensive measures seemed futile, because the 
decision-making power was mostly in the government’s hands. However, according 
to Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín’s empirical research, conducted in Europe, the 
level of defensive tactics increase when principal shareholders are institutional in 
nature. This research also indicated that the adoption of takeover defences is 
facilitated by a concentrated ownership environment, because the principal 
shareholders could potentially do whatever was necessary to maintain control of the 
company.410 Thus, it might not be entirely accurate to say that regulating takeover 
defence measures is a waste of time in China now. 
A higher degree of diversification in a shareholder base would put the listed 
companies under the threat of hostile takeovers.411 For example, it is acknowledged 
that 20-25 per cent of shares is seen as a line for the largest shareholders to control the 
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company.412 There are 893 listed companies out of 2739 listed companies in which 
the largest shareholders have less than 25 per cent of total shares. Therefore, some 
Chinese companies might be exposed to hostile takeovers and deploy some 
anti-takeover measures to survive. However, according to Article 33 of the Takeover 
Measures, the following takeover defensive measures are prohibited by law: 
 1) Issuing shares; 2) issuing convertible bonds; 3) repurchasing shares; 4) 
amending the target company’s articles of association; 5) entering into contracts 
that could have a material effect on the target company’s assets, liabilities, 
interests or results of operations, except in the ordinary course of business; and 6) 
disposing of, or purchasing major assets, or changing the target company’s 
principal business, except for changes to business or restructuring of assets 
carried out by the company experiencing severe financial difficulties.413 
Even if Article 33 exempted a board of directors from continuing to act as per their 
pre-existing contracts when facing a hostile bid, directors still need the shareholders’ 
approval under Chinese Company Law, as directors are obliged to manage a company 
only within a certain remit of the shareholders’ authority. Thus, all relevant legislation 
should adhere to the principles of a shareholder-friendly system of takeover defence 
regulation.  
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3) Comparison with the UK’s and the US’s legal framework 
As regards the takeover rules in different legal frameworks, two topics are necessary 
to consider: the mandatory bid rule, and the wider notion of whom the law protects.414 
Even though the US and the UK have had longer than China to develop their capital 
market and their relevant regulatory frameworks, their legal systems could not be said 
to be perfect. Following the revolutions within these two economies, small investors 
are in need of investor protection more than ever before.415 Accordingly, all the 
takeover legislation is aimed at minority shareholders’ protection in these countries, 
and also in China - but the effects of this legislation varies between each market.  
As discussed, China’s regulatory regime evolved alongside the step-by-step 
development of her stock market. However, because of multiple factors, China’s 
corporate governance problems are serious, particularly in terms of the limited 
supervision of management.416 According to China’s Company Law, shareholders 
have the right and responsibility to monitor directors. However, there are a high 
percentage of state-owned shares in the market, which makes the state the majority 
shareholder in many listed companies, and the state can only exercise its rights 
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through omnipresent bureaucracy, creating the issue of agency costs . Thus, the state 
can be seen to be non-existent in terms of monitoring the directors of companies in 
which it is a stakeholder.417 In China, the state therefore bears the label of a 
“non-functional proprietor of state-owned shares” (Guoyougu suoyouzhe quewei).418 
In addition, China has a two-tier corporate governance system, which has a special 
supervisory board to monitor the board of directors of listed companies,419 but does 
not practise its responsibilities and serve its ideal function.420 In fact, in China, the 
supervisory board does not have any actual power in practice, because most 
supervisory board members do not exercise any supervisory rights except attending 
board meetings and looking at the financial reports.421  
a. Lack of legislation 
Between 1999 and 2007, the enactment of China’s Securities Law established the 
legal status of her capital market and pushed the development of relevant 
legislation.422 Similar to the UK and US, every piece of legislation emerged as a 
response to a market crisis. The event that pushed China to legitimate its securities 
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market occurred in 1997, when the number of listed companies and the total turnover 
increased rapidly,423 and the relevant legislative framework was improved. China’s 
market experienced remarkably rapid development during that time. However, the 
stock market itself was a product of other, western countries. The absence of a 
relevant regulatory regime and the contradiction of incorporating a takeover regime 
from a totally different legal framework became apparent with the development of the 
capital market. Research shows that, starting in 2001, China’s stock market entered a 
four-year period of deep change: the index of the stock exchange decreased sharply – 
the highest point was 2,245.44 in 2001, dropping to 998.23 in 2005.424 At that time, 
the issue of new shares and refinancing of listed companies became harder. The 
refinancing period grew longer. Many companies’ operations were in trouble and 
whole industries experienced losses over those four years.425  
It is claimed by Hui Huang that China’s takeover laws seem to be “both 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive” in reference to the serious problems associated 
with takeover defensive tactics. 426  Article 33 of the Measures for Regulating 
Takeovers provided the principles directors should follow, and named six types of 
takeover defensive measures that were to be prohibited in all circumstances.427 
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However, this was not enough, as takeover measures are not confined to these six 
types; directors can still use other unregulated measures to defend against a hostile 
takeover. Thus the law is still “far from perfect, especially in respect of takeover 
defences”.428 Moreover, it could be seen that China’s prohibition on defensive 
measures is very specific but the UK’s is very broad, but it is not good for China to 
copy the UK’s outright prohibition on defensive measures. Because since the UK is a 
common law system, and the judges can follow the precedent to have their own 
interpretation of regulations case by case, but China is a civil law system which have 
to make the regulations as clear as it can to prevent misunderstandings of the 
regulation. 
b. Lack of experience 
At first, China’s market was supervised by the State Council Securities Commission 
(SCSC) and, from 1992, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
However, in 1997, after just a few years, there were many securities fraud scandals, 
                                                                                                                                      
the lawful interests of the target company and its shareholders. After the acquirer makes [a] takeover 
announcement, the board of directors of the target company can only continue to execute the existing 
contracts or the resolutions previously made by the shareholder general meeting, and shall not 
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and thus the CSRC merged with the SCSC the next year in order to centralise 
supervision in one unit.429 The merger of the SCSC and CSRC could be seen as a 
measure intended to help prevent conflict between the two bodies and properly 
regulate the market in China. It was also intended to push regional markets to become 
national, and to supervise the national market uniformly. The CSRC is not like the 
Takeover Panel in the UK, however. The CSRC is an authority of the state, charged 
with supervising China’s market, and the state’s influence cannot be ignored. That is 
to say, the CSRC is not an independent body, unlike the UK Takeover Panel. The 
CSRC has a mix of the powers held in the UK by HM Treasury and the Takeover 
Panel, and has some local branches which are delegated a certain amount of power to 
resolve some issues. Thus the CSRC is in several respects a more powerful authority 
than the Takeover Panel. The UK Takeover Code sets out a detailed timetable and 
provides clear guidance on merger and acquisition activities, and has gathered lots of 
experience in resolving takeover related issues over past years. However, the 
UK-style takeover legislation that was transplanted to China was not an exact 
duplication, but took the form of a revised version with less clear regulations 
regarding the resolution of issues because of the existence of exemptions. In the UK, 
the mandatory bid rule provided by the Code preserves a high level of equality among 
shareholders who participate in the takeover bid, however, China’s mandatory bid 
rule diverges from the law in many aspects, and the most obvious one would be the 
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wide exemption of mandatory bid rule.430 According to chapter 6 of the Measures, it 
sets several exemptions which the mandatory bid rule cannot apply.431 Even though 
the UK also provide some exemptions432, China amended the UK rules “in order to 
serve the purpose of facilitating important types of Chinese takeover transactions to 
proceed without performing the obligation to make a mandatory takeover bid”.433 In 
addition, the CSRC has more freedom to judge whether a situation can be considered 
an exemption or not, such that a takeover bid might or might not be successful based 
totally on the will of the state. Moreover, the Chinese supervisory team lacks 
individuals with professional experience,434 thus the average competence of members 
to exercise the responsibility of supervising the market is lower than is the case in 
mature markets, like the UK or US.  
A crucial issue in China is that what is written as Chinese law may not be applied in 
practice, because the government excessively interferes in the market and the growth 
of Chinese enterprises does not occur in a truly competitive environment.435 The 
market actually has the ability to self-regulate, and even if it failed to resolve certain 
issues, would be better to let social organisations, rather than the government, help 
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first. That said, the market has its own defects in terms of allocating resources, and 
the government could be more effective in helping to fix that problem to some 
extent.436 One thing should be adhered to is that the government should not interfere 
in the market without limits, otherwise the market cannot play its own statutory role. 
Unfortunately, China’s government frequently intervenes in the market. For example, 
it is argued that China’s government cannot provide a competitive environment in 
certain industries, such as electronics or water supply because of its national 
monopoly. 437  The government has also tried to interfere in the market over 
administrative measures, rather than helping the market resolve problems that it 
cannot resolve it itself.438 In this way, China’s government controls aspects of the 
market and restricts its ability to perform freely. To continue the reform of China’s 
capital market and to perfect relevant legislative and supervisory systems, the market 
needs to be opened further and become more internationalized.439 If China wants to 
achieve the goal of building a more effective market, it should open its market and 
limit administrative intervention in market activities. Otherwise, it is difficult to claim 
that China has a sufficiently sound market for advanced, western-style market 
strategies because of the level of government intervention. Thus, there is still a long 
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way to go to strengthen the quality of supervision in China and facilitate the healthy 
development of the Chinese market. 
 
4. Summary 
To summarize, transplanting western-style takeover legislation to a totally different 
market is no easy thing. There does not exist a perfect legislative system that can fit 
any market in the world; a regulatory system should be based on an analysis of market 
structure and legislative environment for specific economies - like China. This 
chapter sought to establish the distinctive features of the UK and US markets, and in 
particular, their takeover regulation systems, and then looked to analyse the reasons 
for which certain systems fit the Chinese market better.  
Regarding market structure, the UK’s market is occupied by a large number of 
institutional investors, which is a strength over a market dominated by household 
investors. As discussed previously, institutional investors are more active in managing 
listed companies. At the same time, since most institutional investors’ portfolios 
include insurance companies, retirement or pension funds, etc., they are more 
professional in terms of business acuity, and more well equipped to participate in the 
corporate governance of listed companies. Consequently, institutional investors as 
majority shareholders in listed companies are more apt to make the right choice(s) 
when they are facing a tender offer or a hostile bid. Thus, the UK’s 
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shareholder-friendly takeover legislation system fits the UK’s market and ownership 
structure. Furthermore, the Takeover Panel, an independent institution charged with 
resolving takeover issues, is considered to be effective and professional, and can offer 
support regarding the implementation of relevant legislation. In addition, as most 
investors seek to maximise the profit from their investment, they are likely to prefer 
bids with a high premium, and the UK’s rules give them the freedom to decide which 
these are.   
The US market is similar but not identical to the UK’s, so the legislative intent is 
different. The US ownership structure is highly dispersed, and there are more 
household investors in the US market who typically have more limited professional 
skills and experience in managing a company. Thus, trusting professional directors 
could be a better choice for listed companies’ corporate governance in such an open, 
advanced and competitive market as the US. The US has also set up duties and 
responsibilities in its legislation to ensure that directors act with good will to fight for 
shareholders’ interest. Thus, the US takeover regulations are much more 
director-friendly, and may be beneficial for the development of the market in putting 
companies into professionals hands. Moreover, the US legal framework is more 
complicated than that of the UK or China because of the existence of blue-sky laws 
and the three levels of supervision in the US. The statutory system could be really 
helpful for solving the issues of daily transactions. The system of self-regulation 
cannot work well without professional members with more experience in a mature 
market with a long history of development, however. Most of the issues related to 
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takeover activities may only be brought to court for a final judgement, which could 
involve waiting for a long time, and by this measure, it could be claimed that the US 
system is less effective than the UK system in resolving serious disputes. That said, 
no system is perfect, yet the current US system seems an apt one for a market with the 
aforementioned features. 
Both the UK and US experienced a change from private markets to more public ones. 
During their periods of change, both countries’ legislators focused on the protection 
of minority shareholders, given the large number of minority shareholders in their 
markets. In addition, the market-oriented principles of these two countries made the 
markets more active as a result, and able to act and develop without governmental 
interference.  
China’s market is young and it has some features that make attempts to transplant a 
western-style legislative system complicated. The major barriers are the concentrated 
ownership structure and the special shareholder in the Chinese market - the state. The 
market was designed to resolve the financing problems of SOEs, so has a very 
different origin to the UK and US markets. China has introduced a system that 
combines US- and UK-style regulatory systems; this has been criticized by scholars 
as having many defects, however. In addition, the CSRC, the Chinese supervisory 
authority, is not like the UK Takeover Panel in the sense of being an independent 
department that acts to resolve all issues without consideration of the will or 
preferences of government. It has been argued by Chinese scholars that the capital 
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market should be made freer through reducing governmental interference,  
perfecting the supervisory system, and increasing the professional quality of the 
supervisory team members.440 Scholars have also argued that China cannot improve 
on the inefficiency of SOEs by using western-style systems of regulation “unless the 
State withdraws [from] or considerably reduces its ownership [of] the large number of 
State-owned listed companies”.441 If the percentage of shares held by the state 
remains at the current (high) level, western-style takeover regulation cannot work.442 
That is to say, the rules would only exist in name, but could not work in practise. It is 
also important to note that “the adoption of a specific takeover rule may lead towards 
more dispersed ownership … and the takeover regulation reforms that enhance 
investor protection are likely to lead towards more dispersed ownership.”443 That is 
not to say that the transplanting of a western-style system would totally change the 
ownership structure in China now, but that the influence of a legislative framework 
matters for the development of China’s market. Based on the effort put into market 
development over recent years in China, it seems fair to conclude that the SOEs are 
still reforming and that the Chinese market may be more open and more effective in 
the future.  
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This chapter has considered how the historical development of markets influence their 
features, and that relevant legislation and market development have a synergistic, 
symbiotic relationship as the development of one pushes the advance of the other. 
Both the US and UK markets are international and are have grown to become the 
most advanced in the world through the aid of appropriate regulations. That does not 
mean that their rules will work in the same way in China. Considerations of cultural, 
and environmental differences should come ahead of a simple transplant of 
regulations.  
The next chapter will focus on the introduction of markets and their legal frameworks, 
establish the preconditions for regulating takeover defensive measures, and discuss 
and suggest how to transplant western takeover rules to China and which measures 
should be prohibited, and which should be allowed.   
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Chapter 4: Takeover defence tactics relating to 
stock trading 
Executive Summary 
We have now examined the different takeover markets apparent in three jurisdictions 
– the UK, US and China. We have also examined the way these markets are regulated. 
The following three chapters will focus on takeover defence measures, and consider 
their features in order to find establish whether any these measures might fit China’s 
market. To better discuss them, this thesis will classify all takeover defence measures 
into one of three categories: 1) takeover defence tactics relating to stock trading, 2) 
takeover defence tactics relating to management, and 3) takeover defence measures 
relating to litigation and similar tactics. Each chapter will discuss the features of a 
specific tactic, and how this tactic would work. Case studies will also be included for 
a better understanding of how the tactics work, followed by a discussion of the 
advantages and/or disadvantages of each tactic in order to conclude whether they 
should be legalised in China. While most of these defence tactics are legal in the US, 
the UK prohibits most of them, and has a takeover-friendly regulatory system. The 
case studies and discussion in the following chapters will therefore draw reference 
more from the US than the UK for a better understanding of how these measures 
work. 
This chapter will introduce four major takeover defensive measures relating to stock 
trading. First, it will discuss share repurchase and greenmail tactics’ features and 
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cases, and argue that greenmail, as a special kind of share repurchase method, is a 
high-risk measure to defend against hostile takeovers; thus, most systems prohibit it. 
China has prohibited the greenmail tactic as well, and similar share repurchase 
activities are highly restricted. 
Secondly, the chapter will introduce the Pac-man tactic and related cases, and will 
argue that the Pac-man defence is also risky because it requires the target to have 
sufficient funding to finance a reverse takeover against the hostile bidder and may be 
harmful to both the target and bidder during the defensive process. Nonetheless, the 
potential benefits of this defensive tactic are acknowledged by the US, and so it is not 
prohibited. 
Thirdly, the chapter will discuss white knight, grey knight, and white squire tactics, 
with reference to related cases. These tactics are low-risk and easier to deploy because 
they are tactics, which depend upon seeking allies to help the target defend against a 
hostile bidder, and so may fit in any market. They are legal in all three countries. 
However, one significant problem the white knight tactic gives rise to is the 
possibility that a business ally may turn into a hostile bidder. That said, this risk is not 
sufficient to affect the legality of the white knight defence. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss crossholding and ESOP tactics, other effective 
defensive measure that could be deployed in any market because of their user-friendly 
features. The crossholding tactic could make the shareholding structure in a target 
company more complicated, and reduce the likelihood of a hostile take over, while 
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ESOP could increase employees’ engagement to the company as well as lower the 
risk of hostile takeovers. These two measures could both be deployed in China, and 
ESOP is, in fact, now encouraged there. 
1. Share Repurchase (Greenmail) 
1) Definition & Features 
Share repurchase is a tactic whereby a target company repurchases its shares when 
faced with a hostile takeover, and by doing so, reduce the amount of total public 
shares and increase the share price to make the takeover harder than before.444 Share 
repurchase can be achieved via two methods: “greenmail” and the “dead swap”.445 
The negotiated share repurchase is often called “greenmail”, used to describe a target 
company’s purchase of “its own common stock at a premium above the current price” 
when they are faced with a hostile takeover offer.446 It is aimed at “avoiding an 
inadequately priced coercive takeover offer and removing the threat of a destructive 
                                                
444 Liang Huang, A Study on the Legal Regulation of Anti-takeover of Listed Corporations (Jilin 
University 2010) 66. 
445 Ibid 66. 
446 Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney, ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’ 
(1985) 95 The Yale Law Journal 13, 13. 
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control contest” by repurchasing shares from dissident shareholders.447 It has also 
been called a “targeted stock repurchase” or a “goodbye kiss” by some scholars.448  
 Greenmail was controversial during the 1980s and 1990s, 449  and due to the 
enactment of anti-greenmail and other related anti-takeover statutes and some adverse 
tax laws450 on the receipt of greenmail payments, most of the present discussion of 
greenmail tactics is provided solely an historical background of the development of 
takeover defence tactics in the US.451  
2) How it works 
Generally, the target company could pay some shareholders cash to retain their shares 
in the target company. However, greenmail and the dead swap are (were) two special 
ways of repurchasing those shares. To be specific, greenmail relates to attempts to 
buy the target’s shares at a premium through signing a contract with the hostile bidder 
to ensure that bidder will stop acquiring the target’s shares. This could also be called a 
                                                
447 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
405. 
448 Larry Y. Dann and Harry DeAngelo, ‘Standstill agreements, privately negotiated stock repurchases, 
and the market for corporate control’ (1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 275, 275. 
449 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
405. 
450 The legislation includes H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R.5694, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., and 
H.R.5695 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,130 Cong Reg. H4537-60 (daily ed. May 22 1984) and is aimed at 
addressing various problems posed by defensive measures. Also, the Internal Revenue Code places tax 
punishments on greenmail payments. 
451 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
405. 
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“stand-still agreement” or “stand-still contract”.452 A dead swap is (was) more 
complicated than greenmail. In a dead swap, the target company issues company 
debts, special shares or a combination of both, to exchange with publically-listed 
shares so as to reduce the total amount of such shares; meanwhile, this measure will 
also help increase the share price and increase the hostile bidder’s takeover cost.453  
3) Case study 
In the case Unocal vs. Mesa,454 hostile bidders, who were also shareholders in the 
target company, were excluded from the list of those whose shares could be 
repurchased by the target company. That is to say, the hostile bidders could not enjoy 
the premiums the target company offered to shareholders to increase the target 
company’s holding ratio of shares. However, shortly after that, the SEC revised 
relevant rules to ensure the equal treatment of all shareholders.455   
Research has shown that, from 1983 to 1984, four billion US dollars were paid by 
target companies to repurchase their stock from individual shareholders; some of the 
companies paid the shareholders good premiums - for example, Warner 
                                                
452 Liang Huang, A Study on the Legal Regulation of Anti-takeover of Listed Corporations (Jilin 
University 2010) 66. 
453 Wan Xiao, ‘Shangshi Gongsi Gufen Huigou de Fan Shougou Shiyong Tansuo [Research on the 
Takeover Defense of Share Repurchase by Listed Companies]’ (2009) 1 Finance and Accounting 
Research 25. 
454 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. (493 A.2d 946(1985)). 
455 Bo Wei, ‘Analysis on Validity of Anti-Takeover Measures by Target Company’ (Master's thesis, 
ECUPSL 2011) 22-23. 
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Communications paid Rupert Murdoch and Saul Steinberg greenmail regarding an 
agreement with Walt Disney Productions.456  
4) Discussion of strengths and weaknesses 
Naturally, a target company’s cash flow is influenced by repurchasing shares from 
shareholders, and this influence can be negative. Moreover, whilst a dead swap might 
limit or negate any negative effect on the target company’s cash flow, it may incur the 
high risk that results from increased levels of debt. Even more importantly, there is 
the key issue of managers’ abuse of power in repurchasing shares during the takeover 
process. Consequently, China’s Company Law does not allow share repurchase with 
the reason of defending a hostile bidder.457 Also, in the UK it is restricted by the 
Code.458 Moreover, share repurchase tactic will be evaluated under Unocal standard 
of review if it is adopted in the US since it has a powerful anti-takeover effect.459 
Ultimately, there are scholars who support greenmail and those who are against it. On 
the one side, scholars who have advocated for the existence of greenmail suggested 
that there was never any requirement of the law that the shares should be purchased at 
                                                
456 Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney, ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’ 
(1985) 95 The Yale Law Journal 13, 14. “Warner Communications’ repurchase of 5.6 million of its 
shares from Rupert Murdoch at 33 per cent above the market price”; Saul Steinberg’s greenmail 
agreement with Walt Disney Productions was at 77.5 US dollars per share when the market price was 
only 65.13 US dollars per share …And it was perhaps the best-publicized negotiated repurchase of all.” 
457 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Revision) a.143. 
458 The Takeover Code 2013 Rule 21.1. 
459 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v Polaroid Corp 559 A. 2d 278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989) and Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946(1985). 
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an “equal term or in equal amounts for all shareholders”, and that share premiums 
were not part of the corporate assets which shareholders should own equally.460  
On the other side, it is thought that, due to the share price decline that may follow 
greenmail, prohibition of the tactic could, as a consequence, enhance shareholders’ 
wealth.461 Moreover, the greenmail payments are highly likely to cause a problem of 
“free-rider” as the information is released through triggering the hostile bid by the 
initial bidder, and other shareholder could enjoy the premium the target company 
offered except the initial hostile bidder.462 In other words, this payment placed the 
hostile bidder, who is also one of the investors in the target company, in a really 
disadvantaged position in trading the shares.   
The practice of making a lump sum payment to a firm or individual in exchange for 
an agreement not to proceed with a tender offer, even when no purchase of stock is 
made, is also referred to as greenmail. When the agreement freezes a shareholder's 
interest at a certain percentage, it is known as a "standstill agreement." These 
                                                
460 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
408. 
461 B. Espen Eckbo, ‘Valuation Effects of Greenmail Prohibitions’ (1990) 25 The Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 491, 504. 
462 Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney, ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’ 
(1985) 95 The Yale Law Journal 13, 28 and Roger J. Dennis, ‘Two-Tiered Tender Offers and 
Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?’ (1985) Ga L Rev 281, 331. According to Dennis’s research, 
in 75 per cent of mergers and acquisition activities that had competitive bids, the initial bidder failed to 
achieve its goal to take over the target company. If greenmail payment was made after the hostile 
bidder announced its intention, the rest of the shareholders could free-ride on the situation generated by 
the hostile bid and enjoy the premiums paid by the target company, while the bidder took a risk by 
announcing and may possibly receive nothing back.    
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agreements are generally thought to be equivalent to greenmail, which also stipulates 
the permissible ownership of the contracting shareholder, but sets it at zero.463 
It has been argued that the greenmail tactic can help “to facilitate management 
entrenchment at shareholders’ expense”,464 so many scholars were (are) against the 
use of this tactic. However, there are others, such as Shleifer and Vishny, who 
challenge the traditional perspective of greenmail’s negative effect on the share price. 
They found that the share price always falls after the payment of greenmail, whether 
the managers were maximizing the long-term value of the target company or not. 
Thus, the performance of share prices could be seen only as a reflection of certain 
management actions and should not be used to judge the effectiveness of greenmail as 
a takeover defence measure.465 It can also be argued that greenmail imparts some 
benefits to target shareholders, but that this can be abused sometimes. Thus, overall, it 
is hard to tell whether greenmail is definitely harmful to shareholders’ interests.  
Most scholars have agreed that takeover defensive measures are useful tools for 
managers to protect their power over the target company.466 However, numerous 
                                                
463 Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney, ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’ 
(1985) 95 The Yale Law Journal 13 note 1. 
464 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest’ 
(1986) 17 The RAND Journal of Economics 293, 294. 
465 Ibid 295. 
466 Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, ‘The Market For Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence’ (1983) April Journal of Financial Economics 36, 39. In this thesis, the authors described the 
negative returns brought by the mangers using takeover defensive tactics such as standstill agreements 
and share repurchase. These actions, relating to takeovers, will harm shareholders’ interests, according 
to the authors’ research. 
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studies have shown various drawbacks to greenmail. For example, data indicate that 
the “share price always declines when greenmail is paid, despite the fact that target 
management is acting in the interest of its shareholders.”467 Additionally, a standstill 
agreement may only serve to inform the other potential hostile bidders that the target 
company is weak.468   
Meanwhile, from Eckbo’s research, it could be concluded that greenmail could be 
influenced by other takeover defensive measures, such as a standstill agreement 
deployed by the target company and the negative effects cannot be calculated 
precisely.469 Furthermore, it was also found that greenmail payments may “reduce the 
expected return to another important group of players in the takeover market: the 
arbitrageurs”.470 It is argued that the arbitrageurs sometimes has certain amount of 
the target company’s shares which is willing to be sold to the target company at a 
premium if greenmail tactic is used. Thus the arbitrageurs could make profits by 
buying and selling shares at different prices even if they do not anticipate completing 
the takeover.471 
                                                
467 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest’ 
(1986) 17 The RAND Journal of Economics 293, 308. 
468 Ibid 308. 
469 B. Espen Eckbo, ‘Valuation Effects of Greenmail Prohibitions’ (1990) 25 The Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 491, 505. 
470 Ibid 505. In this article, it is stated that “the activity of arbitrageurs has the important effect of 
lowering transaction costs of both financing and executing takeovers”. The broader impact of paying 
greenmail to arbitrageurs is a regulation issue, which is not entirely relevant to this thesis, however, 
and so will not be discussed.  
471 Jeff Madura, Financial Institutions and Markets (8th edn, Thomson 2008) 655. 
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Objectively speaking, greenmail is not always harmful to the target company; as 
discussed previously, and as Macey and McChesney have argued, some greenmail 
payments have benefitted shareholders, and need to be distinguished.472 It could be 
concluded from their research that, with the help of business judgement rules, 
managers’ power to abuse greenmail payment is as limited (and difficult) as possible, 
and that the benefits of paying greenmail should not be ignored by regulators. Indeed, 
greenmail may boost total company wealth by increasing the share price and so 
“perform an important social function”.473 Ultimately, the vast majority of empirical 
studies suggest that once greenmail payments are made by a target company, the 
share price of the target company will experience an immediate decrease.474 However, 
general share repurchases without any discrimination between the hostile bidder and 
other shareholders could help increase market share price.475 
In addition, greenmail payments may provide a catalyst for a turnover in the target 
company’s management (as the payment might be taken as a signal of poor 
management).476  To discourage the payment of greenmail, the US government 
                                                
472 Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney, ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’ 
(1985) 95 The Yale Law Journal 13, 16. In this article, the authors clarified that they are not writing to 
advocate greenmail payments, and that greenmail can be abused or impose unacceptable agency costs. 
Rather, they believe in those transactions that are beneficial to the shareholder. 
473 Ibid 28. 
474 Can be found in Note, ‘Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management 
Entrenchment Hypothesis’ (1985) 98 Harv L Rev 1045, 1056.  
475 Michael Bradley and L. Macdonald Wakeman, ‘The Wealth Effects of Targeted Share Repurchase’ 
(1983) 11 J Fin Econ 301,328. 
476 April Klein and James Rosenfeld, ‘Targeted share repurchases and top management changes ’ 
(1988) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 493, 506. 
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created a tax punishment applied to the receipt of it. According to the Internal 
Revenue Service, a tax equal to 50 per cent of gain is levied on greenmail 
payments,477 imposed as a penalty once the greenmail is enacted.478  
It could be said that the benefits of the greenmail payment is old-school, but that it 
still needs to be discussed as a relevant defensive measure because China need to take 
a clear position on its availability. According to China’s contemporary legislation, the 
share repurchase requirements in China’s Company Law 2005 are less strict than the 
previous version of Company Law but the greenmail payments are still not available 
in China.479  
2. Pac-man  
1) Definition & Features 
Pac-man is a defence tactic that can reverse the positions of the bidder and the target. 
The Pac-man defence was named after an electronic game that was quite popular at 
the beginning of 1980s. In that game, the electric animals fight against each other and 
one that fails to eat its enemy it will be eaten by its enemy in return. Since the 
Pac-man defence was aimed at the original offeror so as to defend against the hostile 
                                                
477 According to section 5881 of the Internal Revenue Code: “There is hereby imposed on any person 
who receives greenmail a tax equal to 50 per cent of gain or other income of such person by reason of 
such receipt.” 
478 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 621. 
479 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Revision) a.143.  
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takeover, it is understandable that commentators named this anti-takeover measure 
after that famous game.480 
2) How it works 
Pac-man defence tactic was the strategy used by the target to reverse the role in a 
takeover battle. The target company could offer the hostile bidder a tender offer to 
acquire its shares or tender certain benefits to the possible white knight to acquire the 
hostile bidder’s shares together to take over the hostile bidder company.481 If the 
Pac-man defence is to be deployed by the target company, certain issues should be 
considered first relating to financing the purchase of the hostile raider’s shares. To be 
specific, the premium ratio over the market price of the hostile bidder’s shares should 
be decided, the total capital required to purchase the shares should be calculated, and 
most importantly feasible ways to make, or borrow the required funds.482  
3) Case study 
                                                
480 Yungeng Xie, ‘Media Takeover and Anti-takeover [Chuanmei Binggou yu Fan Binggou]’ 
(People.com, 7 July 2005)  <http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40628/3524651.html> accessed 01 Aug 
2013. 
481 Lynden Griggs, ‘Golden Parachutes, Crown Jewels and the Arrival of the White Knight - Strategies 
to Defeat A Hostile Takoever. What Use in An Era of Rigorous Enforcement of Directors' Duties’ 
(1998) 5 Canberra L Rev 203, 216. 
482 These questions concerned here could be found in the script of program presented by the Section of 
Litigation at the 1983 annual meeting of the American Bar Association in Atlanta. Even if it is an 
edited script, the uses of some of the defensive tactics are better illustrated through that way presented 
by the American Bar Association. For more details, see R. Todd Lang and others, ‘PART 2: The 
Dramatization of a Hostile Tender Offer’ (1984) 70 ABA Journal 72, 77. 
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Pac-man defence attracted heated debated in the 1980s, it was said to be aimed at 
threatening the hostile bidders, but was implemented used, so the number of 
successful cases is limited.483 In 1982, there was a very famous hostile takeover case 
involving Bendix, 484  Martin Marietta, 485  Allied Corporation 486  and United 
Technologies.487 In that case, the target Martin Marietta teamed up with United 
Technologies and used the Pac-man defence in attempting to acquire the stocks of the 
hostile bidder – Bendix. In order to finance the purchases of Bendix’s shares, the debt 
of Martin Marietta was increased, followed by a lower book value, and reduced bond 
rating.488 At the same time, there was a white knight company invited by Bendix – 
the Allied Signal Corporation.  At that time, while the previous hostile bidder was 
defended by the target’s Pac-man defence, the hostile bidder became a target as well. 
To defend against Martin Marietta, Bendix invited Allied Signal to help purchase 
                                                
483 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 238. 
484 Bendix is an American manufacturing and engineering corporation active since the 1970s, and 
since 2002, has been a subsidiary of Knorr-Bremse since 2002. More information can be found at 
http://www.bendix.com/en/aboutus/history/history_1.jsp Accessed 26 December 2013. 
485 Martin Marietta Materials has been the second largest producer of construction aggregates since the 
1960s. Details about the company can be found on its official website: 
http://www.martinmarietta.com/Corporate/profile.asp accessed 26 December 2013. 
486 Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation was previously only active within the chemical industry but 
became involved in aerospace during their merger with Bendix. It is now part of a Fortune 100 
company, Honeywell.  The company history can be found at 
http://honeywell.com/About/Pages/our-company.aspx accessed 26 December 2013. 
487 “United Technologies Corporation is a diversified company that provides a broad range of 
high-technology products and services to the global aerospace and building systems industries.” More 
information could be seen on its official website www.utc.com accessed 26 December 2013. 
488 Kenneth C Johnsen, ‘Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper 
Standard of Review’ (1985) 94 The Yale Law Journal 909, 919. 
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shares of Bendix and won control of the company.489 Through this takeover activity, 
the white knight Allied Corporation did benefit from it and gained valuable Bendix 
assets. 
There were also cases showing that the result of using Pac-man defences was not a 
real success in the end in the US.  As in the takeover case between Mesa and Cities 
Service, it was said that the target company Cities Service fought back against the 
hostile bidder Mesa through Pac-man defence. This defence did work and benefited 
Cities’ shareholders.490 However, the claimed winner of the hostile battle, Cities 
Service ended up being taken over by Occidental Petroleum.  
The most recent case in America began in November 2013 between Men’s 
Wearhouse and Jos. A. Bank – two leading clothing retailers in the US.491 In 
November 2013 Jos. A. Bank announced an offer to Men’s Wearhouse of 2.6 billion 
USD, which is rebuffed by the target company.492 Shortly after the hostile bid was 
launched, Men’s Wearhouse announced a 1.5 billion USD offer to its rival Jos. A. 
                                                
489 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 241. 
490 Gregory Corcoran, ‘The Dangers of the Pac-Man Defense’ (The Wall Street Journal, 2007)  
<http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2007/11/15/the-dangers-of-the-pac-man-defense/> accessed 22 December 
2013. 
491 Liz Hoffman, ‘Back to the '80s: The Pac-Man Defense’ (The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 
2013)  <http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/11/26/back-to-the-80s-the-pac-man-defense/> accessed 
22 December 2013. 
492 Chris Peters, ‘Men's Wearhouse Mounts Hostile Takeover Bid For Rival Jos. A. Bank’ (Reuters, 6 
January 2014)  
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/06/mens-wearhouse-hostile-takeover-jos-a-bank_n_4547733
.html> accessed 08 January 2014. 
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Bank for its shares,493 which made the Pac-man defence tactic attract the public’s 
attention again. Shortly after the defensive measure was taken, in January 2014 the 
target company Men’s Wearhouse raised its bid for Jos. A. Bank and it could be seen 
that this hostile battle caused the target’s share price to increase and the hostile 
bidder’s share price experienced a slight decline.494 Finally, the target successfully 
acquired the bidder in 2014 after few months’ negotiations.495 And for now, this 
defensive measure could be seen as a successful one.  
4) Discussion and summary 
Currently, there is no regulation prohibit the use of Pac-man defence in China. 
However, since Pac-man includes the investment of the bidder company, it is not easy 
for the target company to succeed if it has the difficulty of financing. Also, in the UK, 
the Code requires the directors get the shareholders’ approval “(iv) sell, dispose of or 
acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of or acquire, assets of a material amount; or (v) 
enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business”496 when the 
                                                
493 Liz Hoffman, ‘Back to the '80s: The Pac-Man Defense’ (The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 
2013)  <http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/11/26/back-to-the-80s-the-pac-man-defense/> accessed 
22 December 2013. 
494 Chris Peters, ‘Men's Wearhouse Mounts Hostile Takeover Bid For Rival Jos. A. Bank’ (Reuters, 6 
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495 Brent Kendall and Dana MAttioli, ‘FTC Approves Merger Between Men's Wearhouse, Jos. A. 
Bank: Commission Grants Antitrust Clearance to the Planned Merger of Men's Clothiers’ The Wall 
Street Journal Business Section (30 May 2014).  
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action may result in any offer or bona fide possible offer being frustrated.497 So as a 
post-bid defensive tactic, the Pac-man defence would only be used if the directors get 
the shareholders’ approval.  
It is possible that use of the Pac-man defence could result in either the take over of the 
hostile bidder company by acquiring its shares or abandonment by the hostile bidder 
of its original intention. However, both of the possibilities were based on the premise 
that the target and the hostile bidder were not quite different in sizes, financing 
abilities, etc.; that is to say that the target could possibly threaten the hostile bidder by 
threatening to acquire it. If the target did not have this ability at all, the Pac-man 
would not be able to work in effect.  
Also, it is hardly to say that Pac-man defence is a better strategy even if the target has 
the power to take over the hostile bidder, because it could harm both of the target and 
the bidder at the same time. First of all, one key problem of the target company is how 
to finance the purchase of the hostile bidder’s shares. As it is shown in the cases, the 
capital required for the purchase of the hostile bidder’s shares is potentially huge. And 
if the target company does not have sufficient capital to finance Pac-man defence, not 
only could the use of the defence fail, but also the interests of shareholders might be 
harmed because of the possibility of a share price decline during the defensive 
process.  
                                                
497 Ibid Rule 21. 
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Furthermore, there were many scholars who were against the internecine Pac-man 
defence since it may cause many problems.498 For example, a successful Pac-man 
defence may result in a crossholding structure between the hostile bidder and the 
target, where these shares purchased by each other have voting rights.499 Especially 
in the US, the cross holding could be more complicated if the two companies are 
located in two different states, because the regulations of exercising these voting 
rights could be different. Consequently, allowing the companies to use Pac-man 
defence created a threat to the efficiency of US’s corporate law.500  
Consequently, it could be seen that the Pac-man defence is a high-risk measure to 
fight against the hostile bidder. And if the decision right is in the directors’ hands, 
legislation, such as in the US, should help to guarantee the board of directors was 
behaving in the shareholders’ interests in taking such high risk measures to save the 
target company. Moreover, the SEC used to consider a prohibition of Pac-man 
defence but did not pursue this idea because the SEC commissioners admitted the 
benefits to of shareholders in certain circumstances when using the Pac-man defence, 
even if it can be a “cause for ‘serious concern’”.501 
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3. White knight, Grey Knight and White Squire 
1) Definition & Features 
Some hostile takeovers involve more than one hostile bidder, which means that other 
bidders may enter the takeover battle after the original bid is announced. If the 
potential acquirer is recommended to raise its initial offer by the target company, this 
alternative bidder could be seen as the cause.502 Similar to the white knight, the 
White squire is also an ally of the target company who will acquire a specific amount 
of stock of the target company, but not a sufficient amount to control the whole target 
company. Unlike the white knight, who may take over the target company and break 
the hostile bidder’s takeover plan, the white squire will only help the target company 
secure a certain percentage of shares and prevent the hostile takeover by working 
alongside the target board.503 There may also be some restrictions placed on the 
shares tendered to the White squire, such as a bar on selling them to a third party, but 
the white squire will nonetheless benefit from a discounted share price or a seat on the 
target’s board504 through helping the target company.  
                                                
502 Tim Jenkinson and Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers, Attack and Corporate Governance 
(McGRAW-Hill Book Company Europe 1994) 32. 
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In some cases, the white knight may also use the so-called “Lady Macbeth 
strategy”505 whereby they pretend to be friendly to the target company and then 
change to be a Grey Knight. That is to say, after the initial hostile bidder is rejected by 
the target company, the erstwhile white knight will become a hostile bidder of its 
own.506  
An important fact that should be pointed out is that neither the white knight nor the 
white squire are totally selfless: The decision to help the target company to get rid of 
the risk of being taken over by a hostile bidder is likely to be motivated by the 
possibility of returns from the target company (such as the aforementioned best price 
for shares, or board seat). However, such preferential terms could be in breach of the 
target company director’s duties to the company’s shareholders. Thus, the directors 
usually attempted to make an agreement with the white knight - for example, a 
white-knight-leveraged buyout507 - to achieve both maximum gain for the target 
company’s shareholders and the preservation of existing management.  
2) How it works 
Finding a white knight could be beneficial to the target company in that it will create 
competition for the hostile bidder. First, this white knight could offer a higher price 
for the target so as to directly counter the hostile bidder’s original price. The hostile 
                                                
505 Patrick Barwise, ‘OB or Not OB?’ (2006) 7 Business Strategy Review 49,52. 
506 Tim Jenkinson and Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers Denfence, Attack and Corporate Governance 
(McGRAW-Hill Book Company Europe 1994) 33. 
507 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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bidder might then give up taking over the target company. Even if the hostile bidder 
did not give up its original intention, the participation of a white knight could help 
increase the takeover price of the target company, which will still be beneficial to the 
target.  
Importantly, it is asserted by scholars that cooperation between the target and the 
white knight is essential due to the requirement of certain sensitive information being 
released by the target to the white knight about the potential profits to be made from 
the takeover/bid scenario.508 At the same time, a white knight could be concealed by 
the target to promote information acquisition by letting another bidder surface and 
pretending to be weak.509 
Among 78 successfully defended takeover cases in the US between 1978 and 1984, 
36 of them are attributed to the actions of white knights. Thus, there is some historical 
evidence that locating a White knight can be helpful and a relatively safe course of 
action for a target company to take. 
As for the White squire, certain agreements should be signed when the friendly 
company acquires stock from the target company. Such an agreement will usually 
include restrictions on the transfer of shares or prohibition of further purchase of the 
                                                
508 Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, ‘The Market For Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence’ (1983) April Journal of Financial Economics 5, 50.  
509 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest’ 
(1986) 17 The RAND Journal of Economics 293, 294.  
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target’s shares,510 because the target company still needs to ensure that they do not 
end up under the White squire’s control due to the transfer of a large percentage of 
shares.  
3) Case studies 
In the takeover involving Sina and Shanda, the white knight tactic was used together 
with the ‘poison pill’ tactic. Sina is a very famous global information service provider 
and is one of the four largest portal sites in China. It was listed on the NASDAQ in 
April 2000.511 Shanda Interactive Entertainment (Shanda) was also a Chinese top 
Internet company which was listed on the same market in 2004.512 Sina was the 
target of a hostile takeover by Shanda on the 18th February 2005, when Shanda 
claimed that it had acquired 19.5 per cent of Sina’s stocks and was seeking to control 
Sina.com.513 On 19th February 2005, Shanda made an official announcement of its 
intention to acquire Sina.com on the NASDAQ and submitted a 13-D form to the SEC 
which stated that this takeover was a strategic investment and that Shanda might 
possibly move forward to purchase Sina’s stocks through public transaction, private 
deal, tender offer or exchange offer, in order to control Sina and accredit 
                                                
510 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
378, 379. 
511 Bi Zhang, ‘10 Years after Sina Listed in the Market and Weibo Let It Show A New Life [Xinlang 
Shangshi Shinian Qifu Weibo Rang Laoshu Fa Xinya]’ (China Business News, 23 April 2011)  
<http://finance.ifeng.com/usstock/huagu/20110423/3924824.shtml> accessed 02 August 2013. 
512 Detailed information can be found on the Shanda Corporation’s official website: 
http://ir.shandagames.com/. 
513 Yong Liu, ‘China Business News: Seeing Overseas Takeovers from the M&A Case of Shenda v. 
Sina [Diyi Caijing Ribao: Cong Shengda Xinlang An Kan Haiwai Shichang Binggou]’ (Sina.com, 7 
March 2005)  <http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2005-03-07/0332543039.shtml> accessed 12 August 2013. 
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representatives on the board of directors. Failing this, Shanda indicated that it might 
sell part or all of its held Sina shares.514  
The executive board of directors pursued a number of options: firstly, Sina began 
negotiating with Tianqiao Chen, the director of the Shanda Corporation; secondly, the 
‘poison pill’ was utilised to prevent Shanda acquiring more shares in the open market; 
and thirdly, Sina sought to invite Yahoo! - another large internet corporation - to 
invest in Sina as a white knight and help defend against the hostile bidder.515  
Another anti-takeover case featuring the white knight defence was that of Tung Shing 
Group516 vs. Livzon Pharmaceutical Group Inc.517 This was the first takeover case to 
happen in China which involved two listed companies bidding for one target listed 
company in the secondary stock market.518 (Most of the earlier takeover cases in 
China involved helping a bidder find a shell company to be listed on the market, as 
                                                
514 Xiao Wang, ‘Poison Pill in Counter-Acquisition in US’ (2007) 2 Securities Market Herald 68, 69. 
515 Shaomin Yan, ‘Zhengquan Shibao: Baiyi Qishi Anzhu Xinlang, Longhu Dou dao Sanguo Zhengba 
[Securities Dairy: White Knight Secretly helped Sina, from Dragon and Tiger Fight to Heroes 
Lengend]’ (2005)  <http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2005-02-26/1148536430.shtml> accessed 11 October 
2013. 
516 Tung Shing Group is a hi-tech Pharmaceutical corporation with a total value of about 500 million 
from Xi’an and was listed in China’s market. Further information about the background of the Tung 
Shing Group can be found under the “Overview” section on its official website 
http://www.topsun.com/ accessed 08 November 2013. 
517 Livzon Pharmaceutical Group Inc., founded in 1985, is a comprehensive pharmaceutical enterprise 
integrating development and research, production and sales. It has been listed among the Top 200 
Asian SMEs by Forbes, in the Top 20 companies within the Chinese medical industry, and among the 
Top 20 Most Competitive Listed Medical & Pharmaceutical Companies. Further information about 
Livzon Pharmaceutical Group Inc. can be found under “Overview” on its official website: 
http://www.livzon.com.cn/english/channels/89.html accessed 08 November 2013. 
518 China Merger and Acquisition Research Centre and Hollyhigh International Capital, China Merger 
and Acquisition Review: Book 4 (Tsinghua University Press 2003) 148. 
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the Chinese market is not as mature as the western countries’ markets.519) In 2002, 
China Everbright Group520 owned 518 state-owned legal person shares, equivalent to 
12.72 per cent of Livzon’s total capital. The Tung Shing Group acquired all of 
Livzon’s shares held by China Everybright Group; it was clear to see that the 
ambition of the Tung Shing Group was to control Livzon. Since the Tung Shing 
Group had become a threat to Livzon’s controlling shareholders, and to prevent 
Livzon being taken over by the Tung Shing Group, Livzon used two defensive tactics 
to fight against the hostile bidder: one was to adopt a ‘Scorched Earth’ policy; the 
other was to find a white knight.521 The best choice of white knight available to 
Livzon at that time was Shenzhen Taitai Healthcare food Co. (Taitai).522 After Taitai 
be a shareholder of Livzon, Taitai cooperated with Livzon’s current controlling board 
of directors very well and successfully gained control by acquiring 19.34% per cent of 
Livzon’s shares.523 Through this takeover activity, Taitai gained significant benefits 
for its future development and also helped Livzon, since, as a pharmaceutical 
company, Taitai was focused on health care products, it nonetheless wanted to expand 
                                                
519 Mingxia He, ‘Presentation and Abnormal Phenomenon for the "Shell Value" of the Chinese Listed 
Companies ’ (2004) 3 Finance Theory and Teaching 8, 10. 
520 China Everbright Group is a state-controlled enterprise in China, and involves a number of business 
areas. See About China Everbright Group, http://www.ebchina.com/ebchina/about.shtml accessed 26 
December 2013. 
521 China Merger and Acquisition Research Centre and Hollyhigh International Capital, China Merger 
and Acquisition Review: Book 4 (Tsinghua University Press 2003) 148. 
522 Taitai was established in 1992 and has a leading position in the healthcare industry. It has changed 
its name Joincare Pharmaceutical Co. See its official website for more information: 
http://www.joincare.com/ accessed 27 December 2013. 
523 Jianmin Dai and Wen He, ‘Zhu Baoguo Xi Caikong Jiankang Yuan Lizhu Si Xiangpi Tang 
Guanlian Jiaoyi Mimi’ (Sina Finance, 28 July 2013).  
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20130729/055816268147.shtml> accessed 26 December 2013. 
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its business area to the medical area - and Livzon held a key factor in this respect – 
the approval documents of the China Food and Drug Administration.524 Without 
these approval documents, drugs cannot be produced, even if Taitai has the ability and 
sufficient resources to make them. Thus, the participation of the white knight not only 
saved the target company, but also resulted in a win-win situation for both companies. 
4) Discussion and summary 
As in the case of Sina, the target company may not use only one tactic to defend 
against the hostile raider but rather, employ a combination of different tactics. The 
white knight defence is potentially useable with most other takeover defensive 
measures. For instance, if the target prepares to repurchase their shares with an 
insufficient budget, they can seek a white knight to help by tendering a certain 
percentage of shares or other benefits to secure the ownership of the target 
company.525  
The ‘Crown Jewel’526 is seen as part of a “lock up” transaction, which usually occurs 
when a white knight is involved.527 The crown jewel is a key asset of the target 
company and is likely to be safe in the hands of a friendly “bidder” - a white knight 
                                                
524 Ibid. 
525 Yungeng Xie, ‘Media Takeover and Anti-takeover [Chuanmei Binggou yu Fan Binggou]’ 
(People.com, 7 July 2005)  <http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40628/3524651.html> accessed 01 Aug 
2013. 
526 This is another takeover defence strategy that involves the target company selling important assets - 
its crown jewels- to a friendly buyer when faced with a hostile bidder. This tactic will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
527 Tianshou Shi, Company Law (2nd edn edn, Peking Law Press 2006) 502 cited from Liang Huang, 
A Study on the Legal Regulation of Anti-takeover of Listed Corporations (Jilin University 2010) 60. 
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could therefore be a good choice. That said, the white knight is ultimately an 
independent corporation, and a target company’s board of directors should consider 
the potential risk that a white knight will act objectively, not emotionally. It is also 
understandable that directors will act in their own company’s interest, such that if a 
white knight defence tactic is deployed, it could have one of two results: The first, 
which benefits the target company by defending against the hostile bidder and 
benefits the white knight in that they gain a certain percentage of the target’s shares or 
assets. The second could be that the white knight may turn to be a grey knight, and the 
target company cannot ultimately avoid being taken over.  
Overall, however the white knight’s typical benefits usually outweigh the possible 
risks. As per the case of Tung Shing and Livzon, the cooperation of the white knight, 
Taitai, successfully helped the target company resist the hostile takeover and, to a 
certain extent, this furthered the development of both companies and benefited both 
companies’ shareholders. Although all defensive tactics have some pros and cons, it 
could be argued that white knight defence enjoys considerably less risk than other 
tactics and it is among the tactics not prohibited by Chinese legislation. Although 
there is some research that suggests the performance of a company which has acted as 
a white knight may not be as positive as expected after trying to save a target 
company,528 that does not mean the white knight defence is not a viable option for the 
                                                
528 Carolyn Carroll, John M. Griffith and Patricia M. Rudolph, ‘The Performance of White-Knight 
Management’ (1998) 27 Financial Management 46,56. According to this research, white-knight 
managers may “make less efficient decisions than do hostile bidders”, and CEOs who make big 
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target company in takeover defence and there are case studies which attest to the 
win-win situations that can be created by a cooperative target and white knight - such 
as Livzon and Taitai. The white knight defence tactic is also less complicated than 
others (such as the poison pill) because those tactics involve special shares with 
certain rights plan, whereas the white knight defence can be seen as relatively 
straightforward business cooperation between two or more companies that may also 
act as a defensive measure. When choosing a white knight as a business partner, what 
matters most is not whether the plan is successful, but whether this ally can be trusted. 
White knights, such as Taitai can face the problem of over-financing, because most of 
white knights raise capital by investing in listed companies no matter whether it saved 
the target company in the end or not. If the company cannot make good use of the 
capital raised from the stock market, the risk could only be taken by those innocent 
investors in the market. Thus the supervision administration and the legislators could 
consider that problem serious and take a decision whether to encourage those 
measures or not.529 That said, this problem is not exclusive to the white knight 
defence, and could happen in any business investment activity in the stock market. All 
mergers and acquisitions end up with certain amount of investment into the listed 
companies and those investors could be considered to be raising money from the 
stock market.  
                                                                                                                                      
mistakes in business may be removed, even whilst inefficient management teams are relevantly safe in 
their positions. 
529 China Merger and Acquisition Research Centre and Hollyhigh International Capital, China Merger 
and Acquisition Review: Book 4 (Tsinghua University Press 2003) 149. 
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The white knight is a popular and effective takeover defence measure: It is widely 
used both in the US and the UK, and there are a number of successful cases where its 
use helped the target in the takeover battle. One thing should be noticed that to invite 
a white knight in the UK, there are still rules to be followed. “The directors should 
recommend the shareholders to accept the competing bid and would make the 
substance of the advice received by its independent financial adviser on te bid know 
to the shareholders”530 as it is required by the Code.531 Moreover, the white knight 
strategy does not need a special legislative framework, and can work in either the 
western or Chinese market, so it can ultimately be seen as a user-friendly tactic with 
relatively low risk. 
As for the White squire, its function is similar to that of the white knight and it could 
therefore be presumed that it would also work well in the Chinese market and be a 
good choice of defence strategy for a target company. But in the UK’s market, it is 
prohibited by the Code, because it may include material changes to the share capital 
and voting structure of the company, which requires the shareholders’ approval.532  
4. Cross holding and ESOP 
1) Definition & Features 
                                                
530 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
714. 
531 The Takeover code 2013 Rule 3 and Rule 25. 
532 The Takeover Code 2013 Rule.21. 
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Cross holding means a number of companies hold each other’s shares so that they link 
together like a mesh. Thus if a hostile takeover emerges, they can help each other to 
increase the target company’s shares and hopefully prevent the hostile bidder 
controlling the target company.533 Often, the target’s shares are held by its employees, 
so this could diffuse the ownership of the target company; this plan is called the 
“employee stock holding plan”, or “employee stock ownership plan”(ESOP).534 
Moreover, the employee stock holding plan can be enacted alongside other defensive 
measures, such as the white knight defence. 
In fact, the ESOP originated from the employee benefit plan, which centred on 
pension plans in the US.535 It was regulated by Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.536 According to the reports of the US General 
Accounting Office (GAO) in 1986, the ESOP was classified as one of four major 
types: leveraged, leveragable, nonleveraged, and tax credit.537 The leveraged ESOP is 
                                                
533 Shun Luo, ‘Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Fan Shougou Shizheng Fenxi Ji Falv Guizhi Yanjiu 
[Empirical Study over China's Listed Company's Takeover Defensive Activities and Research on 
Relevant Legislations ]’ (Master, China University of Political Science and Law 2011) 14. 
534 M Pagano and P F Volpin, ‘Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control’ (2005) 60 The Journal of 
Finance 841, 843. 
535 J.Fred Weston, J.Harold Mulherin and Mark Mitchell, Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate 
Governance (4th edn edn, Pearson Education Limited 2003) 379. 
536 Ibid 379. 
537 According to Weston, Mulherin and Mitchell’s research, “the leveragable and nonleveraged ESOPs 
are also recognized under ERISA and are plans that have not used leveraging.” The previous plan is 
authorized but not required to borrow funds while the latter one is essentially a stock bonus plan that is 
required to invest primarily in the securities of the employer firm. Tax credit ESOP is provided by Tax 
Reduction Act of 1975, and by contributing certain amount to this plan, extra percentage of credit 
could be earned in addition to the regular investment credit in existence at that time. In this thesis, it 
will only focus the leveraged ESOP as it is the one which played as a takeover defensive measure, not 
the other three. Further information about those three ESOPs could be found in ibid 380-400. 
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the type used as a takeover defensive plan for the target listed companies in the US538 
which “borrows funds to purchase securities of the employer firm”; the employer firm 
makes contribution to the ESOP trust in an amount for both repayment of the capital 
and the annual interest of that loan. Data show that about 19 per cent of shares were 
held by employees other than the top management in 100 large high-technology firms 
in the US,539 which could explain the wide use of ESOPs.  
ESOPs have also been deployed by UK listed companies, but the proportion of 
companies that have used the ESOP is far behind the US.540 In recent years, UK 
lawyers and researchers have started to pay attention to the ESOP, but the ESOP’s 
development in the UK is still not as mature as in the US.541 Moreover, in the US, the 
ESOP should be with proper purpose since an ESOP “may increase its equity stake in 
the target company by purchasing a substantial number of the target’s voting shares 
with the proceeds of the recapitalization”.542 However, in the UK, the ESOP could 
only be used as a pre-bid defensive tactic with proper purpose and the shareholders’ 
                                                
538 Ibid 386. 
539 Andrew Tylecote and Paulina Ramirez, ‘Corporate Governance and Innovation: The UK Compared 
with the US and 'Insider' Economies’ (2006) 35 Reseearch Policy 160, 168. 
540 Ibid 168. 
541 Advocates for the employees shareholding plan were from the 2010s for example the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer made a speech in 2012 to advocate for the employees’ rights plan. His speech could be 
found on Rt Hon George Osborne, ‘Conference 2012: George Osborne’ (Consevatives, October 8 2012)  
<http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2012/10/George_Osborne_Conference_2012.aspx> 
accessed 02 January 2014. 
542 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
359. 
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approval because of the Code prohibit the directors to recapitalise without the 
shareholders’ consent.543  
In this thesis, we can observe that some defensive tactics share similarities and 
intersect. The intersection here is between the White squire defence and the 
crossholding defence. To some extent, if the crossholding defence is achieved via the 
help of employees, it can be seen as an “employee stock ownership plan” and in 
certain circumstance, the employees holding the target’s shares can act as a White 
squire for the target company, and defend against the hostile bidder(s). By way of a 
reminder, per the discussion above, the White squire is a third-party from the target 
company and the hostile bidders, and can hold certain amount of shares to secure 
voting rights in the target company, with the intention of voting against the hostile 
bidders and secure control of the target company. Likewise, the ESOP is designed to 
disperse the shareholding structure in the target company by giving shares to its own 
employees; once the hostile bidders emerge, these employees are expected to act 
against the corporate raiders and protect the target company.544  
2) How it works 
Sometimes, a target company has many subsidiaries (often more than three), and all 
the shares of these subsidiaries are owned by their parent company. These shares can 
                                                
543 The Takeover Code 2013 Rule 21. 
544 M Pagano and P F Volpin, ‘Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control’ (2005) 60 The Journal of 
Finance 841, 864. It could be almost true that the workers are allies of the target company who do not 
want to take the risk of losing their job. 
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be transferred from a parent company to a subsidiary, with the parent company 
transferring its most valuable assets to a subsidiary. In doing so, the parent company 
will no longer have a blocking shareholding.545 However, if the parent company 
wants to defend against the hostile bidder by using this tactic, the loyalty of these 
subsidiaries is a key consideration.  
The application of the ESOP is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
Per this figure,546 the ESOP Trust is set to borrow money from financial institutions 
by issuing promissory notes.547 The sponsoring firm should guarantee those notes. 
                                                
545 Katerina S. Kokot, ‘The Art of Takeover Defence’ (2006) September The Ukrainian Journal of 
Business Law 18, 19. Available at http://www.pwc.com/en_UA/ua/assets/pwc_atd_eng.pdf, accessed 
01 July 2015. 
546 This figure makes reference to United States General Accounting Office, Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans: Benefits and Costs of ESOP Tax Incentives for Broadening Stock Ownership (Report 
to the Honorable Russell B Long, US Senate 1986) 49 Here in this chapter, it refers to the instrument in 
which the issuer promises in writing to pay a certain amount of money to the payee under certain 
terms. 
547 Promissory note either substitutes for money or performs in part the functions of money. See J S 
Waterman, ‘Promissory Note as a Substitute for Money’ (1930) XIV Minnesota Law Review 313. 
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Then, the ESOP Trust will purchase shares from the sponsoring firm, and the firm in 
turn contributes cash to the ESOP Trust. Last, the ESOP Trust uses cash to repay the 
principal sum and interest on the loan to the financial institution.  
Sometimes, if the target company is using an ESOP to increase the defence effects, 
this can help the target company’s shareholding structure become more dispersed, and 
even if the employees do not hold a large percentage of shares (since “employees’ 
lobbying against a change in control is complementary to long-term contracts as a 
takeover deterrent”548), the ESOP’s defensive effect cannot be denied. 
3) Case studies 
There used to be cases in China in which a target company successfully defended 
against a hostile bidder by deploying the cross holding method. One such case was in 
2004, between CITIC Securities549 and GF Securities,550 where CITIC Securities 
announced their intention to acquire GF Securities at a price of RMB 1.25 (GPB 0.13) 
per share in order to hold 51 per cent of GF Securities’s voting shares.551  
                                                
548 M Pagano and P F Volpin, ‘Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control’ (2005) 60 The Journal of 
Finance 841, 843. 
549 “CITIC Securities Company Limited (“CITIC Securities” or the “Company”) was established in 
October 1995” and “is top-ranked in the Chinese capital markets”. More information could be found on 
its official website: http://www.citics.com.hk/AboutCS.aspx accessed 24 December 2013. 
550 “GF Securities as one of China's first integrated securities companies”, more information could be 
seen on its official website: http://www.gf.com.cn/en/company.html accessed 24 December 2013. 
551 CITIC Securitites, ‘About CITIC Securities Acquiring Shares of GF Securities [Zhongxin 
Zhengquan Gufen Youxian Gongsi Guanyu Shougou Guangfa Zhengquan Gu]’ (Netease.com, 13 
October 2004)  <http://media.163.com/04/1014/20/12MAIU320014187M.html> accessed 24 
December 2012. 
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Shortly after the release of CITIC Securities’s takeover announcement, GF Securities 
utilised the employee stock holding strategy to save the company. Specifically, GF 
Securities treated its sub-company, Shenzhen Jifu (Jifu), as an “employee” in order to 
transfer an amount of GF’s shares to other companies: 3.83 per cent to Yunda Tech., 
and 8.4 per cent to Meiyan, respectively. Thus, Jifu owned 12.23 per cent of GF’s 
shares in total and became the fourth-largest shareholder of GF Securities. At the 
same time, the original third-largest shareholder, Jilin Aodong, increased the ratio of 
GF’s shares to 27.14 per cent, and Liaoning Chengda increased its shareholding to 
27.31 per cent. As a result, the total shareholding ratio was 66.68 per cent of GF’s 
shares, which meant that CITIC Securities could not achieve its goal to control GF 
Securities. GF Securities also used ESOP, by letting JF’s employees have GF 
Securities’ shares to make these four companies unbreakable allies.  
A cross shareholding structure is represented in the figure below: 
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The ESOP bonded the employees’ interests and their company’s interest through the 
shares; if the target company was taken over, the employees who had the target 
company’s shares would be taking the risk as well.552 Just over a month later, CITIC 
revoked its hostile offer for GF Securities. The employees had successfully stood 
together to vote against the hostile bidder in this case. So, in this case, the cross 
holding tactic was a success in defending against a hostile bidder.  
In the US, there was a notable case where a target company successfully used the 
ESOP to defend against a hostile bidder and increased the popularity of ESOPs as a 
defensive tactic in doing so.553 That case concerns Shamrock Holdings’554 takeover 
bid for Polaroid555 in 1988. In that case, Shamrock Holdings acquired 6.9 per cent of 
Polaroid’s shares and intended to make a tender offer for control. However, Polaroid 
created an ESOP whereby it purchased 14 per cent of its common shares and created a 
defensive term in its charter stating that any hostile acquirer could not merge with the 
target company for at least 3 years unless the hostile bid was supported by more than 
85 per cent of shareholders in the target company.556 That is to say, it became 
                                                
552 Wenting Liu, ‘Research on the Practice of Our Listed Companies' Takeover Defense Tactics 
[Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Fan Shougou Shijian de Falv Yanjiu]’ (Masters Thesis, China University of 
Political Science and Law 2010) 17. 
553 J.Fred Weston, J.Harold Mulherin and Mark Mitchell, Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate 
Governance (4th edn edn, Pearson Education Limited 2003) 386. 
554 “Shamrock Holdings was founded by the late Roy E Disney in 1978 and serves as the investment 
vehicle for certain members of the Roy E Disney Family.” Information retrieved from its official 
website, www.shamrock.com, and from ibid 386. 
555 Polaroid is a famous company best known for pioneering instant photography. More information 
can be seen on its official website: http://www.polaroid.com.  
556 J.Fred Weston, J.Harold Mulherin and Mark Mitchell, Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate 
Governance (4th edn edn, Pearson Education Limited 2003) 386. 
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impossible for Shamrock Holdings to control Polaroid after the creation of Polaroid’s 
ESOP. Shortly after that, Shamrock Holdings sued Polaroid in court557 about the use 
of the ESOP but ultimately lost,558 because the Court of Chancery held that the ESOP 
adopted by Polaroid was “entirely fair”, acknowledging the anti-takeover potential of 
the ESOP.559  
4) Discussion and summary 
It can be seen from these cases that cross holding can be beneficial in lowering 
transaction costs,560 expanding the scale of operations and lowering management 
risk.561 Additionally, due to the complicated cross shareholding structure of the target 
company, it could be assumed that it could be easier for the target company to seek a 
white knight, because any cross holding shareholder could make a good choice of 
                                                
557 Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v Polaroid Corp 559 A. 2d 278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989).  
558 J.Fred Weston, J.Harold Mulherin and Mark Mitchell, Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate 
Governance (4th edn edn, Pearson Education Limited 2003) 386. 
559 In the case of Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v Polaroid Corp 559 A. 2d 278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989) , it was 
concluded that: “The fact that the ESOP has confidential tendering provisions was a significant element 
in this Court's conclusion that the ESOP is fundamentally fair.” And in Marc J Lane, Representing 
Corporate Officers, Directors, Managers, and Trustees (2nd edn edn, Wolters Kluwer 2010) 8-49 
summaries of the conclusion can be found. 
560 According to Coase’s theory, “outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these markets 
transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions 
is substituted the entrepreneur co-ordinator, who directs production.” If the activities are turning from 
“outside” the company into “inside” the company, certain transaction costs can be saved. Crossholding 
structures between companies can also be seen as inside company actions, so could further reduce the 
transaction cost. For more details, see Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) 4 Economica 
386, 405.  
561 Shun Luo, ‘Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Fan Shougou Shizheng Fenxi Ji Falv Guizhi Yanjiu 
[Empirical Study over China's Listed Company's Takeover Defensive Activities and Research on 
Relevant Legislations ]’ (Masters theisi, China University of Political Science and Law 2011) 24. 
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white knight and save the company by transferring more shares to certain 
shareholders. The cross holdings between a parent company and its subsidiaries are 
usually much safer than the cross holding of shares between a target company and a 
white knight, since, as discussed previously, a white knight can become a grey knight. 
However, it is a complicated takeover defensive measure and even if a hostile bid is 
attractive, the obstacle posed by such a sophisticated shareholding structure will 
increase the difficulty of take over. Accordingly, it will make the target company less 
attractive to friendly bidders.  
In fact, two ways of achieving the employee shareholding plan can be identified: one 
is where the target company repurchases its shares for its employees, which could be 
classified as Share repurchase tactic and may have limitations; the other operates via 
the ESOP trust and the help of a third party to achieve this goal. The ESOP is not 
perfect, however, as there could be financing issues with the ESOP cost and there 
should be a limitation of the percentage of shares issued to employees. Usually, 
financing an ESOP is achieved with the help of a White squire, by transferring the 
target’s shares or selling its assets,562 and the shares are purchased by the target 
company and given to its employees. However, there is a clear limitation on issuing 
new shares to employees in China. This is regulated under China’s Company Law, 
such that if the company wants to repurchase its shares in order to distribute them to 
                                                
562 M Pagano and P F Volpin, ‘Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control’ (2005) 60 The Journal of 
Finance 841, 859; Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and 
Practice (OUP 2004) 378. 
 
172 
its employees, the amount of shares distributed to employees may not exceed 10 per 
cent563 of the total shares of the target company, or this plan will be blocked by the 
securities supervision department.564 Moreover, it is totally prohibited by law to 
repurchase shares of any company without the support of the shareholders, even if it 
is for the purpose of encouraging employees to give those shares to them.565 This 
regulation is understandable given concerns regarding reduction in the company’s 
capital to finance this employee shareholding plan. Prior to this regulation of ESOP, 
this made a post-bid ESOP relatively impossible to adopt as a takeover defensive 
measure in China. That is to say, once the hostile bid was placed, it was better to 
consider other takeover defensive measures.  
In addition, in China, there are more limitations on delivering shares of 
state-controlled companies to employees because of these companies’ special 
shareholding characters. If these companies wish to deploy an ESOP to deter hostile 
bidders, it must have the permission of the relevant state-owned assets supervision 
and admissions department.566  
                                                
563 Administrative Measures of the Listed Companies' Employee Shareholding Plan (Exposure Drafts), 
available at https://www.google.co.uk/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#, 
accessed 1 April 2016. 
564 Wenting Liu, ‘Research on the Practice of Our Listed Companies' Takeover Defense Tactics 
[Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Fan Shougou Shijian de Falv Yanjiu]’ (Masters Thesis, China University of 
Political Science and Law 2010) 21. 
565 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (2005 Revision) a. 143. 
566 This is also part of work included in the Working Plan of SASAC of State Council to Guide Local 
SASAC in 2015 [Guo Wu Yuan Guo Zi Wei 2015 Niandu Zhidao Jiandu Difang Guozi Gongzuo 
Jihua], May 2015, available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85911/c1908341/content.html, 
accessed 12 July 2015. 
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However, things seem to have changed in recent years, just as the public attitude 
toward ESOP is changing in the UK. China has experienced the development of more 
American-style ESOP regulation over the past two years. As discussed, if the 
employee shareholding plan succeeds, regarding the repurchase of shares by the target 
company, there are certain limitations and financial burdens. However, a 
western-style ESOP could be user-friendlier and is, in fact, already in use in some 
Chinese listed companies but just lacks systematic legislation. Thus, the launch of the 
draft of the Interim Measures on the Administration of ESOP of Listed Companies567 
(hereafter, “Interim Measures”) in August 2012 could be taken as a sign confirming 
the takeover defence effects of the ESOP in China, even though this draft is still under 
discussion and it is hard to tell when it may take effect officially. Admittedly, the 
draft of these Interim Measures does not cover takeover defence effects and focuses 
more on the principles of using the ESOP, the business benefits of the ESOP (for 
example, how an ESOP could encourage work efficiency and initiative of employees), 
and regulates some details regarding its use.568 The anti-takeover effect of an ESOP 
is manifest; it seems likely that one day, the ESOP will work in the Chinese market. 
Consequently, the section below will focus on some regulations in the Interim 
Measures that relate to ESOP takeover effects. 
                                                
567 The sketch could be downloaded from the CSRC’s official website http://www.csrc.gov.cn 
accessed 12 December 2013. 
568 CSRC, ‘Introduction of Drafting the Interim Measures on the Administration of ESOP of Listed 
Companies’ (CSRC, 2012)  
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201/201208/P020120805589752343115.doc > 
accessed 22 December 2013. 
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First, there is a limit of 10 per cent of the total shares that can be sold under the ESOP, 
and cannot be exceeded. This will not include any initial shares held by employees 
before the listed company’s initial public offering.569 Thus, supposing the company 
had used the share repurchase defence successfully, it could be presumed that the total 
shares held by employees could amount to 15 per cent of the total shares of the target 
company, together with the repurchased shares by the target company. Thus, the 
shareholding structure of the target company could be seen as a relatively dispersed 
one, and that amount of shares could be helpful defending against a hostile bidder.  
With Polaroid, the total amount of shares held under the ESOP was 14 per cent, and 
was of great help to the target company in winning the hostile takeover battle.  
Secondly, these may only be purchased through a third party in a secondary market; it 
is not for the target company itself to repurchase them.570 This entails the financial 
institution holding these shares not the employees themselves. Distinct from the 5 per 
cent of shares regulated by Chinese Company Law that may be repurchased for the 
employees, 5 per cent of shares must be repurchased by the target company, and the 
10 per cent of shares mentioned in the Interim Measures may only be purchased by 
the third party: the capital management company. Of course, the money used to 
                                                
569 CSRC, ‘The Interim Measures on the Administration of ESOP of Listed Companies (Sketch)’ 
(CSRC, 2012)  
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201/201208/P020120805589752345819.doc> accessed 
22 December 2012 a.10. 
570 Ibid a.15 According to the Interim Measures, five kinds of financial institutions are allowed to 
manage the ESOP and those are: 1. Trust companies; 2. Insurance asset management companies; 3. 
Securities companies; 4. Fund management companies; 5. Other qualified capital management 
institutions. 
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purchase these shares for the ESOP is funded from employees’ payments based on 
employees’ voluntary joining of this plan.571 As was said by the press secretary of the 
CSRC, the successful implementation of an ESOP still needs the support of a 
profound tax preference, credit policy and other relevant regulations in related areas: 
The Interim Measures are still under discussion, and lessons from the western markets 
are welcomed.572  
The ESOP’s benefits are recognized by both the western and Chinese markets. This is 
likely because the use of an ESOP could work in any market, unlike other measures, 
and has gained public awareness both in the UK and China. An ESOP could work in a 
market by dispersing shareholding structures, such as it has done in the US, gaining 
the recognition of the Court of its anti-takeover effects, and it can also work in a 
market with a highly-concentrated shareholding structure, such as China’s, to help the 
shareholding structure becoming more dispersed. It should be noticed that the 
application of ESOP might have negative effect on the white knight defence, but it 
would not totally deter the white knight because of the shareholding limit of ESOP is 
10 per cent in China.573 It is still possible for the white knight to take control of the 
                                                
571 CSRC, ‘Introduction of Drafting the Interim Measures on the Administration of ESOP of Listed 
Companies’ (CSRC, 2012)  
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201/201208/P020120805589752343115.doc > 
accessed 22 December 2013 part 3. 
572 Zhuang Jia, ‘CSRC: Working on the Research of Suggesstions of the ESOP’ (Security Times, 11 
January 2014)  <http://epaper.stcn.com/paper/zqsb/html/epaper/index/content_535718.htm> accessed 
12 January 2014. 
573 Administrative Measures of the Listed Companies' Employee Shareholding Plan (Exposure Drafts), 
available at https://www.google.co.uk/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#, 
accessed 1 April 2016. 
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target company. However, with the help of ESOP, it will be easier for the target 
company to invite a white squire to act in consent to defend against a hostile bidder. 
Thus, an ESOP could be a win-win choice for listed companies.  
5. Summary 
Research shows that domestic bidders appear to be more in favour of hostile 
takeovers than foreign acquirers.  Easterbrook and Jarrell supported this idea and 
found that managers who adopted takeover defensive tactics “do a grave disservice to 
their investors” because even if they lower the risk, of the target’s shares being in the 
market, it is still possible that there will a loss in shareholders’ equity.574 Thus, 
managers are highly likely to defend against any offer to secure their place in the 
target company at the expense of the shareholders’ interests. However, the possible 
abuse of these measures could not be the reason for prohibiting them. For example, an 
ESOP could be a good plan for the listed companies to achieve both motivation of 
employees and anti-takeover effects. 
In fact, all four kinds of defence tactic discussed were related to the trade of shares in 
the stock market. And all four measures could work in any kind of market: the 
western-style dispersed one or the Chinese-style continuously evolving market. 
Additionally, these tactics could work in any legislative system with only small 
differences, because these measures do not require a certain level of market 
                                                
574 Frank H Easterbrook and Gregg A Jarrell, ‘Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?’ (1984) 
59 NYUL Rev 277, 292. 
 
177 
development to work. The only reason that certain markets have prohibited certain 
defensive measures is when the tactic or issues relating to it are high-risk. 
Specifically: (1) the Share repurchase tactic is regulated very strictly and certain 
measures are prohibited because of the risk of unfair treatment of shareholders, as in 
the case of greenmail. This thesis does not recommend the use of share repurchase in 
China, except for what is allowed by Article 143 of China’s Company Law,575 
because the use of share repurchase carries a high risk of reducing the target 
company’s total capital and may harm shareholders’ interests. (2) The Pac-man 
defence is also a high-risk tactic, since it could raise the financial burden of the target 
company, and even the hostile bidder would not benefit from a takeover. However, it 
does have the potential to allow the target company to retain control. The economic 
returns in the future are not assured if the target company survives, however. Thus, 
this defence tactic is not guaranteed to help the development of China’s stock market, 
but should not be banned totally. (3) Both the white knight and ESOP can be very 
user-friendly and effective measures to defend against hostile bidders and carry lower 
risks, which could be valued by regulators. The cross holding tactic is more 
complicated, but could even be a more effective one because the more complicated 
the shareholding structure is, the less possible it is that a hostile bidder will emerge.  
                                                
575 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (2005 Revision) Article 143: A company shall not 
purchase its own shares, except where: (1) It reduces its registered capital; (2) It merges with another 
company that holds its shares; (3) It rewards the staff and workers of the company with its shares; or (4) 
A shareholder requests the company to purchase his shares because he holds objections to the 
resolution on the merger or division of the company adopted by the shareholders general assembly. 
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Chapter 5: Takeover defence tactics relating to 
management 
Executive summary 
This chapter will discuss takeover defensive measures relating to management 
including the poison pill, scorched earth policy, shark repellents, dual class 
recapitalisation and three kinds of parachute measures. These tactics can be employed 
pre- or post-hostile offer and relate to the management team of a company.  
The ‘poison pill’ is the most well known of these tactics, and is still used in the US, 
but not in the UK market. A review of the creation and use of the poison pill and 
related cases concludes that the poison pill is a powerful strategy to stop a hostile 
raider by increasing takeover costs. Research has shown that this tactic works well in 
the mature American market (it remains an effective method to protect the control 
power of the listed company), and has been legalised in China’s market as from 2014. 
A review of the ‘scorched earth’ policy, used in some takeover cases, concludes that it 
is an internecine method and not good for the long-term interests of target companies 
and should therefore be used carefully. In addition, because of the internecine feature 
of this method, it is not legal in China’s market; it does not fit China’s Company Law 
principle to protect the best interest of shareholders. 
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A review of the use of the dual class recapitalisation tactic finds that high-tech 
companies prefer this tactic in the US but few use it in China. This is also a tactic that 
gives different voting rights to different class of shares (relative to the poison pill 
tactic) to ensure the company is controlled by a certain class of shareholders. This 
tactic could be effective in China in the future, following the adoption of preferred 
shares, but will encounter similar issues as per the poison pill tactic. 
Finally, this chapter discusses three kinds of parachute tactics that largely focus on 
giving high compensation for managers to increase the cost of hostile takeovers. 
These tactics are user-friendly ones and can fit any market and any legal system. This 
tactic is legalised in China and could be a good choice for targeted companies. 
1. Introduction 
We have seen that each takeover market has different structures and other 
characteristics. We now consider, in the next three chapters, the way in which several 
further defence tactics have evolved and assess their suitability to each market setting.   
There are many kinds of takeover defence tactics, and these can be categorized in 
different ways. Some classify these measures into two groups: proactive defence 
measures and reactive defence measures. In this thesis, all measures will be classified 
into three groups: takeover defence tactics, relating to stock trading; takeover defence 
tactics relating to management; and tactics relating to litigation. (Some of the 
measures may also involve activities that fit into other groups - for example, the 
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poison pill is categorized under takeover defence tactics relating to management, but 
once triggered, may also involve some activities regarding stock trading. This will be 
noted where applicable.)  
2. Poison Pill 
1) Definition & Features 
A poison pill is a kind of “rights plan”.576 It is one of the most frequently used 
antitakeover measures in the US, and was previously called a “warrant dividend 
plan”.577 Martin Lipton first mentioned it to argue for the directors’ duties of deciding 
whether to accept a takeover offer in 1979578 and in 1982, he created this popular 
defensive tactic.579 The pill received the support of the Delaware Court in 1985 in the 
case of Moran v. Household International, Inc.580 More recently, in 2010, Airgas 
Inc.,581 J.C. Penney Co.,582 and Barnes & Noble Inc.583 all adopted poison pills 
                                                
576 Krishnan Chittur, ‘Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover Defense’ (1985) 11 J 
Corp L 25, 38. 
577 Erik Yang and Samim Zarin, Mergers & Acquisitions - Hostile Takeovers and Defense Strategies 
Against Them (University of Gothenburg 2011) 16. 
578 Martin Lipton, ‘Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom’ (1979) 35 The Business Lawyer 
101,134. 
579 Shira Ovide, ‘Marty Lipton: Why I Invented the Poison Pill’ The Wall Street Journal, (December 
29, 2010)  <http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/12/29/marty-lipton-why-i-invented-the-poison-pill/> 
accessed 10 August 2013. 
580 Dosoung Choi, Sreenivas Kamma and Joseph Weintrop, ‘The Delaware Courts, Poison Pills, and 
Shareholder Wealth’ (1989) 5 J L Econ & Org 375, 376. 
581 Steven M. Davidoff, ‘Winners and Losers in the Airgas Poison Pill Case’ The New York Times, (16 
February 2011)  <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/who-won-in-the-airgas-poison-pill-case/> 
accessed 01 August 2013. 
582 Shira Ovide, ‘Marty Lipton: Why I Invented the Poison Pill’ The Wall Street Journal, (December 
29, 2010)  <http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/12/29/marty-lipton-why-i-invented-the-poison-pill/> 
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when they were facing hostile takeover bids. Also, evidence shows that a company 
with a poison pill is still likely to continue as a target and may finally be acquired by 
some bidder even if it survived some hostile takeover attempts.584 
A poison pill is triggered by certain conditions, such as a pre-specified percentage of 
shares bought by the hostile bidder. It gives the target’s shareholders certain rights. 
The aim is to “transfer wealth and/or control from the acquiring firm to the target firm 
and so provides a means of alleviating takeover risk”.585 It has been popular in the 
US since it was invented and has attracted both supporters and critics - it has received 
a favourable consideration by American courts,586 but does not require shareholders’ 
approval for its use. Indeed, according to Jenkinson and Mayer, approximately 560 
companies employed poison pills from 1985587 to 1988 and some of them are 
examples where management “clearly act[ed] against shareholder interests”.588 
                                                                                                                                      
accessed 10 August 2013 and all the news about the takeover activities could be seen on Wallstreet 
Journal and New York Times. See: Rachel Dodes and Joann S. Lublin, ‘J.C. Penney, Facing Activist 
Efforts, Adopts 'Poison Pill'’ The Wallstreet Journal (18 October 2010)  
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304410504575559931192338068.html> accessed 05 
August 2013.  
583 Dealbook, ‘Barnes & Noble Shareholders Back Poison Pill’ The New York Times, (17 November 
2010)  <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/barnes-noble-shareholders-back-poison-pill/?_r=0> 
accessed 01 August 2013. 
584 Elizabeth A. Raymond and Stuart M. Litwin, ‘Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States: 
Review of Defensive Charter and By Law Provisions for Delaware Incorporated Companies’ (1996) 7 
ICCLR 104, 107. 
585 Richard D. MacMinn and Douglas O. Cook, ‘An Anatomy of the Poison Pill’ (1991) 12 Managerial 
and Decision Economics (Special Issue: Corporate Structure and Control) 481. 481. 
586 Ibid 481. 
587 Tim Jenkinson and Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers Denfence, Attack and Corporate Governance 
(McGRAW-Hill Book Company Europe 1994) 33. 
588 Ibid 25. 
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In the UK, the poison pill does not function in the same way as in the US. It could 
instead be described as a form of  “golden parachute”, since it provides certain 
options to existing management.589 Consistently with the discussion in the second 
chapter, the UK’s takeover legislation is shareholder-friendly, the use of poison pills 
is precluded in UK takeovers because Rule 21 of Takeover Code set the requirement 
of shareholders approval.590 In addition, because of the invention and legality of the 
poison pill in the US, this section, will discuss its features and rationales mainly from 
an American perspective. 
As a takeover defence, a poison pill may have different variants. The most frequently 
used are the flip-over poison pill and flip-in poison pill.591 The flip-over poison pill 
functions by transferring some control from the bidder company to the target’s 
existing shareholders by allowing the target’s shareholders to purchase shares of the 
bidder company at a much lower price than available on the general the market. This 
is particularly efficacious when the bidder aims to acquire all of a target’s shares.592 
The flip-in poison pill is a proactive measure, which allows the target company to 
issue preferred shares for existing shareholders once a hostile bidder emerged; it is 
                                                
589 Ibid 33. 
590 The Takeover Code Rule 21. 
591 Richard D. MacMinn and Douglas O. Cook, ‘An Anatomy of the Poison Pill’ (1991) 12 Managerial 
and Decision Economics (Special Issue: Corporate Structure and Control) 481, 481. 
592 Ibid 481. 
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argued by scholars to be more effective in defending against hostile bids and/or 
increasing the tender price.593  
The poison pill has evolved since it was invented more than 30 years ago and it has 
seen two ‘generations’. The first generation of poison pill was the Lenox poison 
pill,594 as per that triggered by Brown-Forman Distilleries Corporation announcing “a 
cash tender offer for ‘any and all’595 common shares of Lenox”,596 which gave 
preferred shareholders in Lenox the right to convert their preferred shares into 
common shares at a 1:40 conversion ratio. The pill also included the requirement of 
super-majority approval if anyone wished to amend Lenox’s charter, securing the 
safety of the poison pill. The takeover was, ultimately, successful – and in a relatively 
short time - because the cash offer was attractive to Lenox’s shareholders. This 
highlighted some of the features and weakness of the first generation of poison pills: 
firstly, Brown-Forman’s offer was an “any and all” offer to all shareholders in Lenox 
Company. Unlike a “partial offer”597 or “two-tier offer”,598 an “any and all offer” 
                                                
593 Ibid 481-487. 
594 Krishnan Chittur, ‘Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover Defense’ (1985) 11 J 
Corp L 25, 27. 
595 “Any and all” tender offer means that the acquirer will acquire any and all the shares of the target 
company, and it often shows the intention of the acquirer to get the control of the target company.  
For details, see Lloyd R. Cohen, ‘Why Tender Offers? The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Supply of 
Stock, and Signaling’ (1990) 19 The Journal of Legal Studies 136. 
596 Krishnan Chittur, ‘Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover Defense’ (1985) 11 J 
Corp L 25, 28. 
597 Partial offer is an offer made by the bidder to acquire certain amount of shares, and it could be part 
of the hostile takeovers. See Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings 
(5th edn, John Wiley & Sons 2010), 256. 
598 A two-tier offer means that the bidder offers to buy certain amount of shares to gain control of the 
target company and then offers to buy the remaining shares at a lower price. See ibid 256, 257. 
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does not infringe minority shareholders’ rights and treats all shareholders equally. 
Thus, an “any and all offer” is not easy to defend against.599 In other words, preferred 
shareholders could not resist the premium being offered by the bidder, and the success 
of the poison pill was overly dependent on the removal of target shareholders’ 
incentive to tender their shares. Clearly, the first generation of poison pill could not 
achieve its goal of when the bidder offered the target an “any and all tender offer”. 
The second generation of the poison pill was (is) the Bell & Howell’s pill.600 It made 
some improvements over the Lenox pill by giving preferred shares voting rights and 
allowing redemption of what had been 3 USD shares for 300 USD, plus unpaid 
dividends after more than 15 years of its issuance in 1998.601 Once this poison pill is 
triggered, preferred shareholders have the ability to redeem their shares prior to 
common share shareholders, which means common shareholders will get nothing if 
the preferred shareholder cannot or do not redeem their rights. Even if preferred 
shareholders do not redeem their shares, they still have the right to elect two directors 
to the board.602 Compared with the first generation of the poison pill, the Bell & 
Howell pill made an important improvement in attracting shareholders with a high 
return.  
                                                
599 Ibid 259. 
600 Krishnan Chittur, ‘Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover Defense’ (1985) 11 J 
Corp L 25, 31-33. 
601 Ibid 31. 
602 Ibid 32. 
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Nowadays, the poison pill is not only used as per the previous role in defending 
against hostile takeovers, but is also used as a very popular tax management tool “to 
protect [a] company’s net operating losses”.603  
2) How it works 
It is essential to explain how the poison pill works towards achieving the goal of 
defending against a hostile bid. The poison pill is argued to be effective in diluting the 
bidder’s control of the company or making the target less attractive to the bidders.   
If a target company’s shares are 10 GBP per share and there are 1 million shares listed 
in the market, the value of the company is 10 million GBP. The company can issue 
50,000 preferred shares with the poison pill; if the bidder would like to buy the shares 
at 12 GBP per share,604 and wants to control the target company by acquiring 51% of 
shares of the target company, the total budget of the bidder would need to be 6.12 
million GBP (12*51%*1,000,000). If the conversion ratio between the preferred 
shares and the common shares is 1:20, then after the poison pill is triggered, all the 
preferred shares could be converted into common shares, so the total number of the 
common shares of the company would then be 2,000,000 (1,000,000+50,000*20). 
Once the poison pill is triggered, the total value is presumed to be the same as it used 
                                                
603 Jacopo Crivellaro and Milosz Morgut, ‘The End of Nocuous Relations? New Shareholders, Poison 
Pills and Markets for Corporate Control’ (2012) 3 IBLJ 349, 352. 
604 This means a 20% premium for the target’s shares. 
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to be before the hostile takeover arose.605 Consequently, every common share will be 
worth 5 GBP (10,000,000 / 2,000,000), and every preferred share will be worth 100 
GBP (5*20) per share. Thus, if a bidder wanted to control the target company by 
acquiring 51% of target shares, he could acquire 51% of the target’s common shares 
and 51% of the target’s preferred shares. However, it is worth noting that 1) 
shareholders have the right to ask for the redemption of shares at any time following a 
certain point after the acquisition date or the post-merger corporation issued these 
shareholders equivalent securities;606 2) the bidder should also acquire the target’s 
shares at a premium not lower than the original tender offer provides, which means 
the premium should be equal or over 20% in this case. Thus, after a bidder gets 
control of a target company, it still needs to be able to fund the rest of the preferred 
shares and that potentially makes the deal very expensive.  
Alternatively, a bidder could acquire less than 5% of the voting class of shares 
“without fil[ing] the Schedule 13-D disclosure form under Securities Exchange 
Act”,607 and then make a tender offer for another 75% of preferred shares to have 
                                                
605 It could be argued that the value of the shares may increase in the stock market and, per previous 
discussion, it could also be suggested that a hostile takeover could increase the price of shares of the 
target company. Moreover, the target could also be devalued before a hostile takeover. However, the 
percentage of the increased price of shares may not be predicted correctly. In respect of how the poison 
pill works, it is presumed that the total value of the target will stay the same.   
606 Krishnan Chittur, ‘Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover Defense’ (1985) 11 J 
Corp L 25, 31. 
607 “Schedule 13-D is commonly referred to as a “beneficial ownership report.” The term "beneficial 
owner" is defined under SEC rules… When a person or group of persons acquires beneficial ownership 
of more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities registered under Section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they are required to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC.” Available at 
 
187 
approximately 80% preferred shares total. By gaining these shares, the bidder can 
gain the power to ask for a change of the target’s charter and then try to remove the 
pill.  
In relation to the functionality of the poison pill for tax purposes, net operating losses 
allow a company to decrease its payable taxes in the future or refund its paid taxes if 
it reported net losses.608 Net operating losses could be used to offset the previous two 
years’ income and could be carried forward for up to 20 years as well.609 However, 
the Internal Revenue Code limits the ability to use net operating losses “after a change 
of ownership”;610 to be specific, if there is a ownership change involving a 5-percent 
shareholder or any equity structure shift, the loss-making company could not employ 
net operating losses to claim a tax refund.611 Thus companies can use a poison pill to 
prevent ownership change by setting it at a 4.99 per cent trigger.612 
                                                                                                                                      
US Securities and Exchange Commission’s official website http://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm 
accessed 12 December 2014. 
608 Donald M. DePamphilis, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring Activities (4th edn, 
Elsevier Inc. 2008) 494. 
609 J.K. Lasser, J.K. Lasser's Your Income Tax 2011: For Preparing Your 2010 Tax Return (John Wiley 
& Sons 2010) 648. 
610 Jacopo Crivellaro and Milosz Morgut, ‘The End of Nocuous Relations? New Shareholders, Poison 
Pills and Markets for Corporate Control’ (2012) 3 IBLJ 349, 352. 
611 Details about this regulation can be found in the Internal Revenue Code s.382 (g) Limitation on net 
operating loss carry forwards and certain built-in losses following ownership change. 
612 Jacopo Crivellaro and Milosz Morgut, ‘The End of Nocuous Relations? New Shareholders, Poison 
Pills and Markets for Corporate Control’ (2012) 3 IBLJ 349, 352. 
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A poison pill is often compared with a staggered board, which means once there is a 
successful takeover of the target company there could be certain directors “remain[ing] 
in place … to protect the rights of the remaining minority”.613 
3) Case study 
As mentioned in previous chapters, most well-known Chinese corporations are listed 
in the US. This chapter will study the takeover case of Sina v. Shanda in 2005 to 
illustrate how poison pills work in the US and their pros and cons.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4 in the discussion of the white knight tactic, in the takeover 
battle between Sina and Shanda, Sina hired Morgan Stanley as its consultant614 with 
the help of whom they issued a poison pill that aimed at diluting Shanda’s acquired 
rights.615 This poison pill included a right for any individual, who acquired more than 
10 per cent of Sina’s shares in the market, or Shanda successfully acquired more than 
20 per cent of Sina’s shares, every original Sina shareholder would be entitled to buy 
Sina’s shares at half price.616 There was a limit on buying shares – 150 USD per right 
– which means the poison pill right (which was enshrined in the original common 
shares before the poison pill was triggered) could allow the shareholder to buy no 
                                                
613 Allan M. Chapin, ‘Takeover Defenses in the United States’ (1988) 3 IBLJ 323, 325. 
614 Xiao Wang, ‘Poison Pill in Counter-Acquisition in US’ (2007) 2 Securities Market Herald 68, 68. 
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more than 150 USD shares at half price.617 This right could not be traded separately. 
At that time, Shanda had already gained 19.5 per cent of Sina’s shares, which meant 
that the poison pill would be triggered if Shanda acquired 0.5 per cent more of Sina’s 
shares. Then, Sina’s shares were priced at 32 USD. If we assume the share price 
would stay constant,618 the original Sina shareholders could buy 9.375(150/160) 
shares at 16 USD per share. The total equity of Sina was 5,048 million shares, and 
there were 4,064 million shares entitled with the poison pill rights excluding Shanda’s 
984 (5048 * 19.5%) million shares. Thus, once the poison pill was triggered, the total 
equity of Sina became 43148 million shares (4064*9.375+4064+984). At the same 
time, Shanda’s acquired shares would reduce from 19.5 per cent to 2.28 per cent.619 
Consequently, the poison pill would clearly dilute the control power of the bidder to 
the target and even if Shanda continued the hostile takeover, the budget for acquiring 
it would be vastly higher than before. 
After Sina announced the poison pill, its share price was not hugely affected620 and 
until 7 March 2005, the stock price of Sina was still 40 per cent more than the share 
price of Shanda.621 This takeover activity was the first anti-takeover case between 
                                                
617 Mingyu Li, Chaohui Yuan and Lei Xu, ‘Offence and Defence between Shanda and Sina [Shengda 
Xinlang Gong Fang Shu]’ (Security Market Weekly, 13 March 2005)  
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618 Once a poison pill is triggered, the share price may change in the stock market. To illustrate this 
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Xinlang Gong Fang Shu]’ (Security Market Weekly, 13 March 2005)  
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two Chinese companies listed in the US market,622 and it is said that “both the 
aggressive bidding strategy and the target firm opposition to the bid” in the case of 
Sina against Shanda were unprecedented in Chinese industry.623  
There are some additional antidotes used by another Chinese company – Fosun 
Capital.624 In 2009, the chairman of Fosun Capital intended to become a major 
shareholder in Sina but he learned the lessons from Shanda’s failure. Instead of 
acquiring Sina’s shares, he decided to acquire one of the companies –Focus Media - 
that Sina was taking over in order to indirectly acquire a position in Sina’s boardroom. 
More importantly, at that time, the poison pill of Sina reduced the percentage of 
shareholdings from 20% to 10%.  After Sina took over Focus Media in December 
2004, Fosun has already acquired 28.65 per cent of Focus’s total shares, which meant 
that Fosun had 13.07 per cent of Sina’s shares after the acquisition and the poison pill 
was never triggered.625  
Another case of note is the takeover offer between APTECH and Sohu. At first, Sohu 
welcomed APTECH’s investment into Sohu but shortly after this, Sohu found out 
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TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2005-029 12 <http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=53839> accessed 13 
August 2013. 
624 This is one of the most famous corporations in China, and is engaged in investment, insurance, 
capital management and industry operations. For more details, see the official website: 
http://www.fosun.com/ accessed 13 August 2013. 
625 Xuefeng Zhou, ‘Guo Guangchang Qiao Po Xinlang Duwan Jihua’ (Sohu.com, 4 April 2009)  
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APTECH’s real intention, and issued a poison pill on 19 July 2001.626 That poison 
pill included a right for Sohu to issue preferred shares which entitled the shareholders 
of Sohu to buy a unit of Sohu’s preferred shares at 100 USD per unit; if any 
individual or institution acquired more than 20 per cent of Sohu’s shares, the 
preferred shares could be changed into twice of the new corporation’s shares – which 
meant that the previous 100 USD share could be exchanged into 200 USD shares in 
the new corporation. Thus poison pill can therefore be seen as a combination of a 
“flip-in” and “flip-over” pill that would increase the budget of the bidder to buy the 
target shares and dilute the control rights that the bidder already had. Consequently, 
APTECH decided to give up taking over Sohu and the poison pill saved Sohu.627 
4) Summary 
To summarize, the poison pill functions by increasing a target company’s negotiation 
power in making a deal “more difficult and more expensive to acquire full control”,628 
providing the board with some time “to develop a merger strategy or find a better 
partner (a white knight) in times of extreme market pressure”.629  
                                                
626 Shuo Wang and Qing Guan, ‘Sohu and APTECH, Poison Pill’ (Caijing Magazine, 26 November 
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627 Ibid. 
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However, whilst the poison pill has been played as the preferred corporate defence for 
publicly listed companies for many years,630 their adoption has decreased in recent 
times. According to Bernd Delahaye, the rate of poison pill adoption decreased from 
61 per cent to 41 per cent among the top 1,500 listed companies in the United States 
between 2001 and 2007.631 More importantly, the emergence of new corporate actors 
such as the proxy advisory firm,632 shareholder activists,633 and hedge funds,634 etc., 
changed the market playing rules. The increased number of institutional investors, 
moreover, is “at the core of poison pill reform” 635  because most institutional 
investors are seeking their own directorship over the company. The changing 
character of the target shareholders has prompted the decrease of poison pills because 
most institutional investors and new market players do not like them.636  
Furthermore, scholars also argue that the benefits of adopting a poison pill may not be 
realised in terms of successfully defending against a hostile takeover but has still 
                                                
630 Ibid 351. 
631 Bernd Delahaye, ‘Still Alive: Poison Pills and Staggered Boards as Hostile Takeover Defences - the 
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taken time and expended negotiation power.637 One perspective is that the aim of 
adopting a takeover defence tactic might not be refusing a bidder’s offer, but 
negotiating a reasonable, and highest possible price for target shareholders to tender 
their shares. It is also worth noting that the Delaware law that approved the poison pill, 
as well as the poison pill itself, could continue to evolve over time. As discussed 
previously, the usage of the pill in tax management issues highlights that the defence 
tactic is becoming more sophisticated in respect of corporate governance.  
According to existing research, more poison pills were adopted during the recession, 
when equity prices fell down dramatically such that companies tried to use these 
defence measures pro-actively, to “protect shareholders in a period of market 
volatility”.638 From the perspective of purely financial issues, the poison pill could 
modify shareholders’ rights once triggered, as mentioned earlier. The different rights 
between preferred shareholders and common shareholders could become a legal 
issue639 because it could be said to treat shareholders unequally.  
                                                
637 China Merger and Acquisition Research Centre and Hollyhigh International Capital, China Merger 
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Poison Pill Developments and Trends’ (April 2011) 35 <http://www.lw.com/knowledgelibrary> 
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Research also suggests that the poison pill may hamper or even prevent the success of 
a friendly tender offer because it will be triggered at a certain percentage of share 
holdings and does not distinguish a tender offer from a hostile takeover.640  
Nonetheless, consistently with the cases presented above, the target company could 
still be attractive because its value and share price may increase as a result of the 
announcement of a potential takeover. Hostile takeovers might therefore even be 
welcomed in a developing market, such as China. Indeed, since early 2014 China has 
been encouraging the preferred shares, which are well developed in American market 
come. Such shares fill in the gap between China’s market and the advanced ones.641 
Usually, however, preferred shares do not carry any voting rights unless certain 
conditions are met:  
(1) Amendment of provisions related to preferred shares in corporate articles; (2) 
reduction of more than 10 per cent of corporate registered capital; (3) corporate 
mergers, divisions, dissolutions or changes of corporate form; (4) issuing 
preferred shares; (5) other circumstances in corporate articles.642 
Given this regulation, the poison pill might be applicable in China’s market because 
the different levels of voting right given to the preferred shares could be written into 
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corporate articles and, once the company meets a hostile bidder, could trigger a 
poison pill to protect the company. In addition, the power to make the decision 
whether to give voting rights to these preferred shares is still in the hands of the 
shareholders, and not the managers, because this regulation requires that:  
The decisions of above matters should be made by at least two thirds of the 
normal share shareholders who attended the meeting and at least two thirds of 
preferred shares shareholders (excluding voting rights restored preferred shares 
shareholders) who attended the meeting.643 
Thus, China’s takeover regulation is still shareholder-friendly, like the UK, but now 
also has some American features. The issuance of Administrative Measures of 
Preferred Shares Experimental Units in 2014 provided a legal environment of the 
introduction of poison pills in China and there is no regulation clearly prohibits the 
adoption of poison pills. If the authority approves the issuance of preferred shares, the 
adoption of poison pills could be possible in China.  
3. Scorched Earth Policy 
1) Definition & Features 
Scorched earth is an internecine takeover defence measure that aims to defend against 
a hostile takeover bidder by selling, or even destroying valuable assets in order to 
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make the target less attractive to bidders and/or trying to make more time for the 
directors to find a white knight. Scorched earth often includes two kinds of measures: 
the “crown jewels” and/or “puffiness tactics”. “Crown Jewels” refers to the most 
valuable part of a company, which is also the most attractive part for the hostile 
bidder. It could be a subsidiary, branch office or department, or it could be some 
assets, a business licence or business profession. It could also be a technology secret, 
patent, or key skilled talent - or any combination of these factors. “Puffiness tactics” 
aim at raising the ratio of debt to equity in order to discourage a hostile raider.644 It 
often requires distributing a good amount of cash dividends or repurchasing stock so 
that the indebtedness will be increased.645 Once the debts are raised, a hostile bidder 
might consider more carefully controlling the target because it may require additional 
funds. Thus the puffiness tactic could possibly lower the target’s attractiveness. As a 
matter of fact, the sale of crown jewel assets, or the purchase of assets which may 
raise obstacles for potential bidders could be used as a pre-emptive defensive option 
in the UK but shareholders approval is typically required.646 
2) How it works 
As the crown jewels are attractive to bidders, a defensive tactic that depends on their 
sale or mortgage reflects the intention of a target company to get rid of major 
inducements to hostile bidders. It is worth noting that Courts in the United States will 
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only allow the selling of crown jewels on the basis of a “business judgement rule” and 
the sale requires itself that is “at arm’s length”.647 This could be understandable 
because the crown jewels may be the crucial part of a company, and if the directors 
make a wrong decision this could result in the failure of the target company’s 
business in the following days. 
If a company is in a good financial shape with a sound business structure and high 
asset quality, it is often attractive to hostile bidders. The puffiness tactic seeks to alter 
this, in one or multiple ways: the target company may purchase lots of assets, which 
are not related to their business area, or deteriorate their financial status, increasing 
the investment risk. These measures could make the target company less attractive to 
bidders because even if a bidder successfully took over the target company, the high 
debt will make the deal unprofitable. Even if the bidder was not concerned about high 
debt levels, a “puffed” target company is no longer the target it used to be. Whatever 
is done in using the puffiness tactic aims at decreasing the value of the target 
company, so no matter what the target company does specifically, it will increase the 
risks associated with taking it over. 
3) Case study 
A notable case where a scorched earth policy was invoked was Jademan and Singtao 
News Group, in 1988. The chairman of Jademan, Zhenlong Huang (hereafter, Huang), 
was talented in drawing comic books and established a comic empire in 1979 when 
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his business became the dominant corporation in comic book selling in Hong Kong. 
The Jademan Corporation took more than 80 per cent of the sales volume of the Hong 
Kong comic business and was listed on the market in 1986.648 Shortly after, Singtao 
started to acquire Jademan’s stock and became the secondary shareholder, eventually 
owning about 30 per cent of the shares.649 To defend Singtao and protect Huang’s 
empire, he used a scorched earth policy to lower the attractiveness of Jademan. 
Specifically, two of Jademan’s crown jewels were sold: the Jademan Central Building, 
and its main media press, the Daily News. To sell these major assets, Huang needed 
the consent of the board of shareholders. Ultimately, Huang achieved his goal as the 
board of shareholders passed the decision to sell these assets and Singtao gave up the 
aim of controlling the Jademan Corporation.  
4) Summary 
The scorched earth policy is a form of restructuring defence which has proven 
effective as it can help the target company get rid of what the hostile bidder is 
interested in.650 However, it also receives much criticism. A scorched earth policy 
can be dangerous to a target company. Once the defensive measure successfully 
lowers the target’s attractiveness, it is likely to be less valuable than before, because 
of the sale of its crown jewels or the high debts raised. 
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Evidence showed that corporations with “crown jewels” are prime targets for hostile 
raiders,651 because these may be the most profitable parts of the company and/or 
responsible for most of its value. That said, selling the crown jewels or puffing up a 
company does not necessary mean making that company worthless. Saving control of 
the company aims at helping the target company move through the risk of being taken 
over by a hostile raider. Ultimately, target companies should use this tactic very 
carefully.  
Since this tactic can be harmful to both the target and bidding company, it might not 
be suitable for China’s market. According to China’s Company Law, one of the major 
duties of the directors is to protect the best interests of the company.652 Such a risky 
method does not meet this requirement and so cannot be used. Moreover, is likely to 
be banned by the supervisory department according to Article 8 of the Takeover 
Measures because of its inherent violation of directors’ duties. Even if the directors 
can gain the approval of shareholders, the process of organising a shareholding 
meeting can be very time-consuming, losing efficiency as a takeover defensive tactic. 
More importantly, it seems reasonable that shareholders would like having premiums 
rather than having a less valuable shell company. Thus, to protect the best interest of 
the shareholders and the long-term development of target companies, legalising this 
tactic is not a good idea.  
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4. Shark Repellents 
1) Definition & Features 
The shark repellent defence tactic focuses on making amendments to a company’s 
constitution to repel an acquirer from taking over a target company by introducing 
unfriendly factors into the target’s articles and making the target less attractive to 
bidders.653 During the 1980s, a peak period for merger and acquisition activities in 
the US, hostile bidders were often called “sharks”; thus from that time, certain 
anti-takeover tactics became known as “shark repellents”.654 This tactic includes a 
series of measures that are achieved through setting special terms in the articles of 
corporation; these are the staggered board, supermajority terms, and fair price 
provision. 
2) How it works 
The staggered board means that only some of the directors of a target company will 
be elected at each election, instead of changing them en masse.  This means that, 
even when a hostile bidder successfully takes over, they cannot gain control of the 
board of directors in a short time.655 A staggered board is often accompanied by a 
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poison pill, and with the help of the pill, the staggered board can be potent in 
defending against hostile bidders because it makes it difficult for said bidder to win 
the proxy fight to control the company.656 
A super majority provision allows the target company to amend its corporate 
constitution - if it is not against the law - and to add some provisions that require 
super majority shareholder approval.657 In this circumstance, a super majority usually 
requires 75 to 80 per cent.658 This measure places obstacles in the way of hostile 
bidders seeking to control the target company’s board. For example, if super majority 
approval is required to change the CEO of the target company, if a hostile takeover is 
successful, the hostile bidder will likely find it hard, or even impossible to gain the 
super majority of shareholders’ support required to make their desired changes; thus 
this could make bidders less interested in a company as they may not be able to 
control it.  
Fair price amendments indicate “a ‘fair price’ that the bidder must pay for all 
purchased shares, which is usually the highest price paid by the acquiring party during 
the previous year”.659 This tactic is motivated by the desire to obtain a higher price 
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for shareholders in a hostile takeover660 yet is claimed to be ineffective in defending 
against a hostile bidder.661 However, this fair price provision may be effective in 
defending against a two-tiered purchase of the target company. In effect, corporate 
raiders often try to control a target company in two steps: firstly, they may “purchase 
enough shares on the open market for a foothold and then make a tender offer for 
enough shares to gain control or partial control of the firm”.662 Secondly, they might 
purchase shares at a lower price if the shareholder does not accept the offer the first 
time. 663  This could be seen as price discrimination against those more loyal 
shareholders who did not accept the tender offer at the first stage. Thus, a fair price 
provision could help these shareholders to guarantee profits on their tendered shares. 
3) Case study 
These shark repellents tactics could be beneficial to retain incumbent management 
and help a company with lower leverage: with their use, both the target company and 
the bidder company might be protected.664 
Shark repellent tactics are the most controversial of the pro-active management 
related tactics and many scholars have criticised their misuse in the US.665 It is 
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claimed that most shareholders are easily misled by managers; if a target company 
decided to use shark repellents, especially to amend corporate bylaws, the incumbent 
manager may be incapable of making appropriate decisions. Incapable management 
teams may not perform well enough to deprive or delay the hostile takeover, and on 
contrary, might only aim at retaining their positions in the target company. In a 
famous takeover case between Mesa (the hostile bidder) and Gulf Oil, the latter’s 
management team was trying to convince shareholders to approve a switch of its state 
of incorporation to Delaware which did not require cumulative voting rather than 
using other effective tactics to defend against the hostile bid. Ultimately, the 
shareholders did not receive any benefits, having been misled by management to 
agree to the move. 666  In this case, the current boards nearly squandered the 
shareholders’ last chance to sell their stock at its proper price.667 Thus, whether this 
shark repellent tactic is in the best interests of shareholders can be questioned; it could 
be said to be too easily used to protect incapable directors’ positions. 
4) Summary 
Linn and McConnell suggested that the adoption of shark repellents is not likely to 
have a negative impact on shareholders’ stocks, and nor is it likely to “lead to any 
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misallocation of real corporate assets”.668 Other researchers have claimed that the 
adoption of shark repellents may not have any effect on takeover activity or takeover 
premiums, and of course the shareholders do not need to bare any consequences 
either.669 In any event, shark repellents can help to delay the hostile takeover process 
and give the board of directors more time to seek a white knight or strive for a higher 
tender price for shareholders.670 
The staggered board tactic has been described as a soft strategy to defend against 
hostile bidders as it cannot impede the bidder in continuing to buy a target’s shares - 
but used alongside other defence tactics, its effectiveness could be magnified.671 It is 
argued that a staggered board could entrench inefficient managers. 
Moreover, according to the US business judgment rule, all directors should act in 
good faith to protect shareholders’ interests, and few shareholders are likely to vote 
for such an amendment because it can not only act as a takeover defence tactic, it can 
also act as protection for incumbent management.672 In fact, few companies will 
adopt this tactic because some already had staggered board requirement in their 
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articles,673 and some by-law amendments could possibly allow directors to abuse this 
power, with the potential for directors to use their minority shares to vote down 
shareholders’ suggestions if the company adopted super majority provisions.674 Shark 
repellents could thus increase management influence or promote stakeholders’ 
interests.675 Shark repellent tactics could save a company from a hostile takeover yet 
at the same may save inefficient managers and sacrifice shareholders’ short-term 
profits. In the long-term, however, communities may benefit from the target company 
remaining, via job provision and increased local revenue so that shareholders can still 
benefit.676 Overall, however, these potential benefits are not guaranteed and some 
sacrifice of shareholder’s interests is likely.677 In addition, many of the US’s shark 
repellent provisions are inapplicable in the UK, such as supermajority voting 
requirements, fair price shark repellents. Staggered board and shark repellents which 
permit the removal of a director ‘for a cause’ are also not generally applicable in the 
UK because the Companies Act allows the shareholders in general meeting to remove 
a director from office with or without cause.678 
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These tactics do not require a highly developed market, nor a specific legal system, so 
they could be utilised in China as well as elsewhere. China’s Company Law only 
regulates directors’ terms of office, without requiring that every director should share 
the same term,679 thus making a staggered board possible. Additionally, China only 
regulates that there be a minimum standard for shareholders to vote regarding the 
major affairs of the listed company, but no specific limit is set.680 This therefore 
makes super majority terms feasible in China. Ultimately, any terms added into the 
corporate articles that do not violate the principles of China’s Company Law and 
directors’ duties could feasibly be used to defend against a possible hostile takeover.  
5. Dual Class Recapitalization 
1) Definition & Features 
                                                
679 According to Article 46 of China’s Company Law, “The terms of office of the directors shall be 
provided for in the articles of association, but each term of office shall not exceed 3 years. The 
directors may, after the expiry of their terms of office, hold a consecutive term upon re-election. If no 
re-election is timely carried out after the expiry of the term of office of the directors, or if the number 
of the members of the board of directors is less than the quorum due to the resignation of some 
directors from the board of directors prior to the expiry of their term of office, the original directors 
shall, before the newly elected directors assume their posts, exercise the authorities of the directors 
according to laws, administrative regulations as well as the articles of association.” According to 
Article 109,  “A joint stock limited company shall set up a board of directors, which shall comprise 
5-19 persons.” No specific regulations are included in the Company Law to indicate that directors 
should have same term of office. 
680 According to article 104 of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China (2005 Revision), 
“When the shareholders’ assembly makes a decision to modify the articles of association or to increase 
or reduce the registered capital, or a resolution about the merger, division, dissolution or change of the 
company form, the resolution shall be adopted by shareholders representing 2/3 or more of the voting 
rights of the shareholders in presence.” 
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A Dual Class Share Structure is also been referred to as “Dual Class 
Recapitalization”. 681  This defence measure creates two classes of shares “and 
involves the issue of stock with different voting rights from the firm’s existing 
common stock”.682  
2) How it works 
The plan is usually achieved through issuing two classes of shares - class A and class 
B - with different voting rights. This creates two classes of shareholders, “one class 
with more voting privileges than the other class”.683 When a target company adopts 
this plan, it makes shares with voting rights different from common shares, and 
privileged shares with voting rights have “lower dividends or reduced 
marketability”.684   
3) Case study 
A few years ago, a Chinese company, Baidu Inc., used this tactic to prevent its potent 
competitor Google in the US. In 2005, Baidu Inc. submitted its prospectus to SEC to 
express its intention to list on the US market, NASDAQ. This dual class plan was 
                                                
681 Qingkai Meng, ‘Preactive Takeover Defense Measures in the Listed Companies in the Global 
Environment [Quanqiu Tong Huanjing Xia Shangshi Gongsi Fan Shougou de Shixian Fangyu Cuoshi]’ 
(2007) 7 Business Culture 17. This is different from a Chinese shareholding structure, because 
non-tradable shares cannot be purchased in the market; dual class shares are traded in the market but 
with different rights.  
682 Uma V. Sirdharan, ‘Dual Class Plans and Unequal Voting Rights Plans: A Managerial Choice’ 
(1997) IX Journal of Managerial Issues 230, 230. 
683 Ibid 232. 
684 Ibid 232. 
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mainly intended to prevent one of its investors – Google - from becoming a hostile 
bidder.685 In this prospectus, it noted that Baidu would issue two classes of shares 
with different voting rights: One, the class A share, would be the common share held 
by common shareholders, traded in the market, and which carried 1 vote per share. 
The other, the class B share, would be the privileged share, conferring 10 votes per 
share and held only by original shareholders (mostly the founders of Baidu).686 At 
this ratio, even if outside investors took over 13.4 per cent of Baidu’s shares, they 
could only get a 1.5 per cent say, meaning there would be no takeover threat for 
Baidu.687 The founder of Baidu, Yanhong Li, owned 25.8 per cent of Baidu’s 
privileged shares, meaning he had (has) absolute control of the company.688 The dual 
class recapitalization plan worked very well in giving Google almost no chance to 
control Baidu.  
4) Summary 
The dual class recapitalization plan was popular in the 1980s and 1990s in the US, but 
as it distinguishes between two classes of shareholders, it can be seen as 
discriminating against common shareholders, and so this plan has not frequently been 
                                                
685 Yuxiang Xiong, ‘Baidu IPO Niuka Jihua Suo Yinhan de Xintuo Qiyue zhi Paoxi’ (JRJ.com, 06 July 
2009)  <http://trust.jrj.com.cn/2009/07/0618595435727.shtml> accessed 20 August 2013. 
686 Zhong Ji Newspaper, ‘Dual Class Plan Baidu's Plan’ (163.com, 02 August 2005)  
<http://tech.163.com/05/0802/09/1Q50UTSU000915BF.html> accessed 13 August 2013. 
687 Serena Ng, ‘Baidu Plays Defense on Voting Rights’ (The Wall Street Journal, 18 August 2005)  
<http://www.marketwatch.com/story/baidu-plays-defense-on-voting-rights-2005-08-19> accessed 22 
August 2013. 
688 Zhong Ji Newspaper, ‘Dual Class Plan Baidu's Plan’ (163.com, 02 August 2005)  
<http://tech.163.com/05/0802/09/1Q50UTSU000915BF.html> accessed 13 August 2013.  
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used in recent years.689 One reason could be that the voting ratio of a dual class plan 
between voting shares and common shares is usually over the limit permitted by 
corporation law in most of the jurisdictions.690  
In the UK, Takeover Code requires shareholders be treated equally, so this policy 
cannot work there. Moreover, the UK’s takeover activities are additionally influenced 
by EU regulations, and the Directive 2004/25/EC requires all member states to treat 
shareholders fairly.691 
China’s Company Law requires that all the shares be issued on a fair basis;692 that is 
to say, each share issued at the same time should have the same rights and price. This 
means such shares cannot be divided into two classes.  
 
6. Three kinds of ‘Parachutes’ – Golden, Silver, and Tin  
1) Definition & Features 
                                                
689 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George G. Triantis, ‘Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity’ in Randall K. Morck (ed), National Bureau of Economic 
Research (University of Chicago Press 2000) 297. 
690 Ibid 297. 
691 The Takeover Code (Eleventh edition) 2013 Rule 11, 12 and 20. Also, according to the 
“introduction” part of the Code, it could be known that the Takeover Code “is based upon a number of 
General Principles, which are essentially statements of standards of commercial behaviour. These 
General Principles are the same as the general principles set out in Article 3 of the Directive”. 
692 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 revision) a.127. 
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 “Parachutes” are protections against displacement of executives693 that mainly focus 
on payments made to directors and/or employees once a hostile takeover is triggered 
and they run the risk of losing their jobs.694 Parachute strategies might be seen as a 
kind of shark repellent tactic by some scholars because they serve the function of 
repelling hostile bidders.695 There are three kinds of parachutes that a target company 
could employ (or deploy): the golden parachute, the silver parachute, and the tin 
parachute. These three have similar functions but focus on different groups of people.  
A golden parachute is a severance package given to senior managers who can utilize 
it once a takeover has occurred.696 A silver parachute is a similar package given to 
lower-level executives, and a tin parachute is similar, again, but for even lower-level 
managers and employees.697   
2) How it works 
The term of “golden parachute” originated in 1961 when the first example of a golden 
parachute clause was included in the contract of the former chairman of TWA – 
                                                
693 Edwin T. Hood and John J. Benge, ‘Golden Parachute Agreements: Reasonable Compensation or 
Disguised Bribery’ (1984) 53 UMKC L Rev 199, 202 note 13. 
694 John A. Pearce and Richard Robinson, ‘Hostile Takeover Defenses that Maximize Shareholder 
Wealth’ (2004) 47 Business Horizons 15, 24. 
695 Edwin T. Hood and John J. Benge, ‘Golden Parachute Agreements: Reasonable Compensation or 
Disguised Bribery’ (1984) 53 UMKC L Rev 199, 200. 
696 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 186. 
697 Albert Choi, ‘Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism’ (2004) 20 J of L Econ & 
Org 170, 171. 
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Charles Tillinghast, Jr.698 His contract included a good amount of money paid in the 
event of his losing his job – however, this “parachute never opened”.699 This vividly 
illustrates issues relating to letting chief executives leave their position safely and just 
like the parachute which is protecting people who drop from high place so this tactic 
is called the golden parachute.700 In fact, provision of a golden parachute requires the 
approval of the board of directors and can be established by way of a contract 
between CEO and target that includes terms giving chief managers high compensation 
after removal from the target company if the company is taken over by a bidder.   
A silver parachute is part of lower-ranking executives’ employment contracts, and 
promises good compensation “before the possibility of a takeover or a merger”.701 
Mostly, silver parachute terms include a promise of paying these managers a certain 
amount of money, usually equivalent to several weeks’ or months’ salaries, depending 
on their working ages. Compared with the compensation offered by golden parachutes, 
however, silver parachutes are much smaller.702 As for tin parachutes, these are 
seldom used, covering only lower-level employees’ compensation. These apply if a 
                                                
698 Claire Suddath, ‘Biggest Golden Parachutes’ (Times)  
<http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1848501_1848500_1848418,00.html> 
accessed 11 August 2013.  
699 Ibid. 
700 Yungeng Xie, ‘Media Takeover and Anti-takeover [Chuanmei Binggou yu Fan Binggou]’ 
(People.com, 7 July 2005)  <http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40628/3524651.html> accessed 01 Aug 
2013. 
701 Albert Choi, ‘Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism’ (2004) 20 J of L Econ & 
Org  170, 171. 
702 Randy Myers, ‘Minimize Parachute Penalties’ (Journal of Accountancy, October 2001)  
<http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2001/Oct/MinimizeParachutePenalties.htm> accessed 
20 August 2013. 
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target company is taken over by a hostile bidder and if their job is lost within the 
following two years.703   
According to the Internal Revenue Code, 20 per cent excise tax is charged on 
parachute payments, and this kind of tax could not be deducted.704 This tax exists 
because companies could otherwise use these tactics as an alternative form of extra 
pay.   
3) Case study 
Golden parachutes were frequently used in the US in the 1980s because of the 
popularity of hostile takeovers and some active hostile raiders, such as Carl Icahn and 
T. Boone Pickens.705 As hostile takeovers might cause a target’s directors to lose 
their jobs, parachutes were popular in seeking to reassure managers that they would 
receive a high payment in such a case.  
One example of their use can be found in the fight between the Gulf Oil Corporation 
and the Mesa Corporation. It was suspected that the golden parachutes existed that 
were worth approximately ten million dollars; these helped the giant Gulf Oil 
                                                
703 Liang Huang, A Study on the Legal Regulation of Anti-takeover of Listed Corporations (DPhil thesis, 
Jilin University June 2010) 58. 
704Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 620.  
705 Paul M. Hirsch, ‘From Ambushes to Golden Parachutes: Corporate Takeovers as an Instance of 
Cultural Framing and Institutional Integration’ (1986) 91 American Journal of Sociology 800, 814. 
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successfully defend against the raider.706 In another case, Stan O’Neal, the previous 
CEO of Merrill, received about 159 million USD (77 million GBP) as a golden 
parachute for his loss of job in 2007; this tactic, and this pay-out, attracted much 
criticism at that time.707  
Evidence shows, however, that golden parachutes are still in style. In 2002, as 
reported by the New York Times, a record parachute pay out was received by James J. 
Mulva, the CEO of Conoco Philips for 10 years. The total size of his package was 
approximately 156 million USD, which placed him at the top of managers’ high 
salary list.708 Even more recently, in 2014, Dazhong Gongyong included golden 
parachutes into its corporate articles that apply if a hostile takeover causes directors to 
lose their job directly or indirectly, meaning that shareholders will be obliged to 
compensate the directors for extra fees.709 This is aimed at increasing the takeover 
cost, and therefore decreasing takeover attractiveness.  
4) Summary 
All three parachutes are similar and both silver and tin parachutes can simply be seen 
as lower-level variations of golden parachutes. As an anti-takeover measure, 
                                                
706 Tilton L. Willcox, ‘The Use and Abuse of Executive Powers in Warding off Corporate Raiders’ 
(1988) 7 Journal of Business Ethics 47, 51. 
707 Andrew Clark, ‘Merrill Lynch, the Firm Lost $8bn and the Chief Executive Had to Go - With 
$159m’ (The Guardidan, 39 October 2007)  <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/oct/30/6> 
accessed 20 August 2013. 
708 Pradnya Joshi, ‘Golden Parachutes Are Still Very Much in Style’ (NY Times, 29 June 2013)  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/business/golden-parachutes-are-still-very-much-in-style.html?pa
gewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 25 August 2013. 
709 Nan Jiang, ‘Takeover and Anti-takeover Strategies in Practise’ (2014) 7 Top CFO 60, 60. 
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parachutes may force an increase in takeover budget or necessitate a larger cash 
outlay for the bidding company, and hold up the takeover process.710 Also, as it is 
introduced that the “parachute” tactic could be seen as a kind of shark repellent 
measures, so it is also not applicable without the shareholders’ approval due to the 
rules set in the Code.711 
Empirical research has been conducted into the incidence of golden parachutes and 
the differential compensation-tenure relationship for managers in a sample of 331 
firms.712 This study showed that the golden parachute was of benefit and “arose to 
assure managers against tender related opportunism”.713 The primary purpose of 
parachutes is to distribute the accumulated wealth of the company to employees - this 
can also make the target less attractive for the hostile bidders. However, as a tactic, it 
does not seem to be of value to shareholders, whom it is argued do not benefit from 
their use. In considering this point, it could therefore be said that “directors may be in 
violation of their fiduciary duty”.714  
On this point, a study also showed that both shark repellents and golden parachutes 
could help target company shareholders ensure directors’ reliability by offering them 
                                                
710 Yungeng Xie, ‘Media Takeover and Anti-takeover [Chuanmei Binggou yu Fan Binggou]’ 
(People.com, 7 July 2005)  <http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40628/3524651.html> accessed 01 Aug 
2013. 
711 The Takeover Code 2013 Rule 21.1. 
712 Charles R. Knoeber, ‘Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers’ (1986) 76 
The American Economic Review 155, 166. 
713 Ibid 166. 
714 Allan M. Chapin, ‘Takeover Defenses in the United States’ (1988) 3 IBLJ 323, 326. 
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a contract that simultaneously makes both parties – shareholders and managers – 
better off if accepting a bidder’s offer.715 In other words, this could reduce the 
likelihood of a situation whereby managers would defend against any hostile offer 
whatsoever, to avoid losing their jobs (since a successful takeover could be a threat to 
the directors’ positions). Work by Richard Lambert and David Larcker revealed that 
golden parachutes had a favourable effect on major directors’ actions over the 
management of target companies and also had a positive effect on the price of target 
company’s securities in the market. 716 That said, it could also be argued that 
parachutes are not a fair tool for a target company as they give too much protection 
for directors even if said directors acted foolishly, or were incompetent.717 The golden 
parachute may otherwise also cause a lower takeover premium for a company if a 
situation arises where the target’s managers “are too eager to sell the company to 
receive [a] large payment”.718  
7. Other takeover defence tactics 
There are also some other takeover defensive tactics that may not be very frequently 
used or very well known, but could be very useful in certain circumstance.  
                                                
715 Charles R. Knoeber, ‘Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers’ (1986) 76 
The American Economic Review 155, 166. 
716 Richard Lambert and David Larcker, ‘Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making and 
Shareholder Wealth’ (1985) 7 Journal of Accounting and Economics 179, 201. 
717 Randy Myers, ‘Minimize Parachute Penalties’ (Journal of Accountancy, October 2001)  
<http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2001/Oct/MinimizeParachutePenalties.htm> accessed 
20 August 2013. 
718 Albert Choi, ‘Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism’ (2004) 20 J of L Econ & 
Org  170, 184. 
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One example is the people pill, which is where the management team or professional 
employees resign at the same time en masse once a hostile takeover succeeds, and can 
be useful in specific situations. This measure could work in some hi-tech businesses 
in which employees with special knowledge are important to the corporation and are 
of great value to the company.719   
Second, the target company could use management buyout (MBO) to defend against a 
hostile takeover. An MBO is when the managers/directors of the target company use 
the assets of the company or future profits as a guarantee for finance from the market 
or their shareholders, and they use the funds to buy shares of the target company in 
order to have the control over it. Consequently, the managers of the target company 
become the owner of the company at the same time, which could help the company to 
reduce agency costs and promote the directors’ positivity.720 However, this tactic is 
not legal in China; it is very risky to finance an MBO. Indeed, in order to finance an 
MBO, managers usually use the company as a guarantee for a loan from the bank to 
purchase shares, or mortgage existing shares to the bank to get the purchase money. 
In this case, the managers only have rights over the purchased shares but have no 
responsibility to pay the money back if the MBO fails.721  According to China’s 
                                                
719 Katerina S. Kokot, ‘The Art of Takeover Defence’ (2006) September The Ukrainian Journal of 
Business Law 18, 20. 
720 Peking Univerisity Research Group of Guanghua School of Management, Listed Companies' 
Takeover Defence Tactics and Relevant Regulations in China [Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fan 
Shougou Cuoshi jiqi Guizhi] (Fudan Press 2003) 166-167. 
721 Xiying Cai and Kankan Xu, ‘Some Thoughts On Management Buyout’ (2004) 5 Caikuai Tongxu 
42, 44. 
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Interim Measures for the Management of the Transfer of the State-owned Property 
Right of Enterprises, certain types of SOEs, such as the state-owned high technology 
enterprises, could not use MBO without the approval of the government, to prevent 
the loss of state assets.722 
The board of directors can go against a hostile takeover offer for the good of target 
companies. That is to say, the directors could make a decision that the hostile offer is 
not good for the target company and try to defend against the hostile raider. There 
was one such case in China in 2001, between Jinan Department Store and Huajian 
Electron. In that bid, the board of directors in Jinan Department Store approved the 
rejection of a takeover offer from Huajian Electron in defiance of the Jinan 
Department Store’s major shareholder – the Jinan Treasury. Ultimately, the actions of 
the directors were approved of as in the best interest of the shareholders because 
Huanjian did not have the ability to provide sufficient finance to take over Jinan 
Department Store;723 however, this tactic relied on the fiduciary obligation of the 
directors to ensure their actions were in the interest of shareholders of the target 
                                                
722 Interim Measures for the Management of the Transfer of the State-owned Property Right of 
Enterprises, a.12. “If a State-controlled high technology enterprise or a scientific research institution 
subject to restructuring which satisfies the provisions of the State Council General Office, 
Transmission of the Circular (Guo Ban Fa [2002] No. 48) and the State Council General Office, 
Transmission of the Circular (Guo Ban Fa [2003] No. 9) needs to assign State-owned equities of the 
enterprise to the management in carrying out pilot projects of equity incentives, it shall apply to the 
department in charge of finance at or above the provincial level or the relevant State-owned assets 
supervision and administration authority for approval”. 
723 Peking Univerisity Research Group of Guanghua School of Management, Listed Companies' 
Takeover Defence Tactics and Relevant Regulations in China [Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fan 
Shougou Cuoshi jiqi Guizhi] (Fudan Press 2003) 140-141. 
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company. This could be seen as a special takeover defensive tactic, led by the 
directors themselves. The directors played a defence against a takeover measure, but 
this required sufficient experience on their part in accurately recognising that the 
hostile offer was not good for the target company; given that being so, this defence 
was therefore a success. Had this not been the case, such a tactic could be dangerous, 
since it is possible that directors might be acting in their own interests. 
8. Summary of this group of takeover defence measures 
Most of these management-related defensive measures are only used in the US, 
because the US takeover defence regulation is more director-friendly. In the UK, “the 
target company shareholders ultimately determine the success or failure of a hostile 
offer, and the directors do not have the power to prevent shareholders’ choice to the 
same extent as in the US”.724 Such differences give specific takeover defence 
measures a very different legal status across these countries. That could be caused by 
the following factors: firstly, the composition of shareholders may change the 
legislator’s attitude towards defence measures. As discussed in previous chapters, 
there were many family-owned corporations in the US, and then institutional 
investors started to show up in the market. Some of the management-related takeover 
defence could protect a family business with the help of professionals. Tactics such as 
the poison pill and shark repellents could provide strong pro-active protection for 
                                                
724 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
694. 
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target companies, but these measures require directors to act in good faith, which is 
not easy to guarantee. At the same time, new players in the market are considerably 
reducing the number of poison pills adopted by target companies. In respect of the 
scorched earth policy, this can be seen to best represent a last choice for a target 
company to defend itself. Once a crown jewel is sold, the target company’s long-term 
development is likely to be harmed, even if the policy prevents a hostile takeover. 
However, if the target company finds a white knight to secure these crown jewels - 
and this white knight does not become a grey knight - a “scorched earth policy” could 
be considered. In the US market, Delaware General Company Law allows for the 
availability of a range of takeover defence tactics because of the US mature market 
structure and because States seek to attract incorporations and thus make 
director-friendly rules. Indeed, Federal legislation seldom has an effect over state 
legislation in takeover activities, and most US states are inclined to protect its own 
state’s business by allowing directors the power to use such takeover defence 
measures as they deem appropriate. Each state cares for their own corporations’ 
existence more than the federal economic situation as a whole, and the US “business 
judgement rule” exists to reassure shareholders and legislators that they can trust 
directors to fight against hostile bidders in shareholders’ interest. It has been argued 
that target corporations may have different political influence on how states legislate 
for the states in the US since the US is a federation,725 and this could be the one 
                                                
725 Hui Li, Study on Anti-takeover Provisions of the Charter of the Corporation and Its Legal 
Regulation (Masters Thesis, Southwestern University of Finance of Economics 2008) 26. 
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reason why every state would prefer a director-friendly system to protect its domestic 
corporations. Some defensive tactics also receive much criticism in the US, and this 
illustrates how important the nomination of directors is important in the US legal 
environment.726 Directors should act professionally during take over and the hostile 
defence processes.  
There are more institutional investors in the UK market and institutional investors are 
typically more focused on profits and not the business itself. In addition, it is said that 
these shareholders can “reduce the free-rider problem associated with monitoring 
managers”.727 Thus it is understandable that these professional market players trust 
themselves more than the directors to control the company. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable that institutional shareholders will wish to have control over the use of 
defensive tactics, and to decide whether to accept a hostile bid or not. Given that the 
directors may be acting in their own interests and, under Rule 21 of the UK Takeover 
Code,728 directors are prohibited from taking action to frustrate deals unless they 
have the consent of the shareholders, meaning that takeover defence measures are less 
frequently used than in the US. There is also an independent department in the UK to 
resolve issues that arise in takeovers. In addition, the UK market is a uniform one and 
                                                
726 Paul M. Hirsch, ‘From Ambushes to Golden Parachutes: Corporate Takeovers as an Instance of 
Cultural Framing and Institutional Integration’ (1986) 91 American Journal of Sociology 800, 821. 
727 Anup Agrawal and Gershon N. Mandelker, ‘Shark Repellents and the Role of Institutional 
Investors in Corporate Governance’ (1992) 13 Managerial and Decision Economics 15,22. 
728 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers Rule 21 outlines some circumstances when shareholders’ 
consent is required, and these circumstances include the use of all the stated takeover defence 
measures. 
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this reduces the competition for incorporations and consequent director-friendly rule 
making.729 At the same time, in the UK, both the target and bidder company could 
have an impact. With the existence of those institutional investors who are 
professional market players, it is understandable that UK legislators provide 
self-regulated takeover protocols for the market.730 Moreover, the UK is also part of 
the European market and for all takeover-related issues is required to adhere to the 
rules of the EU Directive to promote the integration of the EU market.731 The EU 
regulations require target boards to be strictly neutral in the takeover process.732 Thus, 
legislators are reluctant to give the directors more power than shareholders. That is to 
say, all crucial decisions should be made by shareholders and not by directors. The 
emergence of defensive measures in the market may also influence the UK, since 
these professional players may push the success of hostile takeovers if a bidder offers 
a good price for shareholders. Because some of the measures described (such as the 
poison pill, and scorched earth policy) are too powerful to fail, applying due 
consideration of shareholders’ benefits, it may be best to prohibit these takeover 
defences. In fact, the target board’s defensive options in response to a hostile offer are 
strictly curtailed in the UK, and in most cases there are 3 most viable options for the 
directors: 1) “defence document—strong criticism by the target’s board of directors 
                                                
729 Hui Li, Study on Anti-takeover Provisions of the Charter of the Corporation and Its Legal 
Regulation (Masters Thesis, Southwestern University of Finance of Economics 2008) 28. 
730 Ibid 26. 
731 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover 
Bids a.5 
732 Ibid a.16. 
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about the price and terms of the hostile offer, and a recommendation of not accepting 
the offer and provide the reasons;733 2) seeking a white knight; 3) the target’s board 
may develop its own alternative transaction such as management buyout.734 Also, the 
available pre-emptive defensive measures in the UK are similar to that in the US, 
although shareholders’ approval is typically required for most cases such as a 
defensive recapitalization of the company’s debt and capital structure.735 Thus the 
defenses almost never happen in the UK’s market. 
It could be presumed that defensive measures could function well in an open market 
with a shareholder-friendly regulatory environment. To prevent the abuse of these 
tactics, directors should be loyal to their fiduciary duties and be professional in taking 
over another company or defending against hostile raiders. Meanwhile, political 
factors and cultural difference may also have influence on takeover regulation choices. 
Importantly, the markets in the US and UK are mature, as is the corporate governance 
experiences within companies. A hostile takeover may not happen to a worthless 
company. One thing is fairly straightforward: Only a company with a crown jewel 
needs a pro-active defence tactic in order to deter hostile bidders from attempts to 
take them over. A company that employs a poison pill alongside a staggered board 
can also indicate shareholders’ will to control the company or their faith in the value 
of the company shares. Parachutes protect directors, but they can be considered as 
                                                
733 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK : Law and Practice (OUP 2004) 
696. 
734 Ibid 714-715. 
735 Ibid 696. 
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intended to guarantee that directors maximise shareholder benefits given that the 
directors do not need to consider their own benefits being harmed by a takeover offer. 
Thus it can be seen that one of the key tenets of these takeover defence measures is 
preservation of the real value of the target company.   
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Chapter 6: Takeover defences relating to 
litigation and other known tactics 
Executive summary 
This chapter will discuss the use of takeover defensive measures relating to litigation, 
which is the last kind of takeover defensive measure. This chapter will generally 
focus on the raising of anti-trust issues in defending hostile raiders. It will additionally 
discuss the view that raising anti-trust issues can be risky because it may terminate a 
hostile takeover; if a target company only intends to stall for time, and/or a better 
offer, this tactic would not be best.  
This chapter argues that antitrust tactics are more popular in China because China’s 
anti-takeover system is still at the start of its development, and this tactic may be 
more easily used by market players in contemporary China as compared with other 
more complicated shareholding structure related tactics. Detailed discussion about 
using anti-trust law as a defensive tactic in China will be included in the next chapter 
as part of the background introduction of China’s market. 
Also discussed are other defensive litigation measures, such as claiming the hostile 
bidder did not provide adequate information, (China’s information disclosure 
provision requires further improvement to help reduce inadequate information 
disclosure issues) or that there might have been criminal activity during the takeover 
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process (however, raising such issues would only be effective if there genuinely were 
criminal actions).  
Finally, this chapter discusses other tactics, including the people pill, and considers 
the wide variety of defensive measures.  In terms of their evaluation, these tactics 
will be defined as one of three kinds of takeover defences discussed in chapter 4 to 
chapter 6, according to that type of measurer’s regulation. Consequently, these tactics 
could be regulated based on the principles of regulating these three kinds of tactics 
separately.  
1. Introduction 
Between 1962 and 1980, one third of US takeover cases involved lawsuits.736 During 
that time, litigation was the most frequently used takeover defensive measure in the 
US”.737 Litigation-related takeover defensive measures are seen as post-bid takeover 
measures and mainly encompass those lawsuits filed by a target against a bidder 
regarding the bidder’s violation of Anti-Trust Laws, Company Law, the Securities 
Act or other relevant legislation. These measures can help the target company 
successfully defend against a bidder’s takeover, by winning the case, or otherwise by 
                                                
736 Liang He, ‘Waiguo Falv Fan Binggou Cuoshi dui Zhongguo Qiye Haiwai Binggou de Qishi 
[Enlightment from the Foreign Anti-takeover Measures to Chinese Companies' Oversea Takeovers ]’ 
(China Business Update, 23 May 2012). 
<http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zlyj/sywz/201205/1294924_1.html> accessed 10 March 2014 and 
also in Richard S Ruback, ‘An Overview of Takeover Defenses’ in Alan J Auerbach (ed), Mergers and 
Acquisitions (University of Chicago Press 1987) 64. 
737 Richard S Ruback, ‘An Overview of Takeover Defenses’ in Auerbach (ed), Mergers and 
Acquisitions (University of Chicago Press 1987) 63, 64. 
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buying time for the target and reducing the bidder’s desire to take over the target due 
to complicated judicial proceedings and a good amount of litigation cost.738  
Target companies typically have one of three reasons for suing the bidder company 
during a takeover. These are: first, based on the anti-trust restrictions, the takeover 
would give the bidder monopoly power over a market or specific area; second, 
information regarding this takeover activity relating to the bidder company or 
takeover process is inadequate, such that key information has been, or may be, hidden 
by the bidding company; third, there may have been criminal activity during the 
takeover process.739 Whichever is the reason in question, the aim of the litigation is to 
either delay the process of hostile takeover and allow additional bidders to emerge, or 
else push the bidder company to increase share premiums through the enhanced 
negotiating power provided by the litigation. 
There are two areas of law that could be relevant if either party involved in the 
takeover desires to buy time using litigation: these are Antitrust Law and Securities 
Law. Antitrust Law focuses on the healthy development of the whole market, while 
Securities Law is more focused on certain illegal activities on the part of the bidder 
company, or on failure by the bidder company to fulfil certain regulatory 
requirements. For example, almost every takeover system has compulsory regulations 
                                                
738 Changqing Xu, ‘A Study of Legal Issues of Listed Company Anti-Takeover’ (Masters Thesis, 
Fudan University 2008) 16. 
739 Hongtao Xu, ‘Research Report on Anti-takeover legislation system of the Listed Companies’ (2006)  
<http://www.szse.cn/UpFiles/Attach/1088/2006/04/19/1624072376.pdf> accessed 25 February 2014.  
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regarding responsibilities that apply to a bidding company, such as the disclosure of 
share holdings, and other certain information disclosures to the public and 
compulsory tender offer.740 Violations of these regulations could be cited by a target 
company in order to bring a lawsuit against the bidder and try to terminate that 
takeover activity. 
In contemporary China, much of the research about takeover defence measures 
pertain to anti-trust issues; a few other measures like three kinds of parachutes and 
white knight defence are familiar to the public. Objective evaluation of anti-trust 
regulations are therefore important to China’s market and research on takeover 
defence measures still needs to be improved in China. This chapter will therefore 
mainly focus on issues regarding violation of litigations, providing inadequate 
information to the target, or even fraud occurring during the takeover process. Other 
seldom-used anti-takeover measures are not discussed in-depth but will be mentioned 
                                                
740 In the US, according to 17 CFR 240.14d-6, there is a detailed regulation of disclosure of tender 
offer information to security holders. Also, in China, according to Liang He, ‘Waiguo Falv Fan 
Binggou Cuoshi dui Zhongguo Qiye Haiwai Binggou de Qishi [Enlightment from the Foreign 
Anti-takeover Measures to Chinese Companies' Oversea Takeovers ]’ (China Business Update, 23 May 
2012).  <http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zlyj/sywz/201205/1294924_1.html> accessed 10 March 
2014; relevant provisions can also be found in Measures for Administration of the Takeover of Listed 
Companies (2008 Revision) (Measures). In the Measures, article 13 and 14 state that “if the shares 
whose entitlements are held by an investor and its concerted parties reach 5 per cent of the issued 
shares of a listed company through the securities transactions at the stock exchange (in article 14, ‘by 
means of transfer agreement’), they shall formulate a report on the alteration of share entitlements 
within 3 days after the said fact occurs…notify the listed company and announce it to the general 
public; and they shall not buy or sell the stocks of the said listed company again within the aforesaid 
term. ”  Article 24 regulates that “when the shares of a listed company held by purchaser reaches 30 
per cent of the issued shares of the company through securities trading at the stock exchange, and the 
purchaser continues to increase the shareholding, it shall adopt the means of tender offer and sent out a 
general or partial tender offer.” 
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in this chapter by way of supplementary information, since these tactics could also be 
a choice of the target company and need to be regulated by law. 
2. Takeover defensive measures relating to other litigation  
1) Inadequate disclosure of information 
It could be said that the less information released to the public, the better condition 
the target listed company is in because investors can only use the information 
disclosed to evaluate whether shares are worth buying or not. Thus, disclosing 
relevant information to investors could ensure the equality of all investors in having 
adequate information to make decisions regarding investment in the listed company. 
In achieving this adequate information disclosure aim, shareholders’ benefits can be 
protected.741  
Not only should the target company’s information be properly disclosed; bidding 
companies are required to disclose sufficient information as well. The UK requires 
bidders to disclose key information, such as merger intentions and finance ability.742 
                                                
741 Deheng Law Offices and Haitong Securities Research Institute, ‘Research on Legislative Issues 
Related to Mergers and Acquisitions of Listed Companies’ (Shanghai Stock Exchange Official Website, 
July 2003) 3 <http://www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/jointresearch/c/plan20030701j.pdf> 
accessed 15 February 2014. 
742 See Peking University Research Group of Guanghua School of Management, Listed Companies' 
Takeover Defence Tactics and Relevant Regulations in China [Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fan 
Shougou Cuoshi jiqi Guizhi] (Fudan Press 2003) 169. According to rule 1 section D of the Takeover 
Code: “(a) An offeror (or its advisers) must notify a firm intention to make an offer in the first instance 
to the board of the offeree company (or its advisers).” Rule 8.1 requires that: “ (a) An offeror must 
make a public Opening Position Disclosure: 
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However, scholars have not always welcomed the requirement of disclosure of 
information. In the US, it is argued that State legislation which forces a bidder to 
release its information to the target restricts the process of the takeover and prolongs 
the takeover period. Thus, it gives a target company more time to ask for a higher 
premium and could lower returns for the acquirer.743 
More importantly, inadequate information disclosure also affects the price of shares. 
The pricing of shares can be seen as the best means of achieving the ideal allocation 
of resources in a relevant free market; the price of shares also reflects the performance 
of companies’ corporate governance and market effectiveness,744 thus pricing shares 
correctly is a key part of listing on the market. If correct information on the listed 
company cannot be collected and is not revealed when pricing shares and using 
certain pricing models,745 the final share price cannot properly reflect the real value 
of the listed company such that investors in the market may run the risk of losses if 
they are misguided by a share price based on inadequate information disclosure. That 
                                                                                                                                      
(i) After the announcement that first identifies it as an offeror; and (ii) after the announcement that first 
identifies a competing securities exchange offeror. (b) An offeror must also make a public Dealing 
Disclosure if it deals in any relevant securities of the offeree company or any securities exchange 
offeror during an offer period for its own account or for the account of discretionary investment 
clients.” 
743 Gregg A Jarrell, ‘State Anti-Takeover Laws and the Efficient Allocation of Corporate Control: An 
Economic Analysis of Edgar v. Mite Corp’ (1983) 2 Supreme Court Economic Review 111, 129. 
744 Zhixue Li, Gongsi Binggou yu Zhengfu Jianguan Zhengce Yanjiu [Research on Corporate Mergers 
and Acquisitions and Supervisory Policy of the Government] (Economy & Management Publishing 
House 2012) 87. 
745 Certain models to price the share in China can be found in Hai Lin and Yongmiao Hong, ‘New Test 
of Asset Pricing Models in China’ (2005)  <http://efinance.org.cn/cn/interest/1.pdf> accessed 12 
August 2014 This article introduced some economical models to price shares in China.  
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is to say, inadequate information disclosure could indirectly infringe the investors’ 
interests in the market. Therefore, claiming information was inadequately disclosed is 
another possible way of defending against a hostile takeover.    
a. Case study 
The most famous hostile takeover case in China involved Baoan and Yanzhong in 
1993, and started the use of anti-takeover measures. 
Qin Guoliang, general manager of Yanzhong Industry, expressed doubt over the 
legality of Baoan Company’s holding stocks of Yanzhong Industry, accusing Baoan 
of secretly holding Yanzhong Industry’s stock which reached 5% for 3 days without 
reporting to the Securities Regulatory authorities of the State Council or to the stock 
exchange; nor did Baoan Company notify Yanzhong Industry, which led to the 
intervention of the SFC for investigation and coordination, and ended with the 
conclusion that illegal behaviour had occurred during Baoan Industry’s acquiring 
Yanzhong Industry. The shares acquired by Baoan were confirmed to be valid, 
however, meaning the anti-takeover action by Yanzhong failed.  
At the same time, Yanzhong pointed out that the affiliated companies had engaged in 
some rogue trading during the hostile merger process. Under Chinese law, all 
shareholders, directors, supervisors and senior managers who hold more than 5 per 
cent of voting shares in the company cannot sell those shares after purchase within 6 
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months or purchase back those shares after selling them within 6 months;746 in 
addition, if one does so, all premiums should belong to the company. On 30th 
September 1993, two companies affiliated with Baoan, who already had more than 5 
per cent of Yanzhong’s shares, sold 276,000 shares. Accordingly, the CSRC made a 
final decision confirming that the premiums belong to Yanzhong.747 
b. Summary 
It could be said that this case was the beginning of China’s adoption of takeover 
defence measures. At that time Yanzhong had hired a consultant from Hong Kong to 
start this takeover defence battle;748 in 1993, few listed companies in Mainland China 
knew about takeover defensive measures. This case also revealed certain legislative 
defects in China. To be specific, compared with legislation in the UK and US, China’s 
legislation regarding the disclosure of shareholding was less comprehensive. China’s 
regulation only provides obligations for shareholding disclosure by major 
shareholders, as well as the takeover bidder’s obligation regarding information 
disclosure. Western legislation, however, mandates information disclosure by the 
management team of the target company, which is undoubtedly a form of protection 
                                                
746 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (1993 revision) Ch.5. 
747 Wenting Liu, Research on the Practice of Our Listed Companies' Takeover Defense Tactics 
[Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Fan Shougou Shijian de Falv Yanjiu] (Masters Thesis, China University of 
Political Science and Law 2010) 12. 
748 Peking Univerisity Research Group of Guanghua School of Management, Listed Companies' 
Takeover Defence Tactics and Relevant Regulations in China [Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fan 
Shougou Cuoshi jiqi Guizhi] (Fudan Press 2003) 104. 
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in the interests of the target company’s shareholders.749 China’s omission of this 
provision, pending further improvement of the Securities Act, is therefore a major 
defect. 
After the emergence of takeover activities in the market, and especially after the case 
of Baoan and Yanzhong, China did improved relevant legislation, such as Company 
Law; it also established the Securities Act. However, the protection of shareholders is 
still insufficient and those regulations have many defects. It is claimed by researchers 
that false information disclosure is a common phenomenon in China’s market, and 
that the information regarding the financing ability of listed companies is insufficient. 
Moreover, even if the information were disclosed sufficiently, it could possibly not 
being disclosed in time,750 making it possible to mislead investors or even targets. 
Data also show that from 2001 to 2011, informed trading’s premium was over 80 per 
cent in all major deals in the market, which implies a huge amount of insider trading 
occurred in China’s market. Along with directors’ selectively disclosing information 
to the public, the fairness of information disclosure cannot be guaranteed in China.751 
Even though China enacted Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure by 
Listed Companies in 2006 to try to force a change in the market, it did not and cannot 
                                                
749 Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart, Tito Boeri and Julian Franks, ‘European Takeover Regulation’ (2003) 
18 Economic Policy 171, 207. 
750 Shaoyan Sun and Yang Yu, ‘Wanshan Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Xinxi Pilou Zhidu de Jianyi 
[Suggestions of How to Perfecting Our Information Disclosure Regime of Listed Companies]’ (2011) 
10 Economic Review 103, 103. 
751 Zhengrong Chen and Miaoli Pan, ‘Zengqiang Shangshi Gongsi Xinxi Pilou Youxiao Xing 
[Enhance the Effectiveness of Information Disclosure of Listed Companies]’ (2012) 12 China Finance 
43, 45. 
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change the situation fundamentally; those regulations are not complimented by the 
existence of relevant civil or criminal responsibilities if someone disobeys the 
information disclosure regulation. Thus, inadequate information disclosure problems 
may exist in the long-term, if the cost of non-observance of relevant regulations is too 
low. 
Consequently, as discussed before, in China’s market, there is a high possibility of 
false information disclosure by the target company or bidder company and with 
insufficient information, or information that is not promptly disclosed to the public, 
no one can guarantee that a target company can make the right decision as to whether 
to defend against a bidder or not. Moreover, there is no detailed liability of 
compensation applied to unfaithful behaviours.752 Hence, with a low cost for the 
illegal disclose of certain information, even if a target company sued the bidder for 
inadequate information disclosure, the target still has the risk of becoming the next 
Yanzhong, and losing control in the end. Thus, claiming the bidding company has not 
disclosed adequate information is a possible anti-takeover tactic but may not be as 
effective as expected in China at the present time. 
2) Crime (Fraud) 
                                                
752 Yu Su, ‘Xiugai Zhengquan Fa Ying Jiada Baohu Touzizhe Quanzhong [Enhance Protections over 
Investors When Revising Securities Act]’ National Business Daily, (9 September 2014)  
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/stocktalk/20140909/014220238435.shtml> accessed 10 September 
2014. 
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Sometimes, the target company may sue the hostile bidder due to illegal measures 
used during the takeover process, and this could be useful, especially for target 
companies that are not as familiar with other possible hostile takeover defensive 
measures. Firstly, the target company could sue as an attempt to stop the takeover 
because of the use of illegal measures by the hostile raider, in which case, the hostile 
bidder would have to provide evidence to prove its innocence. If this is not possible, 
the hostile raider will not be able to continue to merge with the target company. 
Consequently, the directors of the target company could gain additional time to seek 
other possible measures to defend against the hostile raider. However, not every 
hostile takeover will involve the use of illegal measures; thus this tactic will only 
apply to certain cases and cannot be widely used. In the UK, if a target company 
abuses legal actions in order to prevent a hostile takeover, it might also face a charge 
of abuse of process753 and may be punished by the Panel. In addition, this measure 
does not prevent hostile raiders as a pre-bid measure, and thus can only act as a 
supplement to other takeover tactics, acting instead as a remedy if any illegal activity 
happens during the merger process. Therefore, it is only pertinent to sue if there 
actually were any actions in breach of laws. If there were not, it is not a good choice 
as a takeover defensive tactic.  
                                                
753 “Abuse of process has been defined as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the 
court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects”: Hui Chi-Ming v R 
[1992] 1 AC 34, PC.   
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3.  Other takeover defence tactics 
Another measure to defend against a hostile takeover could be arguing that the hostile 
raider’s takeover offer has illegal intentions or the takeover process has procedural 
illegality. For example, in the case of Sihuan Pharmaceutical and Zhonglian 
Construction Group in 2000, Zhonglian mounted a defence against Sihuan because 
the price offered was not as high as expected754 and Zhonglian sued Sihuan for 
violation of terms and regulations governing tender offers. The case was accepted by 
the court and helped Zhonglian buy some time.755 
Indeed, there are many different kinds of takeover defensive tactics but these cannot 
all be evaluated and analysed within this single thesis. Thus, only widely used tactics 
have been discussed in full. However, certain factors exist in common across these 
tactics, based on which this thesis has categorised them. The takeover measures 
discussed in this section could be seen as cooperating measures, not typically used for 
defending against a takeover but could nevertheless have a defending effect in 
practice. These tactics would work best when used in tandem with other major 
anti-takeover measures, rather than their being used alone. In regulating these 
takeover activities, the best choice would be categorising these tactics into one of the 
                                                
754 At that time there was a rumour about the new policy of transferring state-owned shares and legal 
person shares so Zhonglian presumed the share price would increase after the launch of this policy. See 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/topic1517/, there is a lot of news about this topic discussing 
new policy of transferring state-owned shares, accessed 1 July 2015.  
755 Peking Univerisity Research Group of Guanghua School of Management, Listed Companies' 
Takeover Defence Tactics and Relevant Regulations in China [Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fan 
Shougou Cuoshi jiqi Guizhi] (Fudan Press 2003) 143. 
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three kinds of tactics outlined above and enshrining and enacting the principles of 
regulating these three kinds of tactics separately. 
4. Summary 
Certain takeover defensive tactics, such as raising anti-trust issues, or using litigation, 
make for a good choice to use to defend against hostile raiders - but they may 
ultimately result in the termination of the hostile offer without giving the target 
company’s shareholders an opportunity to change their mind. Given that China’s 
Anti-trust legislation is not as advanced as legislation in the UK and US, both the 
hostile raiders and target companies in China do not have extensive experience in 
dealing with anti-trust issues. In addition, Chinese listed companies are not as familiar 
with other takeover defensive measures, and raising a monopoly issue might only buy 
time for targets to find other ways to protect their management power over the 
company. Consequently, if the relevant authorities do not judge that a merger activity 
will cause a monopoly issue, the target company could not prevent being merged with 
the hostile raider without using other practical takeover defence measures or a trusted 
white knight during the period in which anti-monopoly investigations are conducted.  
Furthermore, it should be born in mind that any anti-trust investigation could involve 
government interference into economic activities. Thus making relevant anti-trust 
legislation should consider market conditions, and the level of government 
interference should be well controlled in order to ensure market effectiveness as well 
as market competitiveness. China’s SOEs will not be totally privatized in the short 
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term,756 so it could be seen that certain areas (such as oil and electronic which are key 
areas to the development of a country) will stay relatively monopolized. This may be 
wise given their importance. Other industries, however, could be more competitive 
and government interference should be limited. It could be presumed that in those 
competitive industries, claiming anti-trust issues exist could be effective in defending 
against a hostile raider. That said, the use of anti-trust law requires experienced legal 
workers, as anti-trust issues can be very complicated. As illustrated previously, China 
has three different authorities charged with resolving anti-trust related issues, and 
there are rules shared by different regulations as well as a lack of regulations when 
dealing with anti-trust issues.757 Accordingly, the effectiveness of resolving an 
anti-trust issue cannot be guaranteed. Additionally, anti-trust law should be a tool for 
the government to regulate and control the market at a macro level, rather than being 
an anti-takeover tactic. If hostile takeover defensive measures are regulated properly, 
it could be predicted that anti-trust litigation will only function as a defence in the 
transitional period, as was the case with the US in previous years. Accordingly, the 
situation in China whereby focus is largely on the discussion of anti-trust 
investigations as a defence against a hostile raider should, and likely will, be changed.  
Another point to be noted is that all takeover defensive measures relating to litigation 
- Anti-trust Law or Securities Law – are primarily used to help the target company 
                                                
756 This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
757 Jiansan Shi and Shiyu Qian, Comparative Study on Antimonopoly Review of M&A (Lawpress China 
2010) 36. 
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obtain more time rather than actually terminate the takeover activity. Once the hostile 
raider offers a higher premium, it may be that shareholders will change their mind and 
sell their shares. If, however, the shareholders would rather keep control over the 
target company rather than receive benefits in the short term, raising litigation issues 
alone is not enough to ensure the hostile raider will fail. Thus, companies need to be 
familiar with other takeover defence tactics in case the target company loses in court.  
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Chapter 7: Which system is better for China? A 
comparative study of US, UK, and Chinese 
takeover rules  
Executive Summary 
After discussing the background to two takeover regulatory systems in the US and 
UK, the differences in markets and legal frameworks in China, and the use of three 
types of defensive measures, this chapter will finalise the discussion as to what 
takeover regulatory system is best for China and why. 
This chapter firstly discusses the most important part of making regulations - the 
legislative intent - to find out which legislative intent China is closer to. Initially, it 
was concluded that the US chose a director-friendly approach to regulate takeover 
activities because it primarily wanted to help protect the target company’s control 
power; the Delaware Act introduced some anti-takeover measures into states in this 
respect. Moreover, with the support of a mature market environment and sound 
supervision and regulation, this system worked well in the US for several years. 
Additionally, there is a discussion of the UK’s system as a shareholder-friendly 
takeover regulatory system, for the benefit of institutional investors and the long-term 
good of the market. China shares similarities with the UK in terms of a perspective on 
takeover activities, in that they are good for the development of China’s market. Thus, 
China chose UK’s model of regulation. 
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Secondly, this chapter discusses the large number of SOEs in China and provides 
analysis of these SOEs and their continuous reform. It argues that the SOEs were not 
the obstacles of transplanting UK’s regulatory system to China’s market. And the 
SOEs may not be totally privatised in the future. However, if China successfully 
finishes its reform of the SOEs, they could become good market players. Moreover, 
this chapter also discusses why China does not use the US’s approach: China’s young 
market cannot provide sufficient supportive supervision to guarantee all the minority 
shareholders could have adequate information from the market if these defensive 
measures are used and China’s market affairs are with lots of government intervention 
which makes US’s approach hard to fit in. Also, raising anti-trust investigation as a 
defensive tactic in China will be discussed in this chapter for a better understanding of 
China’s market.  
Following these discussions, this chapter provides some principles for China’s 
regulation of takeover defensive measures: a guarantee of equal treatment of 
shareholders, sufficient supervision, market effectiveness, and obedience of the 
information disclosure principle. At the same time, China also needs to resolve 
current problems in the market: i. the government intervenes in market activities too 
much; in the future it should be limited; ii. the protection of all shareholders is not 
sufficient and needs to be improved; iii. protection for minority shareholders in China 
is particularly weak, and this problem should be solved.  
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Finally, this chapter concludes that UK regulatory system is a better choice for China 
now, but with the development of its markets over time, China may gradually 
introduce more defensive tactics to ultimately arrive at a mixed-style or otherwise 
distinctive regulatory system. However, this depends on the power released by the 
government to the market and sounder supportive factors in the market; China may 
achieve its goal to have an advanced market and maximise shareholders’ interests. 
 
1. Introduction 
Based on the discussions in previous chapters, it could be concluded that the 
regulation of takeover defensive measures is highly reliant on the development of the 
domestic market and the legislative environment. Research has identified three 
important factors which may influence the likelihood of hostile takeovers in China; 
these are shareholding structure, financing structure, and corporate governance 
structure.758 According to Lin, the more concentrated the shareholding structure is in 
a target company, the less likely a hostile takeover is, because controlling power is 
concentrated with major shareholders and a hostile offer could easily turn out to be a 
friendly offer.759 In addition, the UK and US have more advanced markets meaning 
that most companies can be financed from the market directly instead of relying on 
                                                
758 Shufang Lin, Developments of the Hostile Takeover in China From the Perspective of Law (Masters 
thesis, Fudan University 18 April 2012) 21-23. 
759 Ibid 22. 
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banks; however, financing from banks is still the primary source to get funding for 
Chinese companies because of the less developed market in China. Since making a 
hostile offer requires massive funds on the part of the hostile raider, a high reliance on 
banks to get funds has a negative effect on the hostile raiders.760 Even if a hostile 
raider successfully makes an offer, it still faces the problem of funds shortage. Thirdly, 
corporate governance structure may influence the possibility of hostile takeovers. 
Countries such as the UK and the US have single-tiered board structures761 without 
the constraint of the supervisory board, thus hostile raiders have greater opportunities 
to conduct a hostile takeover because of the absence of external governance.762 
China’s corporate governance is two-tiered which lowers the possibility of hostile 
takeover. Additionally, the capital market is one of the most important factors that can 
influence relevant regulations, and China’s market is not as advanced as that of 
western countries. Thus, it is understandable that few scholars are researching hostile 
takeover defence regulations in China because it seems to be not so urgent a topic. 
                                                
760 Peking Univerisity Research Group of Guanghua School of Management, Listed Companies' 
Takeover Defence Tactics and Relevant Regulations in China [Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fan 
Shougou Cuoshi jiqi Guizhi] (Fudan Press 2003) 115. 
761 In the US and the UK there are only boards of directors in the corporate governance system; 
however, in some other countries, such as Japan, there are two-tiered corporate governance structures 
that have both a board of directors and a board of supervisors. 
762 Shufang Lin, Developments of the Hostile Takeover in China From the Perspective of Law (Masters 
thesis, Fudan University 18 April 2012) 22-23 Also, companies in the western markets can be directly 
financed from the market and the board of directors have the remit of managing and supervising the 
company, so external governance is relatively weak compared with companies that have individual 
supervisory boards. If a board of directors represents bad management of a company, the absence of a 
qualified supervisory board would likely result in the failure of that company’s business. Consequently, 
the share price might drop in the market, which could attract some hostile raiders. Thus, it could be 
said that the single-tiered corporate governance structure prevalent in western countries makes hostile 
takeovers more likely.  
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However, in recent years, the number of listed companies in China’s market has 
increased dramatically, and the securities market is developing as well. China is 
continuing the reform of shareholding structures, and it could be predicted that the 
market will become as advanced or even more advanced and attractive to investors - 
including hostile raiders - along with the resolution of shareholding problems. Thus, 
relevant hostile takeover regulations are still necessary for China to prepare for the 
maturity of her market.763  
This chapter, will discuss which legislative system China could adopt, and why, based 
on the analysis of the previous chapters. This does not mean that this chapter will 
suggest China directly copy another system; it will still need to enshrine certain 
unique principles regarding the hostile takeovers within its own market. 
 
2. Legislative intent and China’s background 
In the contemporary Chinese market, not all takeover defensive tactics are prohibited. 
Legalised measures include the staggered board, the white knight, and pursuit of 
litigation. However, other defence strategies are prohibited. The golden parachute, 
scorched earth, and green mail are all disallowed. In addition, some anti-takeover 
measures are neither clearly legalised nor strictly prohibited, such as the Pac-man 
                                                
763 Benzhao Zhang, Yanrong Wang and Zhixiong Zhu, ‘Poison Pills in Western Target Companies and 
the Inspirations to China [Xifang Mubiao Gongsi Fan Shougou Duwan Jihua ji Dui Woguo de Qishi]’ 
(2007) 1 Modern Management Science 67,68. 
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defence, convertible corporate shares, and the employee stock ownership plan.764  
Those takeover defences were not invented in China and they have been learned from 
western markets. For example, white knight defence and pac-man defence are all 
allowed in China’s market. Thus, finding out in which kind of market these tactics 
could work and why some measures are prohibited would be helpful to set some 
principles to follow in the future. 
Laws are made against certain historical backgrounds and with considerations of 
social and cultural environments. Therefore, when discussing China’s takeover 
defence regulations, the legislative intent and backgrounds must not be ignored. 
Indeed, the intention behind making a law reflects which kind of regulatory system 
China seeks, and the social and/or culture background of the country could decide 
whether the chosen regulatory system can fit China’s market. This section will 
therefore clarify the intention of regulating takeover defensive activities in China first, 
provide an analysis of China’s market environment, and then discuss which 
regulatory system China should adopt and how it should regulate takeover activities. 
Since China has drawn reference from the advanced western legislative systems to 
regulate its market, an analysis of the legislative intentions and backgrounds of 
western jurisdictions should be provided to find out under what conditions and against 
                                                
764 Wenxia Zhou, The Value Analysis and Legislation Selection of Anti-takeover Actions - Concurrently 
Discuss the Application of Anti-takeover Measures in China (Masters thesis, Jilin University 2008) 33. 
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which backgrounds certain legislation was enacted. At the same time, this analysis of 
western systems could help with the discussion of their applicability to China.  
China started to establish takeover regulatory systems for listed companies from 1992 
when it issued Provisional Measures of Shenzhen Municipality for Supervision and 
Control of Listed Companies, and in 2002 produced the first version of Takeover 
Measures.765 The first US legislation on the takeover of listed companies in its 
market emerged in 1968 when the Williams Act was enacted.766 The UK’s first 
uniform regulation of takeover activities was published in 1968, also much earlier 
than China.767  
Moreover, as discussed in the preceding chapter, between the 1960s and 1980s US 
companies frequently used litigation to defend against hostile bidders, either to delay 
a takeover or raise the premium; thus it could be said that contemporary China is in a 
relatively similar position now. China’s market has been developing for 
approximately 30 years and many takeover defensive measures are not familiar to the 
Chinese listed companies - except for litigation. Also similar is an awareness of listed 
companies that they can fight against a hostile bidder, but a lack of knowledge and 
                                                
765 Deheng Law Offices and Haitong Securities Research Institute, ‘Research on Legislative Issues 
Related to Mergers and Acquisitions of Listed Companies’ (Shanghai Stock Exchange Official Website, 
July 2003) 3 <http://www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/jointresearch/c/plan20030701j.pdf> 
accessed 15 February 2014. 
766 John Armour and Jr. David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -- 
The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, 1754. 
767 Ibid 1760. 
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experience as to how to do this. Resultantly, litigation is often the first thing these 
companies would think to use. Few Chinese scholars had researched defensive 
measures other than litigation related to antitrust issues. Thus, China’s takeover 
legislation lagged behind other nations. This section will discuss when and why the 
US and the UK started to establish and enhance relevant takeover regulations and 
provide market backgrounds for the analysis of uses of those measures. 
 
1) The Unites States: Historical legislation and market background 
In the US, there was a takeover boom starting in the 1980s in Delaware, when lots of 
corporations started to takeover. Before that time, the economy in Delaware was not 
as good as that of other states, so the state government tried to use a favourable tax 
policy to attract more investors, which proved to be very effective. From the early 
1980s, many corporations moved to Delaware because of this tax policy and sounder 
supportive regulations, which made Delaware a good example for other states and 
even other countries to learn from.768 At that time, the increasing number of 
corporations in Delaware made the state a good place to do business; however, the 
emergence of takeover activities also made companies in Delaware more attractive to 
bidders, friendly or hostile. Later, the invention of takeover defensive measures such 
as the poison pill and staggered board helped potential target companies gain more 
                                                
768 Guhan Subramanian, ‘The Disappearing Delaware Effect’ (2004) 20 The Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization 32,59. 
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bargaining power to protect their control of the company. Proponents argued that the 
existence of takeover defensive measures also allowed the target company more 
bargaining powers even in friendly deals.769 However, some research has shown that 
anti-takeover tactics reduced the differences between Delaware companies and 
non-Delaware companies, the number of takeover activities and even the value of 
Delaware companies relative to those of non-Delaware companies.770   
Thus, the US’ route to regulate anti-takeover tactics was based on the success of 
market environment and relatively sound supportive supervision and regulations. 
Even though the use of takeover defensive tactics reduced the number of takeovers in 
the US, this had advantages from the perspective of long-term interest of the target 
company and the development of the market as not every takeover activity would be 
helpful to the target company or the bidder company. Also, as discussed in the third 
chapter, successful attempts to attract investors or improve the market could occur, 
but that does not mean that success would be replicated in every state or country with 
different background corporation laws.  
                                                
769 Guhan Subramanian, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses’ (2003) 113 The Yale Law 
Journal 621, 622. 
770 Guhan Subramanian, ‘The Disappearing Delaware Effect’ (2004) 20 The Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization 32,59 49. According to Subramanian’s research, the value of Delaware 
firms used to be statistically significant relative to non-Delaware firms between 1991 and1996 but after 
1996 that difference disappears: this may be caused by the emergence of anti-takeover tactics. 
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It was reported in the 1990s that 40 per cent of the outstanding equity of US 
corporations was held by the institutional investors.771 Based on the “active investors” 
hypothesis, the involvement of institutional investors may have reduced the numbers 
of takeovers, as they prefer long-term interests for their investments.772 Thus the 
reduced number of takeovers may not be a result of the emergence of takeover 
defensive tactics alone; the increasing number of institutional investors also 
contributed to this phenomenon. In addition, it cannot be said that a reduced 
frequency of takeovers is necessarily harmful to the development of a market. On the 
contrary, it may be helpful, if weak market players are taken over by competitive ones 
and the remaining companies perform very well.  
Furthermore, shareholder and directors’ struggles in the US provides evidence of the 
relevance of certain legal environment. 773  In effect, a conflict between the 
shareholders and directors is highly possible. However, in the US, the self-restricted 
regulations and related supervisory regulations of the state and federal governments 
support the US’ director-friendly takeover regulation style, yet protect the 
shareholders at the same time. It could be inferred that US legislators chose this 
system based on consideration of the legislation environment as it was at the time it 
was devised; however, this system is still working for the US market now.   
                                                
771 Anup Agrawal and Gershon N. Mandelker, ‘Shark Repellents and the Role of Institutional 
Investors in Corporate Governance’ (1992) 13 Managerial and Decision Economics 15, 15. 
772 Rahul Kochhar and Parthiban David, ‘Institutional Investors and Firm Innovation: A Test of 
Competing Hypotheses’ (1996) 17 Strategic Management Journal 73, 82. 
773 James F. Ritter, ‘Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.’ (1986) 72 Virginia Law Review 851, 852. 
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In sum, the evidence tends to support the view that the allocation of powers to 
directors in the US increased the bargaining power of management in the event of a 
control bid, to the detriment of shareholder wealth.774 At the same time, this appears 
to reduce the frequency of takeover bids significantly but does not seem to improve 
the expected value of shareholder gains in those takeover contests that do occur. 
Overall, these considerations suggest that the shareholders’ ability to police 
management through the enforcement of contracts is imperfect, although far from 
non-existent.775 
This is surprising and leads to the conclusion that the amendments do not have a 
significant positive effect on minority shareholder wealth. A possible reason for this is 
that, if antitakeover amendments make takeover bids more costly – as they must if 
they are to have significant deterrent effects – and if the takeover market is 
competitive in their absence, then the amendments may make some any-or-all bids 
too costly to carry out. In this case, the bidder’s alternatives will be to abandon a 
control attempt altogether or to attempt to gain control through the use of a more 
                                                
774 In the US, the primary feature of its corporate law is its giving managers primary powers to make 
important corporate decisions, including those pertaining to takeover defensive actions. Further details 
about US corporation law features can be found in chapter 6 of David Kershaw, Company Law in 
Context: Te.xt and Materials (OUP 2009) and according to an decision made by Delaware Court in 
case FLI Deep Marine LLC v McKim, No4138-VCN, 2009 Del Ch LEXIS 56 (Del Ch Apr 21 2009) at 
6, the judge held to this principle to allow managers decision-making power over corporate affairs. 
775 John Pound, ‘The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct 
Evidence’ in Gaughan (ed), Readings in Mergers and Acquisitions (Blackwell 1994) 327, 328. 
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coercive, partial bid. The latter alternative is the very strategy that anti-takeover 
amendments militate against, according to their proponents.776 
 
2) The United Kingdom: Different legislative intent and regulatory 
approach from the US 
The UK has a different takeover regulatory system from the US and has influenced 
most of the other EU countries.   
As a matter of fact, there are lots of institutional investors in the UK, for whom the 
UK intended to provide a beneficial regime. Additionally, given that institutional 
investors seek long-term interests and thus are not inclined to stay in a market with 
lower levels of protection, the UK designed a takeover regulatory system with strong 
protection of the shareholders’ interests by giving shareholders decision-making 
power over defending against hostile takeovers.777  
The basic principles that should be included in good corporate governance are 
transparency, accountability, fairness, responsibility, and good regulations.778 Hence, 
the UK law included the fiduciary duty of the management team, which requires 
management to act bona fide in the best interests of the company and to act with 
                                                
776 Ibid 324. 
777 Rule 21.1 The Takeover Code (Eleventh edition) 2013. 
778 Colin Law and Patricia Wong, ‘Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis Between the UK 
and China’ (2005) 16 ICCLR 350, 351. 
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proper purpose.779 There are also a large percentage of minority shareholders in the 
UK. To protect minority shareholders in order to achieve market fairness, giving 
shareholders the right to decide whether to accept a bidder’s offer is appropriate.780 
Thus the UK chose a sensible but different regulatory system than the US for its own 
market so as to meet the requirements of both institutional investors and the long-term 
development of its market. More importantly, the UK adopts the view that takeover 
activities help improve the market so its rules were intended to promote the frequency 
of takeover activities by giving the decision-making power to shareholders. Moreover, 
in the UK a takeover activity is preceded in a relatively short time according to the 
timetable of the Takeover Code 781  and many takeover defence tactics are 
prohibited782 in the UK, helping to shorten the time takeover activities require as well. 
The UK market is not perfect, but few scholars criticize its regulatory system, which 
banned takeover defensive measures and thus could be seen as the right choice for 
UK regulators. 
3) China: A distinct market from the UK and US but with similar legislative 
intent as the UK 
Both the US and UK regulated their markets with certain intentions in mind, given the 
features of their markets. The main reason the UK chose a different regulatory system 
from that of the US was because of its different regulatory philosophy. Thus, 
                                                
779 The directors’ duties in the UK are regulated in s.171-177 of Companies Act 2006.  
780 The Takeover Code (Eleventh edition) 2013 Rule 21.1. 
781 The Takeover Code (Eleventh edition) 2013 Rule 31. 
782 The Takeover Code (Eleventh edition) 2013 Rule 21. 
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regulatory philosophy can make great difference in the future of market regulation. 
Both the UK and the US have a dispersed shareholding structure and minority 
shareholders in the market, but their philosophies are different: the US’s hostile 
takeover regulatory system was started from Delaware and aimed at using regulation 
to the listed companies in a certain state, so it empowered the directors’ 
decision-making regarding takeover defences; the UK gave this power to shareholders 
because of institutional investors, and because regulators believed takeovers would be 
helpful for the development of the market.  
China’s capital market ranked third, globally, for 20 years,783 and it has achieved this 
level in a very short time compared with how long – decades; a century - it took many 
mature markets to achieve.784 This rapid development was not unaccompanied by 
certain defects and a lack of regulations. However, in China, the market structure is 
totally different to the UK or the US, with a highly concentrated shareholding 
structure and few institutional investors when China first began regulating takeover 
activities. China shared a similar view of takeover activities to the UK, in that 
takeover activities can be helpful for the development of China’s market.785 Thus this 
                                                
783 Juan Chen, Regulating the Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies: Divergence from the West 
(Springer 2014) 8. 
784 China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Markets Development Report (China 
Financial Publishing House, 2008) preface. 
785 China keeps making efforts to promote takeover activities to improve market effectiveness and also 
trying to improve the audit process of CSRC to make it even more efficient. It is also argued that 
takeover activities could help the listed company to improve the performance in the market and expand 
its business. And through the reforms of the government authorities, it could be seen that the attitude of 
China’s government towards takeover activities is really positive. See Securities Times, ‘Guli Binggou 
Chongzu Xianjin Fenhong Huigou Gufen [Encouraging M&A Cash Dividends and Shares Buy-back]’ 
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could be taken as a key reason why Chinese legislators partially followed the UK’s 
approach to regulate China’s market even if this system may not have totally fitted 
China’s market. Among all the differences between China’s market and the UK’s 
market, the shareholding structure matters the most when considering takeover 
regulation. As discussed in the previous chapter, China’s shareholder structure is 
highly concentrated and there are a large number of SOEs holding a good amount of 
capital in the market. Given that the state is the only shareholder of these SOEs, it is 
possible that the state is affecting the decision-making process of the many listed 
companies that are directly controlled by the SOEs and indirectly controlled by the 
state. Consequently, as the key difference between the UK’s hostile takeover 
regulation and the US’s is the delegation of decision-making power, the existence of 
those SOEs could be problematic when deciding which way China will go – along the 
lines of the UK, or the US. 
3. The large number of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China 
Before discussing and analysing which regulatory system is better for China, an 
important factor should be clarified: the existence of a large number of State Owned 
Enterprises. For many years, almost all research on Chinese economics, the stock 
market or corporate governance regulation has mentioned China’s SOEs because 
these held a large volume of stock and were able to control China’s economic 
                                                                                                                                      
(1 September 2015) < http://www.sac.net.cn/hyfw/hydt/201509/t20150901_125307.html > accessed 2 
May 2016. 
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development. However, in recent years, certain defects with SOEs have become 
apparent, such as their inefficiency and lack of competition. In this section, a clear 
illustration of SOEs in China will be provided, followed by a discussion as to whether 
SOEs are as problematic as has been claimed, and then a conclusion as to whether 
China should follow western countries and privatize as many SOEs as it can.  
China has a large number of SOEs in its capital market because of its socialist nature 
and the uncompromising principle of “maintaining the leading status of SOEs”786 that 
was adhered to when China started to establish and improve its capital market. After 
years of development, the existence of the SOEs is a key point when discussing 
China’s economy, as they are an important element of China’s capital market. In case 
of any unexpected special circumstances, China’s government has the potential to use 
state power to help SOEs resolve issues, which could be seen as a violation of market 
rules, with SOEs competing unfairly with other companies in the market due to this 
support.  
In addition, SOEs control a large amount of capital in China’s market and they have 
the controlling power over many listed companies in the market. The table below 
illustrates how much capital is owned by China’s listed SOEs: 
  
                                                
786 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Guoyou Qiye Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de 
Jueding[Several Major Resolutions by the Central Committee of the CPC on the Reform and 
Development of State Owned Enterprises], The Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee 
of the CPC, Sep. 22 1999. 
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Table: Listed SOEs as a significant force in Chinese securities market 
Year Number Percentag
e (%) 
Market 
capitalisation 
(US$100 million) 
Percentage (of 
market 
capitalisation) 
1995 211 67.8 3,867 N/A 
1999 626 67.8 29,974 N/A 
2003 928 73.3 45,255 N/A 
2005 828 60.0 30,423 50.8 
2007 936 61.7 400,409 50.6 
2009 777 46.4 242,662 40.9 
2010 1093 53 273,571 71 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)787 
                                                
787 OECD Working Group on Privatization and Corporate Governance of State Owned Assets, ‘State 
Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence’ (2009) http://www. 
oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/42095493.pdf  referenced from Juan Chen, Regulating the Takeover of 
Chinese Listed Companies: Divergence from the West (Springer 2014) 10.  
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Although this table shows that SOEs hold large amount of stock in the market, it does 
not contain anything in terms of SOEs’ effectiveness/efficiency, or provide any 
negative evidence regarding their impact on the market. SOE reform started in the 
1970s while China was still implementing a planned economy,788 and in the decades 
since that time, the SOEs have continued to change. Even though it cannot be said 
that SOEs do not have any drawbacks now, there are still opportunities for the SOEs 
to be improved rather than to be abolished.   
There may be some confusion about State Owned Enterprises for western researchers, 
following some harsh criticism from Chinese scholars, some of whom support the 
idea of abolishing SOEs and letting them privatize as in western countries, in order to 
make them compete equally with other market players. However, this thesis, does not 
take this perspective, and argues that to certain extent, the existence of the SOEs is 
still important for China’s economic development in contemporary society.  
As introduced and discussed in Chapter 1, SOEs are experiencing continual reform in 
China and the number of the SOEs has been significantly reduced over recent years. 
Indeed, SOEs could be as competitive as other listed companies if the current Chinese 
leadership successfully finishes SOE reform. SOEs might always attract criticism 
because of China’s administrative systems, not the SOEs themselves. If and when 
China minimizes intervention in SOE management and limits the government’s 
                                                
788 Dongtao Zou (ed) Report on China's Economic Development and Institution Reform No.1: China 30 
Years of Reform and Opening-Up (Social Sciences Academic Press(China) 2008) Chapter 12 available 
at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/68294/131889/134330/index.html accessed 1 November 2014. 
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power to get involved in market affairs, SOEs would not be a problem while 
transplanting successful western-style legal systems to China. 
4. Anti-trust law as a defensive tactic 
First, it should be acknowledged that a highly-concentrated market is harmful to the 
public interest because: 1) the more concentrated a market is, the higher product or 
service prices will likely be, which might be unfair for consumers, as it would not be 
that high in a competitive market; 2) the fewer competitors in the market, the less 
lively the market. Because of the highly concentrated structure of the market, the 
monopolist will likely be reluctant to undertake further research or development 
meaning that the technology or the level of service will not advance. This effect is 
also harmful to the public interest. Given the long-term impact monopoly issues can 
have on the market, the market is in need of certain level of government intervention 
in takeover activities; there may be no one else to judge whether takeover activity 
should be terminated because of the possibility of monopoly.  
Anti-trust legislation is extremely important in ensuring the economy goes as well as 
it should by setting rules to prevent business monopolies in certain area, instead 
helping the market to be competitive, in the interest of consumers. If the operation in 
certain areas of the market is highly concentrated, merger and acquisition activities 
could cause further concentration, violating anti-trust law, and should be halted.789 
                                                
789 Deheng Law Offices and Haitong Securities Research Institute, ‘Research on Legislative Issues 
Related to Mergers and Acquisitions of Listed Companies’ (Shanghai Stock Exchange Official Website, 
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Consequently, anti-trust law could function as a takeover defence tactic for a target 
company since it could bring to a halt an unsolicited takeover offer by raising 
anti-trust issues to relevant bodies able to terminate takeovers. Anti-trust law, used as 
a takeover defensive tactic, is the most frequently discussed anti-takeover measure in 
China. It was frequently used in the US in the 1960-1970s, but has not been 
encouraged in western countries recently.790 It should therefore be considered why 
China’s market is using a tactic that was popular more than 50 years ago but is now 
less frequently seen in western countries. 
Government should play a role in protecting public interest in order to keep stability 
in society; a sound anti-trust regulatory system is crucial in order for the government 
to develop the market. It is therefore very reasonable that the government should 
reserve the right to stop takeover activity for the good of the public. Moreover, a 
government’s well-advised guidance on activities in the market could decide the role 
of economic regulations to the anti-takeover issues of the listed companies. That is to 
say, the relevant government department could initiate enhanced legislation to provide 
a sound regulatory system and rational supervision of takeover-related issues in the 
market, to protect all participants’ interests. In this way, the government could 
engender a better economic atmosphere for the market and help push market 
                                                                                                                                      
July 2003)  <http://www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/jointresearch/c/plan20030701j.pdf> 
accessed 15 February 2014. 
790 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings (5th edn, John Wiley & 
Sons 2010) 227. 
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development.791 Accordingly, government intervention will also be evaluated when 
considering anti-trust litigation as a takeover defence tactic.  
Encouraging a target company to raise anti-trust issues to defend against a hostile 
bidder could be seen as intervention in economic activities by the government; there 
should therefore be some limitations on the scale of the government’s power to 
intervene in this manner. To some extent, a principle of economic law applies here, 
regulating anti-trust issues during the merger and acquisition process: the principle of 
moderation. This means there are rules to be referenced but that those rules will not 
constrain the development of the market and could instead provide a relevant “free 
market” for participants to do business.792 Governmental interference should be 
regarded as necessary in monitoring the market to ensure healthy development; 
however, the government should not be allowed too much power, which might be 
abused, and could result in a market with too many obstacles relative to the market’s 
development.   
That is not to say that regulating takeover activities is an entirely political issue. It is 
aiming at solving market concentration issues, but the decision of whether a takeover 
could cause this problem is made by the government. That is to say, the intention of 
financial regulations is to provide a competitive market for consumers’ benefit, but 
the government plays the main role in prohibiting monopoly activities. Ultimately, the 
                                                
791 Junjie Zhang, Research on Legal Issues of Takeover Defense Tactics of the Listed Companies 
(Masters Thesis, Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences 2011) 28. 
792 Changqi Li, Economic Law (Law Press Beijing 2008) 79. 
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interference of a government in market activities should be limited, yet still functional 
in terms of executing its duty. The government’s decision-making power is provided 
by anti-trust regulation; if in certain legal systems a government is given too much 
power in deciding a takeover activity, the intended function of this takeover defence 
can work. Markets need relevant regulations to reduce monopoly issues, and the 
regulation needs to allow for the resolution of these issues via relevant authorities. If 
regulation is similar in one market to another but the structures of authorities are 
different, the application of these regulations will be different. This is what happened 
in China as compared with western countries: China’s anti-trust law could be said to 
be advanced because it drew reference from the most advanced legislative experience, 
but the authorities in China and in western countries do not have similar levels of 
government interference. The structures of China’s authorities are more complicated 
than western countries’ and the Chinese government has too much power over these 
affairs, as all authorities are government departments.    
Due to the globalisation of markets, takeover activities may involve participants from 
all over the world, not only from the domestic market. Thus, regulations regarding 
takeover activities should also consider foreign investors. If the success of those 
takeover activities would cause competition issues, the process should be restricted by 
the Anti-trust Law. In the UK, the process is regulated by Competition Law, and the 
Companies (Cross-border Mergers) Regulations 2007 and Directive 2005/56/EC793 if 
                                                
793 Practice statement No.18, The Takeover Code (Eleventh edition) 2013. 
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there is a significant cross-border element; in the US, it is regulated by Anti-trust Law 
- as it is in China. This section, it will not distinguish foreign from domestic bidders 
in China’s market in discussing the impact of raising monopoly issues as a defensive 
measure, because, in China, neither type of investor would be in a different position 
when relative to the anti-takeover effect of this measures. The point of mentioning 
foreign investors here is to act as reminder of the situation in China; more and more 
scholars prefer to focus on anti-trust law to defend against hostile takeovers rather 
than alternative methods, which may be a result of China’s market becoming more 
attractive to foreign investors. However, for the healthy development of Chinese 
market and the development of the Chinese listed companies, research on takeover 
defensive measures should be more comprehensive, and not only focus on one area 
which seems to be popular at present. Consequently, in this section, the discussion of 
anti-trust issues seeks to fill this research gap and tries to provide a comprehensive 
consideration of anti-trust law as a takeover defensive tactic.  
1) Experience in western countries 
In comparing western and Chinese anti-trust legislation, a brief introduction to the US, 
UK, and Chinese systems would be prudent. Two of the most developed countries in 
the world, the US and the UK have the extremely advanced legislation systems. The 
US has an even longer history in regulating anti-trust movements than the UK,794 
whilst the UK’s competition legislation has its own unique elements that differ from 
                                                
794 The first piece of anti-trust related legislation of the US was drawn up in 1887, and the UK passed 
its first competition law in 1948. These will be discussed below.   
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the US: since the UK is a member of the EU, it incorporates some EU regulations in 
its own competition law. China has more and more market-based economic activities 
in recent years, but only developed its own regulations late in the 2000s, and is 
therefore still in its infancy.795  
2) China’s circumstances 
In China, the legal basis of listed companies to use Anti-trust law as a weapon to 
defend against hostile takeover is enshrined in article 38 of the Anti-trust Law which 
states that “any entities or individuals may tip off any suspicious monopolistic 
conducts to the Anti-trust Law Enforcement Authorities and the Anti-trust Law 
Enforcement Agency shall keep the informer confidential.”796 As China has a young 
market compared with the UK and US, its lack of knowledge and experience could be 
an issue for market players, and their use of other defensive tactics such that it could 
be easier to ask for an anti-trust investigation as a defence against a hostile bidder.   
China’s anti-trust drew on EU Competition Law. Even though it is thought that EU 
Competition Law and US Anti-trust Law will become more and more similar over 
time, there are key distinctions between the primary goals of each body of legislation 
that means they will never be identical. The EU’s competition regulations mainly aim 
at helping to promote European integration, while the US’s antitrust law was born in 
                                                
795 Kai Liu and Hasani Mohd Ali, ‘Hostile Takeovers and Anti-Monopoly Regulations in China and 
Malaysia with Special Reference to US and UK Experiences’ (2014) 22 Pertanika J Soc Sci & Hum 
293, 293. 
796 Article 38, Anti-trust Law of P.R.C. 
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an already uniform market, which was more focused on restrictions against 
monopolists. The EU’s political objective is similar to the Chinese regulators’ 
intention to make laws that can help the construction of a uniform market in China.797 
In addition, it is said the US’s antitrust legislation only protects “competition”, and 
not “competitors” within the market, such that other issues are not to be considered by 
legislators. In China, public interest and the national economy are both factors, which 
legislators will consider when dealing with antimonopoly legislation, so as to secure 
the healthy development of China’s market.798 Accordingly, EU’s antitrust legislation 
is more comparable with China’s than the US’.  
That said, China differed from the UK’s voluntary merger control to make reporting 
mandatory, with a stricter policy for the review procedures. Anti-monopoly merger 
reviews are compulsory for certain merger activities, so Chinese anti-trust law is 
broader than the EU rules in this respect.799  
The anti-trust monitoring system in China is more complicated than that in the UK or 
US. This is illustrated below:800 
                                                
797 Tao Sun, ‘Inspirations from the EU Competition Law to China’ (28 April 2002)  
<http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce_list.asp?id=95&l_class=3> accessed 15 May 2014. 
798 Jiang Feng, Law Practice of China's Antitrust of Merger and Acquisition - The Review of Shenzhen 
Lawyers (Lawpress China 2012) 148. 
799 According to a. 21 of Anti-monopoly Law of P.R.C., if the business operators reach the threshold 
of declaration, it should declare in advance, and otherwise they shall not implement the concentration. 
800 This form is referenced from Jiang Feng, Law Practice of China's Antitrust of Merger and 
Acquisition - The Review of Shenzhen Lawyers (Lawpress China 2012) 97. 
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As can be seen in the form above, there is no single independent authority in charge 
of solving antimonopoly issues; different bureaus have different functions to regulate 
the market. Specifically, the first level of the monitoring system is the Antimonopoly 
Commission (AC) of the State Council of the PRC. This committee regulates the 
market at a macroscopic level by establishing anti-monopoly policies, investigating 
and reporting the competition situations of the market, and guiding antimonopoly 
enforcement work. There are then three different bureaus in charge of different 
departments of the State Council, which each have different functions to enforce 
regulations set by the AC. The Antimonopoly Bureau of MOFCOM is chief amongst 
these as the office of the AC is set within it.801 The Antimonopoly Bureau is in 
charge of taking anti-trust investigation and dealing with international antimonopoly 
                                                
801 Ibid 96. 
State	Council	of	PRC	
Antimonopoly	Commission	
National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	
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lawsuits.802 The other two authorities are not as familiar as the Antimonopoly Bureau 
of MOFCOM to western researchers probably because they mostly deal with 
domestic mergers. These are the Antimonopoly and Anti-unfair Competition 
Enforcement Bureau (AACEB) of the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC), and the Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly (BPSA) 
of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). AACEB is 
responsible for investigating monopoly agreements, abuse of dominant market 
position, and abuse of administrative power over antimonopoly affairs. The BPSA 
focuses on solving monopoly issues about price control.803 Therefore, the CMA is 
unlike the UK in that it does not exercise all antimonopoly issues in a uniform body; 
this has the effect of making the enforcement system less clear.  
In addition, the authorities are not independent of government. Thus, it could be 
argued, Chinese antimonopoly administration authorities are executing governmental 
will, instead of purely considering the interests of the market and the consumer. 
Contrariwise, it could be refuted that antimonopoly legislation itself reflects the 
government’s will because anti-monopoly regulation is a combination of political will 
and legal order. Thus no antimonopoly legislation is separate from governmental will, 
and so China is simply stricter in ensuring that competition issues fall under state 
control. Too much state interference is not helpful for the development of the market, 
                                                
802 Antimonopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau, ‘Antimonopoly Commission of 
State Council and Antimonopoly Enfocement Agencies’ (27 September 2008)  
<http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/zflt/200909/t20090927_71218.html> accessed 15 May 2014. 
803 Ibid. 
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but it is reasonable for legislators to be conservative in making laws for the emergent 
Chinese market. That said, things will need to change in the future as the more the 
state interferes in market activity, the less healthily the market will grow. The 
development of a more open and free market has been the trend in recent years, and 
China’s antimonopoly legislation is also predicted to change during this process.804  
At present, antimonopoly litigation may be interfered with pursuant to the 
government’s will. Whether a hostile takeover would be approved by authorities or 
not seems to be totally under the government’s control, and neither the target nor the 
bidder can drive the result. Accordingly, it could be suggested to the target that, if the 
target would never consider accepting the hostile offer, helping relevant authorities 
approve the possibility that a monopoly may be created is not a good choice, because 
once the investigation is cleared, the hostile takeover is terminated even if the hostile 
bidder offered a higher premium. In China, like in the UK and US, there are some 
remedies for disagreements about antimonopoly investigation results: the 
disagreement can be reviewed by administrative authorities or resolved by lawsuits, 
for example.805 However, it seems to be difficult to change the result because 
administrative authorities are also exercising governmental will.   
                                                
804 This thesis, will not recommend how antimonopoly law will change as it is not the main focus of 
this research. However, if the antimonopoly law does change, the impact on hostile takeover defences 
will bear consideration.  
805 Jiang Feng, Law Practice of China's Antitrust of Merger and Acquisition - The Review of Shenzhen 
Lawyers (Lawpress China 2012) 322. 
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Furthermore, to better illustrate the process of how the Chinese authorities actually 
determine competition issues, it is helpful to provide an introduction of the 
competition investigation in brief in China. In fact, China’s Anti-trust Law gives the 
power of monitoring the market about monopoly issues to the Anti-monopoly 
Commission806 but it detailed the process of conducting competition investigation in 
Measures for the Undertaking Concentration Declaration (MUCD) and Provisions of 
the State Council on the Standard for Declaration of Concentration of Business 
Operators (Provisions). According to the Anti-trust Law, “no business operator with 
dominant market position may abuse its dominant position to eliminate or restrict 
competition”,807 and once a takeover activity would have the possibility to make the 
business operator able to exert a decisive influence on other business operators, the 
business operator should file a concentration declaration to the Anti-monopoly Law 
Enforcement Agency under State Council.808 Meanwhile, the authority has 90 days to 
make a decision whether the takeover could continue or not.809 Moreover, according 
to the Provisions, only a concentration of undertakings reaching one of the following 
thresholds need be notified to the authority first, otherwise the concentration is not 
unlawful: 
“(1) the combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned in the 
preceding financial year is more than RMB 10 billion yuan, and the nationwide 
                                                
806 Anti-monopoly Law of P.R.C. a.9. 
807 Anti-monopoly Law of P.R.C. a.9. 
808 Anti-monopoly Law of P.R.C. a.21. 
809 Anti-monopoly Law of P.R.C. a.26. 
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turnover within China of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned in the 
preceding financial year is more than RMB 400 million yuan; or (2) the 
combined nationwide turnover within China of all the undertakings concerned in 
the preceding financial year is more than RMB 2 billion yuan, and the nationwide 
turnover within China of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned in the 
preceding financial year is more than RMB 400 million yuan.”810 
However, according to the MUCD, before the business operator officially notifies the 
authority about the takeover activity, the business operator can file an application for 
consultation with MOFCOM in respect of issues relevant to the takeover.811 Even if 
the participants of the takeover activity do not reach either of the thresholds above, 
the business operator can still voluntarily submits a notification filling to MOFCOM 
to review this takeover activity. At the same time, according to Measures for the 
Undertaking Concentration Examination, the business operator can recall its 
notification of competition investigation to the MOFCOM before the investigation is 
started and a decision is made.812 Given that the Anti-monopoly law is aiming at 
“preventing and curbing monopolistic conducts”813… and the term “monopolistic 
conducts” includes “concentration of business operators that may have the effect of 
eliminating or restricting competition”814, “all entities and individuals shall have the 
                                                
810  Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concentrations of 
Undertakings 2008 a.3. 
811 Measures for the Undertaking Concentration Declaration 2009 a.8. 
812 Measures for the Undertaking Concentration Examination 2009 a.3. 
813 Anti-monopoly Law of P.R.C. a.1. 
814 Anti-monopoly Law of P.R.C. a.3. 
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right to report to the Ministry of Commerce a suspected failure to legally declare the 
concentration of business operators”815. Once the business operators implement the 
concentration without legal declaration and is confirmed by investigation authorities 
to reach the threshold of declaration, the business operators shall be fined up to 
500,000 RMB and can be ordered to “stop the concentration, to dispose shares or 
assets, transfer the business or adopt other necessary measures to restore the market 
situation before the concentration within a time limit”.816 Consequently, it makes the 
target company possible to use this as a defence to the hostile raider.  
To summarize, it could be seen that raising antitrust issues to relevant authorities may 
be helpful for a target company in delaying a hostile bidder, and make time for 
finding a white knight or to strive for a higher premium - but it is also risky as it can 
terminate a takeover. Moreover, the use of this tactic may have different effects in 
different markets because China, the UK, and the US have different authority 
structures which can be interfered with by government at different levels. In addition, 
it is argued that antitrust issues could be problematic for judges or legal practitioners 
as they need “more thorough and delicate analysis of economic issues than had ever 
been needed in resolving questions under the [other] branches of law”.817 Even if a 
target company really wanted to terminate a hostile takeover with the help of the 
                                                
815 Interim Measures for Investigating and Handling Failure to Legally Declare the Concentration of 
Business Operators 2011 a.4. 
816 Interim Measures for Investigating and Handling Failure to Legally Declare the Concentration of 
Business Operators 2011 a.13. 
817 William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
(University of Chicago Press 1981) 143. 
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relevant authority, this is dependant on the decision made by the judges or officers in 
those authorities. If officers are not professional enough to deal with the relevant 
issues, thus could be time-consuming, or the decision will not be what the target 
expected. There may be issues for the target or the bidder if either is not satisfied with 
the decision - but this will cost them more time, and during that period, no one can 
guarantee that they may not miss other investment opportunities. Thus, the more 
professional and experienced the regulators or officers are, the better such an antitrust 
system will work, especially in China’s market. 
The following section will introduce a notable case in China they involved anti-trust 
investigation. In this case, the anti-trust investigation worked well as a takeover 
defence against a hostile raider even though it was not a pro-active measure.  
3) Case study 
Since antimonopoly investigation is not voluntary in China, a target company may 
have more time to fight against a hostile raider. A recent case illustrates this. 
In the case introduced in Chapter 4, when discussing the Pac-man tactic, of Men’s 
Wearhouse vs. Jos. A Bank, the target company, Men’s Wearhouse raised antitrust 
concerns regarding the offer with the Federal Trade Commission and successfully got 
more time to further prepare its Pac-man defence. When the target successfully 
changed its role to a bidder, the original bidder used the same tactic, raising antitrust 
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concerns in a further attempt to stop the takeover. However, the FTC’s investigation 
did not stop that merger and the takeover was successfully completed.818  
In December 2011, Sinopec and ENN Energy joined together to announce a hostile 
offer for 50.1 per cent of the shares in China Gas at a price of 3.5HKD per share.819 
However, after almost a year, Sinopec and ENN Energy gave up this takeover 
because of the lack of approval from the relevant authorities. During the interim 10 
months, the Chinese anti-monopoly authorities, at that time, the MOFCOM and the 
NDRC, conducted investigations into this takeover. This takeover involved two 
parties, which were State-Owned Enterprises; it is quite common for this kind of 
hostile takeover to end in failure if it was not initiated according to the state’s will.820 
Until these two raiders made an official announcement that they would give up this 
hostile takeover, the approval of these authorities was not given. Moreover, this 
anti-monopoly investigation gave sufficient time for China Gas to take other actions 
to defend against the hostile raider, even if the anti-monopoly investigation was 
clear.821 China Gas found allies to save its control over the company: Beijing 
Enterprises Group raised its holding of shares from 15 per cent to 18 per cent of 
                                                
818 Brent Kendall and Dana MAttioli, ‘FTC Approves Merger Between Men's Wearhouse, Jos. A. 
Bank: Commission Grants Antitrust Clearance to the Planned Merger of Men's Clothiers’ The Wall 
Street Journal Business Section (30 May 2014).  
819 Yuequn Li, ‘ENN Energy and Sinopec Join to Takeover China Gas’ (14 December 2011)  
<http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/xwzx/mtbd/20111214/news_20111214_310180000000.shtml> 
accessed 14 May 2014. 
820 ‘Lex Column: Hostile Takeovers With Chinese Characters’ Financial Times, (9 July 2012)  
<http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001045405> accessed 14 May 2014. 
821 Li He, ‘Sinopec and ENN Energy Give Up Taking Over China Gas’ Financial Times, (16 October 
2012)  <http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001046993> accessed 14 May 2014. 
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China Gas’s total shares, and Fortune Oil also raised the percentage of its holding of 
shares of China Gas. Consequently, the total shares held by the white knights of 
China Gas were over 50 per cent, which made Sinopec and ENN Energy’s takeover 
impossible.822  
In this case, the anti-trust investigation was not initiated at the request of the target 
company due the compulsory merger control policy in China. However, anti-trust 
issues did give the target more time to seek a white knight and saved the existing 
management team. This case also functions as a sign to other companies that an 
anti-trust investigation can help defend against a hostile takeover even if the takeover 
is judged unlikely to have a negative effect on competition. Thus it can be understood 
why scholars have started to focus on discussing anti-trust law to defend against 
hostile raiders in an era where foreign investments are flowing into China.   
4) Discussion and summary 
This case shows that anti-trust investigation may be time-consuming but it can work 
very well in defending against a hostile takeover. Thus, China’s mandatory anti-trust 
investigation may also be helpful, to a certain extent.  
Conversely, the UK’s voluntary anti-monopoly rules could prove risky for companies 
in respect of takeover activity if the relevant authorities do not approve this merger 
after the merger has completed. Since the result of a failed competition investigation 
                                                
822 ‘Lex Column: Hostile Takeovers With Chinese Characters’ Financial Times, (9 July 2012)  
<http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001045405> accessed 14 May 2014. 
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may “force the disposal of a business if the merger is prohibited”,823 once this 
decision is made, the merged company - especially shareholders, whose shares are 
consequently devalued - could incur huge losses. The American mandatory merger 
controls could negate this risk to the companies but is time consuming: merger 
investigations take time. For China, where the market is young, the voluntary style 
does not fit very well because the risk is too high for companies if the takeover 
activity is found to have monopoly issues when the takeover activity has successfully 
ended. If China used voluntary notification, less-experienced listed companies would 
bear the risk of failing in post-merger investigations and terminate mergers after much 
preparation. If a monopoly judgement were made by relevant authorities, the losses to 
both the target and bidding companies would be tremendous. Thus it is better for 
China to have a relatively safe way of regulating antitrust issues through its 
mandatory antitrust investigation system. This control system could also be more 
helpful for listed companies to prevent losses after a merger has ended.   
China is different from the US and UK, with a more concentrated power in the hands 
of the government - but it should not be judged to be wrong just because of its unique 
mode of market control. The Chinese government has a large amount of capital 
invested in State-owned enterprises, through which capital can be indirectly 
transferred to other listed companies in China. That is to say, the government could be 
                                                
823 CMA, ‘Mergers: How to notify the CMA of a merger’ (31 March 2014)  
<https://www.gov.uk/mergers-how-to-notify-the-cma-of-a-merger#benefits-and-risks-of-your-decision> 
accessed 24 May 2014. 
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described as something of a monopolist within the market, despite it acting as the 
regulator to provide remedies to protect against monopolies.  
SOEs are directly controlled by the government; some of the listed companies are 
indirectly controlled by the government - we cannot tell the percentage of the 
indirectly controlled companies. However, it can be presumed that “indirectly 
controlled listed companies” are not exactly controlled by the government and are just 
means for investments by the government to maximise the premium of its available 
investment capital. Some business areas are controlled by the state, but those areas, 
such as the electricity, oil, and steel industries, are crucial for the national interest and 
people’s livelihoods, and it is not helpful to fully open these to private companies to 
invest in. These should at least be controlled by the government during the period 
during which China is still developing her market. Thus, it is sensible and to some 
extent a must for the government to act as a monopolist in those industries. As for the 
rest of the industries that are directly or indirectly invested in by the government, it is 
impossible to find out how much capital was invested by the government and in 
which area because the data are too large. There is also no evidence to prove that 
these invested companies are indirectly controlled by the government. 
China’s market reform is continuing, and China finished the second round of SOE 
reform in 2013, with a modern corporate system now established.824 From 2014, 
                                                
824 ‘Di Er Lun Guoqi Gaige: Jianli Xiandai Qiye Zhidu dao "Guo Zi Wei" Shidai [The Second Round 
of SOE Reform: Establising Modern Corporation Regime to "SASAC" Era]’ IFeng Finance, (16 
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China has allowed private capital invested into some SOEs to develop mixed 
ownership and new SOEs will hopefully be more active in the market.825 The route of 
reform of China’s market may be distinct from other markets in the world, but the 
final destination is unlikely to be very different. China is aiming to create a more 
effective market but cannot make it as free as the western markets in a short time. 
Hence, there are certain areas that need to be relatively concentrated and mainly 
controlled – not totally controlled, like the SOEs; some others should be more 
competitive. 826  Anti-trust legislation could be more tolerant regarding mergers 
between those companies and between some small companies in competitive areas 
and be stricter with mergers between larger companies, especially SOEs, in that 
power might already in hands of those companies, making the possibility of 
monopoly higher. 
Anti-trust issues should be considered carefully because success of proving the 
existence of problems within a takeover regarding competition issues will terminate 
the takeover in the end: even if the hostile raider offered a much higher premium 
which the shareholders would like to take they cannot change the situation. This 
                                                                                                                                      
December 2013)  <http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20131216/11282633_0.shtml> accessed 22 August 
2014. 
825 Fengyu Ai, ‘Xi JinPing Tan Suoyouzhi Gaige: Guoqi Minqi He De Lai Caineng Hun De Hao [Xi 
Jinping Discusses the SOE Reform: The SOE and the Private Companies Could Be Mixed Better If 
They are Mixable]’ China Economics, (19 August 2014)  
<http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/201408/19/t20140819_3382163.shtml> accessed 25 August 2014. 
826 Peking Univerisity Research Group of Guanghua School of Management, Listed Companies' 
Takeover Defence Tactics and Relevant Regulations in China [Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fan 
Shougou Cuoshi jiqi Guizhi] (Fudan Press 2003) 172. 
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takeover defensive measure should therefore not be used too frequently in case the 
target’s shareholders miss an attractive offer. In any case, there are alternative options 
to defend against a hostile raider taking over the target company if the shareholders in 
the target company are not satisfied by the premium offered; they need not rely on 
anti-trust law alone.  
As pointed out by the US Supreme Court, anti-trust legislation has the characteristics 
of generality and adaptability, thus judges will have more discretionary power over 
anti-trust cases.827 Accordingly, the implementation of antimonopoly law could be 
very complicated in practice. Meanwhile, in the contemporary world, takeover 
activities are thought to be helpful to the development of the market, and thus too 
many restrictions on takeover activities may have a negative effect on the market. All 
the efforts put into anti-trust regulations are for the purpose of solving monopoly 
issues and providing a competitive market for consumers. But China would be wise 
not to allow administrative powers to interfere into economic activities too much in 
this respect, especially when it does not have sufficient supporting protection for 
market players or experienced staff to help.  
                                                
827 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 US 344, 360 (1933) and Department of Treaty and 
Law of MOFCOM, ‘Features of Antimonopoly Law’ (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC Department of 
Treaty and Law, 27 April 2005)  
<http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/dzgg/gwyxx/200504/20050400081089.shtml> accessed 14 May 
2014. 
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5. Why the UK’s system of takeover regulation is more appropriate 
for China   
In order to establish which regulatory system is better for China, the attitude towards 
hostile takeovers should be considered. That is to say, what system China will adopt 
in regulating takeover activities. As discussed earlier, China’s adoption of a UK-style 
takeover regulatory system may be prudent as China believes an increase in takeover 
activities would bring some benefits to China’s market and help to promote its 
development.828 Encouraging takeover activities may push competition in the market 
to strengthen the best companies, and eliminate the worst. In this case, a 
takeover-friendly legislation system would be a wise choice. In addition, research has 
shown that takeover activities can push the improvement of listed companies’ 
corporate governance and increase the value of listed companies.829 Moreover, the 
stock market is an ideal source of finance for these moves and could help listed 
companies get enough capital for further company development.  
In considering why China did not choose a US-style director-friendly style regulatory 
system, it should be remembered that the US had an attractive market first, then 
improved background regulation, after which takeover activities and then takeover 
defences emerged. Everything happened gradually and at each stage there were 
                                                
828 Jinping Xi, ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’ (The Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
CPC Central Committee) Pt.3. 
829 Yao Lu, ‘Research of the Impact on the Value of China's Listed Companies by Activating Takeover 
Market’ (2010) 7 Finance Research 144, 157. 
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discussions and improvements regarding relevant regulations. China has a young 
market, but market players have already realised the benefits of takeover activities, 
influenced by successful experiences in the more advanced western markets. Yet 
China does not have sufficient regulations to prevent or resolve many issues that may 
arise during the takeover process. Consequently, if takeover defensive measures are 
also legalised in China, the result and experience is unlikely to be comparable to that 
of the US without extant supportive factors in the market.   
As mentioned in the previous chapter, most of China’s commercial legislation is 
based on the experienced western legislative systems, yet different regulatory systems 
are established with different intentions based on specific market conditions. That is 
to say, the degree of government intervention may be different between regulatory 
systems. Thus, the first issue for Chinese legislators to consider could be the degree of 
government intervention desired, after which they could choose a regulatory system 
to take reference from.    
According to research on the theory of government intervention, China’s market is 
not as sound as the western markets and it is still in a state of economic 
transformation.830 There are other important issues which cannot be ignored, too: 
currently, during this transformation of China’s market, companies are taking many 
objections of Chinese government such as the economic development, employment 
                                                
830 Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai and Zhou Li, ‘Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise 
Reform’ (1998) 88 The American Economic Review 422, 427 
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issues, and economic stability hence the companies’ business activities could not be 
totally free from the intervention of the government in China.831 Thus the range of 
government intervention could be wider in China to help finish the economic 
transformation in a smooth way.832 
It is also pointed out that the legal protection of shareholders is relatively weak in 
China because of its corporate governance structure, and merger activities could help 
with resource reallocation in China’s market to adjust industrial structures in order to 
help make the market more effective. Therefore, the power of choosing whether to 
adopt takeover defensive measures should be in the hand of the shareholders.833 
In the US, there is a relatively sound supervisory system of the market even if the 
takeover defensive regulatory system seems to be a director-friendly one, and 
shareholders can be protected through other supervisory means. For example, almost 
every state in the US has a responsibility to supervise takeover activities and has 
powers available to protect market players through litigation.834  Other regulations 
including anti-trust law, supervisory regulations regarding the stock market and the 
                                                
831.Ibid 427. 
832 Rui Tao, Research on M&A Problems of Chinese Enterprises During Transitional Period - Taking 
the Steel Industry as An Example (China Economic Publishing House 2013) 38. 
833 Peking Univerisity Research Group of Guanhua School of Management, ‘Research Report with 
Shanghai Security Exchange: Takeover Defences of Companies Need to be Regulated [Shangzheng 
Lianhe Yanjiu Jihua Baogao: Gongsi Fan Shougou Xu Guifan]’ (Shanghai Securities News, 2003)  
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030422/977513.html> accessed 16 May 2014. 
834 Xin Zhang, ‘Shangshi Gongsi Shougou de Lifa he Jianguan -- Wo'men Wei Shenme Buneng Caiqu 
Meiguo Moshi [Takeover and Legislative Regulation: Why the American Approach is Disfavoured]’ 
(2003) 8 Securities Market Herald 1, 8. 
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professional self-restriction of shareholders in listed companies and of other market 
players, such as investment banks. Judges can also assist in establishing precedent 
when dealing with the disputes around takeovers.835  Thanks to these mechanisms 
and regulations, the SEC can protect the shareholders by considering minority and 
majority shareholders relatively equal in practice, even if the SEC cannot provide a 
mandatory offer requirement in the market. Also, due to the fiduciary duties of 
directors and different requirements of different state regulations in the US, the effect 
of the US takeover regulation in practise could be similar to the UK’s regulatory 
system in respect of a tender offer requirement. For example, in Pennsylvania, there is 
a control share cash-out provision, which regulates that once the bidder gains more 
than 20 per cent of shares of the company, the other shareholders have the right to ask 
the bidder to purchase their shares at a fair price.836  
Conversely, in China, the supervisory framework is not as sound, and the relevant 
regulations are not sufficient to deal with the issues China would face in adopting a 
US-style regulatory system. There is also the fact that, in China’s market, the number 
of listed companies is small, which makes takeover activities livelier. Previously, 
listing on the Chinese market was very complicated, with multiple examinations and 
approvals required by supervisory departments. As a result, companies already listed 
on the market could be seen as attractive targets, no matter how they have performed, 
                                                
835 Ibid 1. 
836 2010 Pennsylvania Code Title 15 – Corporations and Unincorporated Associations Ch. 25 
Subchapter E § 2543 and § 2546. 
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as companies that may not be qualified to list but yet want to engage with the market 
might wish to acquire them.837 Listed companies acquired for use in this way are 
called “shell companies”, and potential bidders can skip complicated approval 
procedures and be listed directly through their acquisition. If takeover defensive 
measures are legalised in the Chinese market, this will increase the difficulty for 
bidders seeking to acquire these companies and may cause problems in selling a 
“shell” company at an unreasonable price. From this perspective, it could be argued 
that the market would benefit from a takeover-friendly regulatory system, making a 
UK-style system the better choice. 
That said, since China has launched a new round of market reform and indicated it 
will simplify the approval procedure for listing,838 the attractiveness of “shells” might 
be adversely affected and the price of such companies might be reduced. This reform 
may help with the increase of numbers of listed companies but is not likely to have a 
negative impact on the frequency of takeover activities. On the contrary, this reform 
might push takeover activities to make the market more active because listing is easier 
than before, reducing the cost of finance in the market.   
                                                
837 Zhixue Li, Gongsi Binggou yu Zhengfu Jianguan Zhengce Yanjiu [Research on Corporate Mergers 
and Acquisitions and Supervisory Policy of the Government] (Economy & Management Publishing 
House 2012) 11. 
838 Jinping Xi, ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’ (The Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
CPC Central Committee), available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm, accessed 10 
July 2015. 
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It is also worth noting that China is seeking reforms to allow for “mixed ownership”, 
which may reduce (but not eliminate) the controlling power of the state in the market. 
After such a reform, SOEs could become more independent from the state; if so, the 
availability of harsh measures for defending against hostile takeover would not be 
desirable as it may prevent private investors making offers to those companies. If 
China succeeds in finishing this reform, the mixed shareholder structure could help 
solving the “Yi Gu Du Da” [highly concentrated shareholding structure] problem and 
might align China further with the UK-style shareholder-friendly system. Whatever 
the results of this reform, the UK’s regulatory system is a better choice for China. As 
it is discussed in the thesis that the existence of China’s SOEs make China’s market 
unique from the western countries, but the SOEs could also be viewed as an 
institutional investor which can make better choice of accepting an offer or not. It is 
just like the UK’s market, which also has a lot of institutional investors. Since the 
UK’s regulating system would fit China’s market better than the US’s. Also, China 
has CSRC to regulate market activities, which is directed by the State Council. With 
this background, the CSRC could have more power than an independent Panel in the 
UK because it could be seen as part of the state authorities. At the same time, it could 
be more efficient than courts in the US, because suing in courts would be 
time-consuming. However, it seems unrealistic to make the CSRC independent from 
the government, and in this thesis it argues that there might be no need for making it 
so. Because if the regulation system is sound and clear, CSRC could just follow the 
rules to solve takeover related issues, it is not fair to say that CSRC cannot solve 
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market affairs fairly just because it is a state authority. Likewise, it is not right to say 
that the Panel would be fairly in supervising takeover activities just because it is an 
independent body. It could be possible that if the regulation system is sound, it does 
not really matter that the supervisory body is a Panel, the courts, or a state authority. 
6. Principles should be followed to regulate takeover defence tactics 
It could be argued that there is no market like the stock market so dependent on 
supportive legislation, and that is because the stock market has an important position 
for the development of a nation’s economy.839 At the same time, since products on 
stock market are virtual, highly risky, and speculative, regulating market activities is 
extremely complicated. However, without sound and proper legislative support, the 
stock market cannot function or develop properly. Thus, a suitable legislative system 
is a key point to guaranteeing market development. The importance of a good 
legislative background to support the improvement of corporate governance should 
not be forgotten, either. Hence, China should adhere to certain principles when 
regulating takeover defensive tactics.   
1) Fair and equal treatment of shareholders  
The first principle to be discussed is the treatment of shareholders in China’s market. 
Ideally, there would be totally equal treatment for all shareholders within a company 
to show the equity of economic rules. However, it seems impossible that an immature 
                                                
839 Liwen Qing, Research on Supervision Related Issues of Listed Companies in Our Country (Masters 
Thesis, Sichuan Academy of Social Science April 2012) 11. 
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market such as China’s will treat every shareholder at an equal level, given its 
imperfect regulation and supervision systems’ support. Moreover, as there are a 
certain amount of non-tradable shares in China’s market, it is hard to ensure that 
tradable shareholders are treated equally to those non-tradable shareholders because 
their shares operate under different conditions. Additionally, even though it is forecast 
that there will be a free market that is as, or even better than those that currently exist 
in more advanced countries, this is only the prediction of some scholars. At present, 
China’s market is still reforming, with lots of takeover agreements negotiated and 
final decisions taken by majority shareholders, without the consent of minority 
shareholders.840 However, since it is likely that state owned shares will stay in the 
market for a long time and that China will not change the administration and 
management of those shares, there will always be critics of the unfair treatment this 
exposes other market players. Only if China can achieve the goal of “managing 
capital only not the directors”, 841 will there be the possibility that SOEs and 
non-SOEs will be equal in the market, as the interference of government would be 
limited and the treatment of shareholders would be fairer.  
                                                
840 Changshi Zhou, Zhengfu Kongzhi Xia de Gongsi Binggou Yanjiu Lilun yu Jingyan Shuju [Research 
on Corporate Takeovers Under Government's Control: Theory and Experience Data] (Economic 
Science Press 2009) 193. 
841 Jinping Xi, ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’ (The Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
CPC Central Committee) states that the goal of changing state-owned capital’s managing mode from 
managing the directors to managing the capital only, in order to make the market fairer and more 
competitive.  
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Thus, under current circumstance in China, providing all shareholders with equal 
treatment is unrealistic. However, the reform in China is continuing to move towards 
an advanced and free market, as it is helpful for the development for China’s 
economy. In the UK (and in most EU member countries), regulators are trying to 
ensure all the shareholders are treated equally, in order to make sure the minority 
shareholders’ rights are not infringed.842 This is the same in the US, where legislators 
also try to treat all the shareholders fairly to guarantee the market’s fairness.843 As 
market fairness is a key factor in ensuring the healthy development of China’s market, 
if China is to develop a sound legislative system, it should also follow the principle of 
existing free markets to treat all shareholders equally. Especially in respect of 
takeover activity, minority shareholders can be vulnerable if only limited protection is 
provided for them. Different takeover defence regulatory systems have different 
levels of protection. If decision-making power is given to shareholders, as in the UK 
system, and a mandatory offer rule is established, shareholders could have strong 
powers in takeover activities. If decision-making power is delegated to the directors, 
as in the US system, more supporting regulation will be required to ensure all 
shareholders are treated equally because of the high possibility of information 
asymmetry between directors and the shareholders, and between majority and 
minority shareholders. Although the UK and the US have both fallen short, at times, 
                                                
842 Jonathan Mukwiri, ‘Takeovers and Incidental Protection of Minority Shareholders’ (2013) 3 ECFR 
432, 460. 
843 James D. Cox, ‘Equal Treatment for Shareholders: An Essay’ (1997) 19 Cardozo Law Review 615, 
616. 
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in protecting minority shareholders and ensuring market fairness, China’s market has 
even more defects in that respect. The best way for China to proceed would be to 
choose a takeover regulatory system that can provide more protection to shareholders 
directly, without too many additional regulations or supervisory support. Thus, the 
UK’s takeover regulatory system, with its principle of equal treatment to all the 
shareholders seems the reasonable and prudent choice for China to emulate.   
The US-style system, in contrast, requires a sounder market to facilitate the protection 
of market players, a market that China does not have in the US’s there are certain 
takeover defensive measures which treat the majority and minority shareholders in 
different ways. For example, the poison pill, a successful and widely used takeover 
defensive tactic in the US, seeks to confer more rights to preferred shares which 
normal shareholders do not have. This gives the holders of preferred shares more 
power over the control of their company than the holders of normal shares as the 
rights conferred by preferred shares could be exercised in certain votes regarding a 
hostile takeover.  Even the inventor of the poison pill, Martin Lipton, has said that 
the intention of the pills’ creation was not to treat shareholders differentially, but to 
give the board of directors sufficient time to decide whether to accept an offer or not, 
in response to the significant increase in activity that occurred in the 1980s.844 The 
success of poison pills in the US market did not arise only thanks to the effectiveness 
                                                
844 Shira Ovide, ‘Marty Lipton: Why I Invented the Poison Pill’ (The Wall Street Journal, December 
29, 2010)  <http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/12/29/marty-lipton-why-i-invented-the-poison-pill/> 
accessed 10 August 2013. 
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of this tactic itself, but also because of appropriate supervision regulations and the 
professionalism of market players. At present, China is at similar stage as the US 
market was in the 1980s, when hostile takeover activities started to emerge, but unlike 
the case in the US, Chinese market players are not as experienced, and China’s 
relevant regulations are not as sound as that which existed in the US at that time either. 
Thus it would be extremely risky for China to adopt a US-style takeover regulatory 
system. That said, according to the newly issued Administrative Measures of 
Preferred Shares Experimental Units in 2014, it seems China is seeking a takeover 
regulatory system with both the UK’s takeover regulation style and certain features of 
US regulation. China’s system provides that, in most cases, preferred shares do not 
confer voting rights, to ensure market fairness - but it is also trialling the use of poison 
pills in the market with the restrictions as discussed in Chapter 5. These regulations 
are based on the principles of protecting market fairness as well as promoting market 
effectiveness.845 
2) Sufficient supervision and market effectiveness 
A sound market requires a sound supervision system to support its running, and 
contemporary China cannot be said to have a sound supervision system. China’s 
market is mainly supervised by the CSRC and under its supervision, stock exchanges 
                                                
845 Mingfang Zhu, ‘Youxian Gu Shidian Shi Woguo Ziben Shichang Fazhan de Zhongyao Yi Bu 
[Experimental Units of Preferred Shares are Key Steps of the Development of China's Market]’ (2014) 
5 Development Research 23, 23. 
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and relevant securities associations play helping roles. However, only the CSRC and 
stock exchanges can supervise all takeover activities in the market.846 
It may not be the right time for China to allow the use of all takeover defensive 
measures since these measures have, elsewhere, evolved alongside the development 
of the market. The poison pill, for example, now has the additional (potential) 
function of protecting net operating losses, yet China is still at the initial stage of 
perfecting its market, and if poison pills are legalised, this could be problematic for 
the market because supervisory legislation needs time to be revised. Currently, 
preferred shares are encouraged in China and allowing use of poison pills would 
require legislation such as the Accounting and financial reports regulations to be 
improved as soon as possible, in order to cooperate with the new facility. 847 
Moreover, supervisory teams lack the necessary experience to even deal with 
takeover defensive measures as regards their original function, so dealing with even 
more evolved functions of the defensive tactics could be especially challenging. 
Furthermore, a hostile takeover requires lots of capital to fund and may involve loans 
from the banks - risk assessments and relevant banking laws might also pose a 
problem. 
                                                
846 Liwen Qing, ‘Research on Supervision Related Issues of Listed Companies in Our Country’ 
(Masters Thesis, Sichuan Academy of Social Science April 2012) 13. 
847 Mingfang Zhu, ‘Youxian Gu Shidian Shi Woguo Ziben Shichang Fazhan de Zhongyao Yi Bu 
[Experimental Units of Preferred Shares are Key Steps of the Development of China's Market]’ (2014) 
5 Development Research 23, 24. 
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More importantly, the market’s effectiveness could be affected by governmental 
intervention. Thus the degree of the government intervention is an issue in 
considering takeover defence regulations. According to Tian’s research on major 
merger activities in China’s market between 2005 and 2010, the effective allocation 
of resources in the market has increased since 2005, but the government’s 
intervention had some negative effects on that growth, and the degree of those 
negative effects increased with higher levels of government interference.848   
3) The information disclosure principle 
Information disclosure mainly involves the following elements: First, the issue of 
disclosure relative to shareholding. Disclosure of shareholding must take place when 
the shares that an investor holds in a listed company reaches 5 per cent. After 
reaching this particular proportion, timely disclosure of this information is required, 
as well as every time that shareholder’s proportion of shareholding increases or 
decreases above 5 per cent. However, if a hostile bidder does not fulfil this obligation 
and secretly buys more than 5 per cent of targets shares, this increases the possibility 
of success of their takeover action and places the target company in an unfavourable 
situation. Called the first case of mergers and acquisitions among China's listed 
                                                
848 However, research shows that, in China, the effectiveness of merger activities intervened in by 
provincial governments is higher than those intervened in by municipal governments. See Manwen 
Tian, ‘The Evaluation of Governement Intervention, the Change of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder 
and the Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions’ (2012) 6 Finance and Economics 18, 25.  
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companies, "Bao Yan storm" is the best-case description of a violation of information 
disclosure obligation.849 
As mentioned, the US takeover regulative system does not have a mandatory bid rule, 
which indicates that the system is not a shareholder-friendly one, affording less 
protection to minority shareholders. However, shareholders still can obtain sufficient 
protections from the SEC supervisory system and states’ supervisory systems; the key 
factor in successfully supervising the market is the US’ information disclosure 
system.850 According to Zhang’s research, the main body in charge of supervising 
M&A activities is the Division of Corporate Finance, and there are special counsel 
and rotating attorneys in that department who review relevant documents of M&A 
activities. These professionals review the adequacy of relevant information 
disclosures and present a “comments letter” to give their opinions on whether this 
takeover would harm any relevant person’s rights, and especially whether the 
information disclosed could mislead certain people, and whether companies involved 
in the takeover activity did not obey the rules on revealing certain details of the 
takeover activity.   
4) Possible problems and China’s regulatory system 
                                                
849 Hongcai Xu (ed) Zhongguo Ziben Yunying Jingdian Anli Chuangxin Pian [Typical Cases of Capital 
Operation in China - Creation Part] (Tsinghua University Press 2005), 154. 
850 Xin Zhang, ‘Shangshi Gongsi Shougou de Lifa he Jianguan -- Wo'men Wei Shenme Buneng Caiqu 
Meiguo Moshi [Takeover and Legislative Regulation: Why the American Approach is Disfavoured]’ 
(2003) 8 Securities Market Herald 1, 8. 
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In China, the stock market is still in its infancy and so should learn from the 
experience of mature western markets, even if the size of China’s market is larger and 
has improved in recent years. Ke Deng, the news spokesman for CSRC approved that 
point officially, on 10 January 2014.851 There are still some areas in which China’s 
market needs to improve, however, and in an immature market, the regulatory system 
cannot be advanced without at least moderate government intervention. 
Any takeover activity can be seen as the “survival of the fittest”, because it eliminates 
weaker businesses to optimise the allocation of resources – yet it also promotes the 
concentration of resources, which may result in a monopoly. Making laws is a tool for 
the government to intervene in market activities.852  It can be a challenge for 
regulators to strike a balance between fairness and efficiency, and even harder still to 
decide on an appropriate degree of government intervention in merger activities in the 
market.853  
There are different features of M&A activities in China and the western countries. 
Firstly, most Chinese takeover activities in recent years have been pushed by the 
government. Most takeover deals were done directly by signing agreements between 
the bidder and the target without any market activity. However, in the western 
                                                
851--, ‘ESOP is Being Studied’ (Securities Daily, 11 January 2014)  
<http://finance.eastday.com/c9/2014/0111/2553526514.html> accessed 12 August 2014. 
852 Hui Yu, ‘Zhengfu Guanzhi yu Xingzheng Gaige [The Government's Intervention and the Reform of 
Administration]’ (1997) 5 China Industrial Economics 29, 32. 
853 Rui Tao, Research on M&A Problems of Chinese Enterprises During Transitional Period - Taking 
the Steel Industry as An Example (China Economic Publishing House 2013) 38. 
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countries, most takeover offers took place within the market and were prompted by 
the power of the market itself.854 Agencies in China’s market that might help to 
facilitate a successful takeover case, such as an investment bank, do not have 
sufficient experience in dealing with relevant takeovers, reflecting the infancy of 
China’s development in dealing with takeover activities.855  
It is also known that the stock market is a good place to obtain finance, market share 
and margins, or improve the performance of corporate governance, 856  so the 
motivation of the companies both in China and western countries could be seen to be 
similar. That said, there is one key factor that is totally different in China, and that is 
the intervention of the government in the market. The Chinese government has, 
historically, pushed profit-making companies to merge with loss-making companies 
in order to achieve political aims. Furthermore, the government has also taken 
advantage of the market’s financing benefits and tried to make those companies that 
want to list on the market to merge with a loss-making state-owned company as a 
requirement to be listed.857 This has been criticized by scholars for years, and there 
many examples that illustrate how the government’s intervention went too far and 
should have been limited in order to let the market itself decide which company 
                                                
854 Zhixue Li, Gongsi Binggou yu Zhengfu Jianguan Zhengce Yanjiu [Research on Corporate Mergers 
and Acquisitions and Supervisory Policy of the Government] (Economy & Management Publishing 
House 2012) 7. 
855 Ibid 7. 
856 Ibid 8-10. 
857 Ibid 11. This is called “Lalang Pei”, which is a kind of matching system in China. It is directed by 
the government to pair a profit-making company with a loss-making company and make them merge in 
order to save a loss-making SOE.  
 
293 
should survive.858 Even if the government intended to integrate the resources owned 
by SOEs and reform the SOEs’ structures, changes should not go against market rules. 
Thus it could be said that the first and most important principle the regulators should 
follow is to let the market have its say and to limit the government’s power to a macro 
level.   
Moreover, moderate government intervention means that the government can instead 
provide the market with a sound supervision system to ensure all the issues could be 
resolved in a reasonable way, and to provide market players with sufficient protection 
by law. 
a. Protection of all shareholders  
The officers dealing with M&A affairs in the Division of Corporate Finance are 
professionals. This is a good guarantee of the effectiveness of the legitimacy of these 
                                                
858 The most significant case to be seen as a failure was the merger between Sinotrans and CSC 
Holdings, which was led by the SASAC. This merger began in 2007 and took 7 years. The merger did 
not benefit any company but caused CSC Holding to incur continued losses. More details can be found 
in Juanjuan Chen (ed), ‘ST Changyou Shuailuo Yangben, Lalang Pei Zhi Baiju [Sample of ST 
Changyou's Failure, Lalang Pei Led to this Failure]’ china.com.cn, (18 March 2014)  
<http://finance.china.com.cn/stock/ssgs/20140318/2265599.shtml> accessed 12 August 2014. And 
more articles supporting this idea could be found in ‘Zengqinghong Yiyu Jingren: Zhengfu Lalang Pei 
Xiangying Haozhao Que Shangdang (2)’ China Business News, (21 August 2013)  
<http://www.s1979.com/caijing/gongsi/201310/21104108021_2.shtml> accessed 12 August 2014 and 
‘Bimian Danchun "Lalang Pei" Guoqi Shichanghua Chongzu Zai Tisu’ Securities Daily, (11 February 
2014)  <http://www.s1979.com/caijing/guonei/201402/11113706911.shtml> accessed 12 August 
2014. Li’s research has also supported the idea that the government should not intervene in the market 
too much. See Zhixue Li, Gongsi Binggou yu Zhengfu Jianguan Zhengce Yanjiu [Research on 
Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions and Supervisory Policy of the Government] (Economy & 
Management Publishing House 2012) 32-34. 
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activities. However, it seems impossible that the contemporary Chinese supervisory 
departments will have this kind of professional background and the requisite 
information disclosure supervision of takeover activities to protect all the 
shareholders in the market.  
First, inadequate or unfair information disclosure can cause the loss of investments 
from shareholders. According to the Administrative Measures On Acquisition Of 
Listed Companies, regulations regarding the information disclosure of target 
companies (i.e., the regulations for obligations of the directors of target companies 
regarding information disclosure) are not sufficiently explicit. For a listed company in 
the process of an anti-takeover action, the "acquisition management methods of listed 
companies” in relation to the procedural issue of information disclosure do not 
embody the characteristics of timeliness, accuracy and integrity etc.;859 because of 
this, the further enhancement of certain regulations is required. These include, firstly, 
that during the process of the acquisition of a listed company prior to the contact of 
the board of target company and the acquirer, if the board of the target company has 
reason to believe that it is inevitable that their company will be taken over, an 
                                                
859 Administrative Measures On Acquisition Of Listed Companies, a.8 regulates that: “The directors, 
supervisors and senior managers of a company under takeover shall assume the obligations of devotion 
and diligence, and shall equally treat all the purchasers that intend to take over the foresaid company. 
The decisions made and the measures taken by the board of directors of the company under takeover 
for the takeover shall be beneficial for maintaining the interests of the company and its shareholders, 
and may not set any improper obstacle to the takeover by misusing its authorities, nor may it provide 
any means of financial aid to the purchaser by making use of the sources of the company under 
takeover or damage the legitimate rights and interests of the company under takeover or its 
shareholders.” But there is no further detailed requirement for the directors in the target company to 
disclose any information such as a possible takeover bid. 
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anti-takeover strategy should be initiated at the same time, after which the board of 
the target company should disclose to the shareholders the currently held information, 
to allow shareholders to be prepared for actions arising during the process of 
acquisition and defence. Secondly, after the directors of the target company and the 
acquirer formally discuss the related issues, regardless of whether the board of the 
target company is for or against the takeover bid or taking related anti-takeover 
actions, the related information must be accurately disclosed to shareholders of the 
target company. Thirdly, after the acquirer makes the takeover bid announcement to 
the target company, the board of the target company should provide the main text or 
abstract of the announcement to company shareholders. After receipt of the takeover 
bid, the board of the target company should, within the statutory period, comment on 
the current takeover bid and include an explanation of whether or not they will seek to 
take anti-takeover actions. Fourthly, among the information required to be disclosed, 
target company board members should state whether there is any conflict of interest. 
Fifthly, opinions of the company’s professional consultants regarding the takeover 
and any anti-takeover defence should be disclosed to shareholders.860 
Secondly, the protection of shareholders should not only focus on the shareholders of 
the target company; shareholders in the bidding company should be protected as well. 
If the rate of failed business after the M&A action increased, the possibility of wealth 
increase through takeover activities will decline. All shareholders take the risk of a 
                                                
860 Junjie Zhang, ‘Research on Legal Issues of Takeover Defense Tactics of the Listed Companies’ 
(Masters Thesis, Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences 2011) 27. 
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loss of their investments, especially the hostile raider’s shareholders, because if they 
successfully take over a target company, the hostile offer will include certain 
premiums paid to the target company and the loss to the raider’s shareholders will be 
larger than that experienced by the target company’s shareholders. A hostile takeover 
defence friendly legislative system, as per that of the US, protects companies and 
increases the failure rate of hostile takeovers. Research has also shown that successful 
takeover activities did not substantially improve the business performance of 84 listed 
companies in China between 1999 and 2001.861  Indeed, Qiu argued that only around 
30 per cent of China’s M&A activities made some improvement.862 Thus, it is 
possible to argue that low returns after a takeover in China is a reason to support a 
system that is friendly towards hostile takeover defences.  
b. The protection of minority shareholders 
There may also be issues regarding the protection of minority shareholders. This issue 
has been intensely discussed over recent years by many Company Law professionals, 
because minority shareholders are thought to be vulnerable compared with the 
majority shareholders due to their relative lack of information and more limited power 
and ability to supervise the company.863 However, little research considered the 
                                                
861 Shanmin Li and others, ‘Research on the Listed Companies' M&A Performance and Its Impact 
Factors’ (2004) 9 World Business 60, 67. 
862 Ming Qiu, ‘Thoughts about the Improvement of Success Rate of M&A’ (2002) 9 Management 
World 146, 147. 
863 Xiaofeng Wu, Research on the Protection of Minority Shareholders in Mergers and Acquisitions 
[Gongsi Binggou Zhong Shaoshu Gudong Liyi Baohu Zhidu Yanjiu] (Lawpress China 2008) 47. 
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protection of minority shareholders during the hostile takeover process. According to 
Wu, there are two major issues from both the target’s and bidder’s minority 
shareholders’ points of views: Firstly, in the target company, adopting takeover 
defensive tactics can bring some risk to the target company due to the possibility of 
making the wrong decision. If minority shareholders cannot benefit from their shares, 
these shareholders will have lost opportunities to gain premiums. Further, if the 
hostile takeover is successful in the end, inappropriate or unsuccessful takeover 
defensive measures adopted by the management team could also result in the loss of 
benefits to minority shareholders. Secondly, in the bidder company, if the takeover 
defence used by the target company resulted in a rise in the premium paid by the 
bidder company, this will result in the loss of capital from the bidding company that 
equates to a loss of benefits to the bidder’s shareholders.864 No one can guarantee a 
hostile takeover will be successful, and the risk is borne by the shareholders in both 
parties. As the majority shareholders have more power over the company, (especially 
in China, where most Chinese companies are controlled by the majority shareholders), 
minority shareholders shoulder more risk than majority shareholders during the 
mergers and acquisition process.     
7. Summary  
China is trying to make its market as free and open as possible in order to catch up 
economically with the developed countries and the continually developing global 
                                                
864 Ibid 47. 
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economy. However, current legislation relating to the market is not sufficient nor 
advanced enough for China’s market players to use some of the advanced strategies 
learned from western markets. However, China has learned from the UK and EU in 
constructing a relatively conservative takeover defence legislative system to regulate 
its own market and to ensure most business activities are under control. Most Chinese 
market players, and even law makers, are not familiar with these tools; in addition, the 
professional knowledge to deal with the issues that accompany the use of certain 
hostile takeover defensive measures is absent, meaning that US-style regulations are 
not currently appropriate for China. However, that does not mean that these tactics 
should never be allowed; some of the takeover defence tactics, such as the poison pill, 
can protect the control power of a target company. Legitimising certain takeover 
defence measures may only be a matter of time and a more open market in China over 
the coming decades. 
China’s regulatory system is often criticised in respect of investing too much power in 
the government and making the market less free than it should be. China’s 
government has undoubtedly reserved many powers for itself to ensure control over 
the development of its market so as to create a market with ‘Chinese’ character.  
China is, however, aiming to develop a more competitive and effective market in the 
future, and so it has reformed SOEs in recent years. However, reforming SOEs does 
not require privatize them completely. Indeed, the on-going SOE reform aims at 
reforming SOEs’ functions to make them work better, and new policies are still in 
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discussion. A positive result could be expected, and it is highly possible that there will 
be a freer and more advanced market in China in the future. 
After the anti-monopoly law was introduced 6 years ago, the defensive impact of 
anti-monopoly investigations was noticed by the listed companies and has been 
discussed by scholars. If legislators bring more advanced defensive takeover measures 
to the Chinese market, the situation in the market will likely be different: Some 
defensive measures can prevent the target company from being taken over by hostile 
raiders in the future, such as the poison pill, and some measures could help gain 
controlling power back for the target company, such as a white knight. Sufficient 
remedies will help improve China’s market and provide shareholders with the 
legislative support required to protect their interests. However, as maximising the 
shareholders’ interests is claimed to be the main principle in regulating takeover 
activities, all legal evaluations of takeover defence regulation should centre on this 
principle.865 But in contemporary China, more factors would be considered while 
regulating the market such as the development of the market in the long run. Based on 
the discussion of China’s current market situation, it seems it is not yet the right time 
to legalise all takeover defensive measures. This can be seen from the newly-released 
Administrative Measures of Preferred Shares Experimental Units (Exposure 
                                                
865 Hong Wu, ‘Principles of China's Anti-Takeover Legislation’ in Baoshu Wang (ed), Takeovers of 
Companies : Law and Practice (Social Sciences Academic Press (China) 2005) 265. 
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Drafts) 866 and Administrative Measures of the Listed Companies' Employee 
Shareholding Plan (Exposure Drafts867), which showed the improvement of the 
market - but these measures exclude takeover defensive functions. This could be a 
sign that China is trying to introduce advanced measures adopted from western 
countries but gradually, so as to give more time for the market to be adapted and for 
supportive regulations to be improved.  
  
                                                
866 Administrative Measures of Preferred Shares Experimental Units （Exposure Drafts）. Available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201/201403/t20140321_245908.htm, accessed 1 July 
2015. 
867 Administrative Measures of the Listed Companies' Employee Shareholding Plan (Exposure Drafts), 
available at https://www.google.co.uk/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#, 
accessed 1 July 2015. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This thesis, has adopted the perspective that every legislative choice is also a policy 
choice, with a discernable reason, and that such choices should be made for the better 
development of the market and the country. The thesis has mapped out a pathway to 
permit the better understanding of the issues. Thus it has discussed the characteristics 
of certain markets and their legal frameworks to find out the reasons why certain 
takeover regulatory systems fit specific markets, introduced the features and usage of 
each type of takeover defensive measures, determined in which kind of legislative 
framework and which kind of market each tactic will work, assessed the suitability of 
each defence in China; analysed the pros and cons of China’s takeover market and 
current development of the market, and predicted which takeover regulatory system is 
better for China now and how it may be in the future. 
This thesis introduced the background of the development of hostile takeovers from 
an historical point of view, and the legislative principles of regulating takeover 
defence strategies in two advanced markets: those of the UK and the US. It analysed 
important factors, including their legal frameworks, the development level of their 
markets, and other social factors, such as the characteristics of their shareholders and 
regulators’ political aims in relation to takeover activities in the market. Different 
takeover defence regulatory systems reflect different attitudes to takeover activities, 
and different political choices. Thus, a market preferring more frequent takeover 
activities should adopt a UK-style shareholder-friendly regulatory system, whilst the 
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market emphasising the directors’ competence to choose may more naturally gravitate 
towards a US-style director-friendly regulatory system.  
Most advanced legal systems are informed partly by other states due to global 
development and global communication. According to research, commercial laws are 
easily transplanted across different countries.868 At the same time, according to 
Kahn-Freund, no comparative study of the laws of different countries could ignore the 
context of these laws, and the “context” could be these countries’ different political 
and social backgrounds.869 Thus, when transplanting certain rules to another legal 
system, rule-makers should always consider the context of each country and assess 
cultural and political differences. This thesis discusses the cultural and political 
differences between China and the UK and US, before explaining why China opted to 
transplant a UK-, rather than US-style takeover defensive regulatory system. However, 
legislators made some changes to the UK system to fit China’s young market. 
However, China’s regulatory system is still improving to facilitate a better market, 
and it seems that it is becoming a mixed system with features from both the UK and 
US systems.  
Meanwhile, there is much evidence that takeover defences are widely used in the US 
when they go public. 870  For example, the social network company Facebook 
                                                
868 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 The Modern Law 
Review 1, 13. 
869 Ibid 13. 
870 Laura Casares Field and Jonathan M Karpoff, ‘Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms’ (2002) LVII The 
Journal of Finance 1857. 
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deployed Dual Class Shares when it listed on the market, similar to other companies, 
like Google, the New York Times, and Ford.871 Even some Chinese companies that 
are listed in the US, such as Sohu872 and Alibaba,873 incorporated some takeover 
defence measures in their articles. It is understandable that, at the time when the 
markets may collapse, many listed companies would be devalued and attract hostile 
takeovers, especially in IT and media area, as IT companies may have developed very 
important technologies and media companies can have a great influence on society. 
Once these companies are devalued because of the declining market, target companies’ 
shareholders struggle to protect their interests. Thus, takeover defensive measures 
would be extremely helpful, now and in the future. 
However, as this thesis has explained, certain tactics and certain regulatory responses 
are apt to develop at certain times. That is to say, with different social backgrounds in 
different markets, there will be certain corresponding rules drawn up so as to 
accommodate this. For example, the US developed its market very early and there 
were more household investors at first, and other shareholders that did not have a 
large percentage of shares and did not trust majority shareholders to make vital 
                                                
871 Matt Orsagh, CFA and CIPM, ‘Dual-Class Shares: From Google to Alibaba, Is It a Troubling 
Trend for Investors?’ CFA Institute, (1 April 2014).  
<http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/04/01/dual-class-shares-from-google-to-alibaba-is-it
-a-troubling-trend-for-investors/> accessed 12 August 2014. 
872 This is mentioned in Chapter 5. 
873 Matt Orsagh, CFA and CIPM, ‘Dual-Class Shares: From Google to Alibaba, Is It a Troubling 
Trend for Investors?’ CFA Institute, (1 April 2014).  
<http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/04/01/dual-class-shares-from-google-to-alibaba-is-it
-a-troubling-trend-for-investors/> accessed 12 August 2014. 
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decisions for the company. Hence the US chose a director-friendly takeover 
regulatory system to solve this problem. In the UK, there were more institutional 
investors in the market before the UK had systematic takeover regulation; rule-makers 
considered this factor while regulating takeover activities and chose a 
shareholder-friendly system to make this regulation fit the market better. In practise, 
this system has worked well in this market. So too, certain social factors and market 
features were considered before China regulated its market. With the Yigu Duda 
problem in China’s market, if there were a director-friendly system, it is hardly 
possible the major shareholder would like this system to work.  
Each anti-takeover defence measure needs a certain premise to work, such as a 
dispersed shareholding structure or sound supportive supervisory regulations. Without 
the correct premise, the defensive tactic may not work as well as intended. For 
example, for the poison pill to be widely used in China, China would require sounder 
supervisory support and relevant accounting regulations.  
That is not to say defence measures are universally praised. On the contrary, scholars 
criticise the fact that takeover defence measures may have a negative effect on the 
share price of a target company, and much research has shown that the price of a 
target’s shares does reduce once the defensive action becomes known to the public, 
especially if the target is without a white knight. Thus, it could be very risky for 
China to legalise certain takeover defensive measure in its market. However, research 
has also shown that the public are accepting of the fact that a combination between 
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target and bidder could increase shareholders’ wealth and has the potential to increase 
share prices, and that resistance can signal the fact that the target does not have a 
white knight. Thus, the performance of the target’s share price at the moment of 
releasing takeover-related information can only be seen as a reflection of getting the 
information and cannot be used to judge the performance of a takeover defence tactic 
itself. 
How China will balance the interests between shareholders and directors, and which 
system China should go with seems to be a difficult issue. However, 30 years ago, 
when the US and the UK were at the starting point of developing their regulatory 
systems, they were also faced with a period of heated discussion between scholars and 
legislators about who should be given the right to accept a takeover offer. And at that 
time, the rise in the number of takeover bids pushed the development of their 
legislative systems. As the market in China has developed much later than that of the 
western countries, China’s market is only now experiencing a similar time as that 
which the developed countries once went through. There is one important difference, 
however: the legislative experiences from those western countries may be used as 
reference by China, which may help it avoid detours and reduce the number of 
mistakes made in the legislative process.  
Thus, Chinese legislators should take reference from the successful western 
regulatory systems but in accordance with the national conditions in China. Certain 
changes should be made due to the development gap between China’s market and the 
 
306 
western markets. That said, this thesis has not focused on the economic development 
of the market; it has only focused on the legislative support for the development of the 
market. Accordingly, it cannot be said what the future market will look like, or what 
will be changed. Regardless, the market should become more open and free in China 
in the coming decades, because that is the trend of the development of a society or a 
market operating in a global context. The legislative system in China must not be too 
anachronistic or conservative. Indeed, the western style legislative systems were 
developed in a free market, so introducing some of the more advanced regulations to 
China could be a shortcut for China to improve the legislation level rapidly.  
This thesis has concluded that the UK-style, takeover-friendly regulatory system is a 
better choice for China. Consequently, Chinese regulators should consider how to 
make this system fit China’s market and make it work well. That is to say, they 
should consider, amongst other matters how to advance takeover-related competition 
issues, supportive supervision legislation, and minority shareholders’ protection and 
so on. In addition, if China wishes to introduce specific takeover defensive tactics into 
its market, it must to research the necessary preconditions in order to predict whether 
this tactic will work in China and establish what drawbacks the use of this tactic 
might cause.  
The “yigu duda” problem still exists in China’s market, and this will influence 
takeover activities dramatically. As long as the state is the only major shareholder, 
whether the listed company is a bidder or a target, these takeover activities could be 
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seen as being conducted and controlled by the government. Moreover, even if China 
chose the US-style, director-friendly regulatory system, that they cannot get rid of the 
government’s control because the shareholder(s) nominate directors: if directors 
violated the state’s will, they would likely lose their positions. Hence, this problem 
should be solved in China for the future; it is encouraging that China is already 
working on it now, as discussed in previous chapters. Thus, it is possible, or even 
probable, that China will have a freer market in the coming years and that the western 
market’s successful regulation experience may be better learnt and used in China 
going forward. 
To conclude, throughout the discussions presented in this thesis, specific points of 
view have been argued; these are summarised below: 
(1) The choice of a legislative system is a political decision, so before legislators 
create regulations, they should consider the market’s features and its 
development direction in order to make it work well. 
(2) Compared with the director-friendly regulatory system of the US, the 
shareholder-friendly regulatory system of the UK will better-fit China’s 
market as the UK and China share a similarly positive view of takeover 
activities in that takeover activities are seen to help improve the corporate 
governance of listed companies and the wider market. Moreover, a system like 
that of the UK should protect well the interests of Chinese shareholders, as it 
limits the risk of directors’ abuse of power. 
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(3) A highly concentrated shareholding structure still exists in China but this is 
not too serious and, with the continuous reform in China’s market, China’s 
market should become more open and modern. 
(4) China’s SOEs will play an important role in its market for a long time; it 
seems impossible that they will all be privatised, and in any case, that would 
be unnecessary.  
(5) The existence of SOEs is not the reason why all takeover defensive tactics 
were unavailable in China. On the contrary, if China can successfully finish 
reform of the SOEs, they could become good market players with sufficient 
capital back up - and the state should not control all business decisions. 
(6) The newly released preferred stock regulation makes the poison pill defence 
useable in China and means China’s regulation is something of a mix between 
the styles of both the UK and US. Supportive supervisory legislation, such as 
improved regulations about director’s duties in using these tactics and 
protections of minority shareholders, needs to be improved to prevent the 
abuse of poison pills. 
(7) Moderate defensive tactics like the white knight, or the three kinds of 
parachutes could be safely used in China, but high-risk measures like scorched 
earth or greenmail payments are not encouraged. Legalising these defensive 
measures should consider the best interests of the listed companies, and 
defending a hostile takeover should be in keeping with the principle of 
protecting shareholders’ interests and development of the market. 
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Also, it could be believed that China’s market could be more attractive to the 
investors, and if takeover defensive tactics could be better deployed it will help to 
maximise shareholders’ interest and promote the development of China’s market.  
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